The Effects of Audit Firms' Knowledge Sharing on Audit Quality and Efficiency

2019 ◽  
Vol 39 (2) ◽  
pp. 51-79 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rong-Ruey Duh ◽  
W. Robert Knechel ◽  
Ching-Chieh Lin

SUMMARY This paper examines the effect of knowledge sharing in audit firms on audit quality and efficiency. We analyze data from a survey of audit professionals from 22 audit firms in Taiwan matched to publicly available data on individual audits conducted by those firms. The results indicate that knowledge sharing within an audit firm is positively associated with audit quality as manifested in lower absolute discretionary accruals and the issuance of more unfavorable audit opinions. We also find that knowledge sharing within audit firms is associated with higher audit efficiency as represented by shorter audit lags. More importantly, we find that both higher audit quality and audit efficiency are simultaneously associated with higher levels of knowledge sharing, suggesting that effective knowledge sharing may help to improve both audit quality and audit efficiency. Given the regulatory changes to enhance both audit quality and audit timeliness, these findings have implications for audit firms. Data Availability: Data used in this study are available from public sources. Survey data are available upon request.

2014 ◽  
Vol 33 (4) ◽  
pp. 167-196 ◽  
Author(s):  
Soo Young Kwon ◽  
Youngdeok Lim ◽  
Roger Simnett

SUMMARY: Using a unique setting in which mandatory audit firm rotation was required from 2006–2010, and in which both audit fees and audit hours were disclosed (South Korea), this study provides empirical evidence of the economic impact of this policy initiative on audit quality, and the associated implications for audit fees. This study compares both pre- and post-policy implementation and, after the implementation of the policy, mandatory long-tenure versus voluntary short-tenure rotation situations. Where audit firms were mandatorily rotated post-policy, we observe that audit quality (measured as abnormal discretionary accruals) did not significantly change compared with pre-2006 long-tenure audit situations and voluntary post-rotation situations. Audit fees in the post-regulation period for mandatorily rotated engagements are significantly larger than in the pre-regulation period, but are discounted compared to audit fees for post-regulation continuing engagements. We also find that the observed increase in audit fees and audit hours in the post-regulation period extends beyond situations where the audit firm was mandatorily rotated, suggesting that the introduction of mandatory audit firm rotation had a much broader impact than the specific instances of mandatory rotation. Data Availability: Most of the financial data used in the present study are available from the KIS Value Database. The data for audit hours and fees were drawn from statements of operating results filed with the Financial Supervisory Services (FSS) in Korea.


2017 ◽  
Vol 37 (3) ◽  
pp. 211-242 ◽  
Author(s):  
Scott E. Seavey ◽  
Michael J Imhof ◽  
Tiffany J. Westfall

SUMMARY Prior audit research suggests that most, if not all, audit quality can be explained at the office level. However, the question remains of whether office-level audit quality is contingent on how individual offices relate to the firm as a whole. Motivated by theories of knowledge management, organizational learning, and networks, we posit that individual offices are connected to their audit network through partner knowledge sharing and oversight, which impact office-level audit quality. We interview Big 4 audit partners and learn that knowledge sharing between partners in different offices is common and intended to aid in the provision of audit services. Using network connectedness to proxy for knowledge sharing and oversight between offices of the same firm, we document that more connected offices are associated with fewer client restatements and lower discretionary accruals. We additionally find that network effects are magnified when accounting treatments are more complex and require greater auditor judgement.


2015 ◽  
Vol 91 (3) ◽  
pp. 767-792 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth L. Bills ◽  
Lauren M. Cunningham ◽  
Linda A. Myers

ABSTRACT In this study, we examine the benefits of membership in an accounting firm association, network, or alliance (collectively referred to as “an association”). Associations provide member accounting firms with numerous benefits, including access to the expertise of professionals from other independent member firms, joint conferences and technical trainings, assistance in dealing with staffing and geographic limitations, and the ability to use the association name in marketing materials. We expect these benefits to result in higher-quality audits and higher audit fees (or audit fee premiums). Using hand-collected data on association membership, we find that association member firms conduct higher-quality audits than nonmember firms, where audit quality is proxied for by fewer Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) inspection deficiencies and fewer financial statement misstatements, as well as less extreme absolute discretionary accruals and lower positive discretionary accruals. We also find that audit fees are higher for clients of member firms than for clients of nonmember firms, suggesting that clients are willing to pay an audit fee premium to engage association member audit firms. Finally, we find that member firm audits are of similar quality to a size-matched sample of Big 4 audits, but member firm clients pay lower fee premiums than do Big 4 clients. Our inferences are robust to the use of company size-matched control samples, audit firm size-matched control samples, propensity score matching, two-stage least squares regression, and to analyses that consider changes in association membership. Our findings should be of interest to regulators because they suggest that association membership assists small audit firms in overcoming barriers to auditing larger audit clients. In addition, our findings should be informative to audit committees when making auditor selection decisions, and to investors and accounting researchers interested in the relation between audit firm type and audit quality.


2019 ◽  
Vol 34 (6) ◽  
pp. 722-748
Author(s):  
Murat Ocak ◽  
Gökberk Can

Purpose Recent studies regarding auditor experience generally focus on auditor overall experience in accounting, auditing, finance and related fields (Hardies et al., 2014), auditor sector and domain experience (Bedard and Biggs, 1991; Hammersley, 2006), auditor experience as CPA (Ye et al., 2014; Sonu et al., 2016) or big N experience (Chi and Huang, 2005; Gul et al., 2013; Zimmerman, 2016) or auditors’ international working experience (Chen et al., 2017). But there is little attention paid to where auditors obtained their experience from? And how do auditors with government experience affect audit quality (AQ)? This paper aims to present the effect of auditors with government experience on AQ. Design/methodology/approach The authors used Turkish publicly traded firms in Borsa Istanbul between the year 2008 and 2015 to test the hypothesis. The sample comprises 1,067 observations and eight years. Two main proxies of government experience are used in this paper. The first proxy is auditor’s government experience in the past. The second proxy is the continuous variable which is “the logarithmic value of the number of years of government experience”. Further, auditor overall experience in auditing, accounting, finance and other related fields are also used as a control variable. Audit reporting aggressiveness, audit reporting lag and discretionary accruals are used as proxies of AQ. Besides this, the authors adopted the model to estimate the probability of selecting a government-experienced auditor, and they presented the regression results with the addition of inverse Mills ratio. Findings The main findings are consistent with conjecture. Government-experienced auditors do not enhance AQ. They are aggressive, and they complete audit work slowly and they cannot detect discretionary accruals effectively. Spending more time in a government agency makes them more aggressive and slow, and they do not detect earnings management practices. The Heckman estimation results regarding the variable of interest are also consistent with the main estimation results. In addition, the authors found in predicting government-experienced auditor choice that family firms, domestic firms and firms that reported losses (larger firms, older firms) are more (less) likely to choose government-experienced auditors. Research limitations/implications This study has some limitations. The authors used a small sample to test the impact of government-experienced auditors on AQ because of data access problems. Much data used in this study were collected manually. Earnings quality was calculated using only discretionary accruals. Real activities manipulation was not used as the proxy of AQ in this paper. The findings from emerging markets might not generalize to the developed countries because the Turkish audit market is developing compared to Continental Europe or USA. Practical implications The findings are considered for independent audit firms. Audit firms may employ new graduates and train them to offer more qualified audit work for their clients. The results do not mean that government-experienced auditors should not work in an audit firm, or that they should not establish an audit firm. It is clear that government-experienced auditors provide low AQ in terms of audit reporting aggressiveness, audit report lag and discretionary accruals. But as they operate more in the independent audit sector, they will become successful and provide qualified audit work. One other thing we can say is that it is perhaps better for government-experienced auditors to work in the tax department of independent audit firms. Originality/value This paper tries to fill the gap in the literature regarding the effect of auditor experience on AQ and concentrates on a different type of experience: Auditors with government experience.


2008 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 553-572 ◽  
Author(s):  
David L. Manry ◽  
Theodore J. Mock ◽  
Jerry L. Turner

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 requires the lead audit or coordinating partner and the reviewing partner to rotate off the audit every five years so the engagement can be viewed “with fresh and skeptical eyes.” Using data obtained from actual audits by multiple U.S. offices of three large international audit firms, we examine whether there is a relationship between evidence of reduced audit quality, measured by estimated discretionary accruals, and audit partner tenure with a specific client. We find that estimated discretionary accruals are significantly and negatively associated with the lead audit partner's tenure with a specific client. Thus, audit quality appears to increase with increased partner tenure. After controlling for client size and engagement risk, we find audit partner tenure significantly and negatively associated with estimated discretionary accruals only for small clients with partner tenure of greater than seven years, regardless of risk level. We also find that tenure is not significantly associated with estimated discretionary accruals for large clients. This suggests that as partner tenure increases, auditors of small client firms become less willing to accept more aggressive financial statement assertions by managers, and that partner tenure does not affect audit quality for large clients or for shorter-tenure smaller clients. Our results relating to audit partner tenure are consistent with the conclusions about audit firm tenure by Geiger and Raghunandan (2002); Johnson, Khurana, and Reynolds (2002);Myers, Myers, and Omer (2003); and Nagy (2005) and extend their findings by focusing on individual audit partners rather than on audit firms.


2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ibrahim Emair Albawwat

Purpose Drawing on the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) audit quality framework and related knowledge management literature, this study aims to examine the influence of tacit knowledge sharing on audit quality inputs within small audit firms’ realm. It also investigated auditors’ social capital antecedent effect via tacit knowledge sharing on audit quality inputs. Design/methodology/approach An integrated model was developed to depict the study constructs’ relationships. The model was then tested using the partial least squares structural equation modelling based on data collected from auditors belonging to small audit firms in Jordan. Findings The results indicate that tacit knowledge sharing influences positively the auditors’ values, ethics, attitudes, experiences, skills and knowledge (i.e. audit quality inputs). This finding implies that active tacit knowledge sharing within a small audit firm is a strong driver for audit quality through improving its inputs. The results also demonstrate that structural, relational and cognitive social capital indirectly affect audit quality inputs through tacit knowledge sharing. Accordingly, social capital can be viewed as an audit firm resource that can smooth auditors’ tacit knowledge-sharing progress. Originality/value The IAASB encourages audit firms to explore ways to boost audit quality. This study offers empirical evidence on the influence of tacit knowledge sharing on audit quality inputs as a way to boost audit quality. It also offers insights into the value of social capital dimensions and indicates the driving forces to make auditors willing to engage in tacit knowledge sharing and, as a result, improve audit quality inputs.


2017 ◽  
Vol 37 (4) ◽  
pp. 95-115
Author(s):  
Neil L. Fargher ◽  
Alicia Jiang ◽  
Yangxin Yu

SUMMARY Following the introduction of SOX in 2002 and the introduction of PCAOB inspections starting from 2003, DeFond and Lennox (2011) found that a large number of small auditors exited the SEC client audit market during the 2002–2004 period and that these exiting auditors were of lower quality relative to non-exiting auditors. This paper seeks to verify whether SOX and the introduction of PCAOB inspections improved audit quality through incentivizing small auditors providing lower audit quality to exit the market. Using client discretionary accruals and the likelihood of the clients restating financial statements as proxies for audit quality, we do not find that the small auditors that exited the market for SEC client audits were of lower quality than successor small audit firms that did not exit the market. JEL Classifications: G18; L51. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.


2014 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 108-119 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chen-Chin Wang ◽  
Fan-Hua Kung ◽  
Kai-Hsun Lin

This study investigated whether the Big N audit firms in emerging markets can provide audits of high quality and mitigate information risk, by comparing the audit quality of Big N audit firms in Taiwan with those in China. The two countries share a similar cultural background and engage in frequent economic exchange; however, they have different legal systems and institutional environments. This study followed previous research in the use of bid-ask spread and discretionary accruals as proxy variables for information asymmetry and audit quality. Our results indicate that politico-economic differences between Taiwan and China influence the effectiveness of independent auditors when it comes to the mitigation of information asymmetry. Big N audit firms in Taiwan helped to mitigate information asymmetry and provided audit services of higher quality, whereas Big N firms in China were better able to constrain earnings management. Our results indicate that market concentration and market share have a stronger influence on reputation incentive and audit quality than does the size of an audit firm.


2012 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 193-214 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rogier Deumes ◽  
Caren Schelleman ◽  
Heidi Vander Bauwhede ◽  
Ann Vanstraelen

SUMMARY As a result of legal and regulatory requirements, audit firms in certain jurisdictions have recently started issuing transparency reports containing information on audit firm governance. In this study we investigate whether audit firm governance disclosure is associated with actual audit quality. Based on a sample of transparency reports of 103 audit firms in a number of EU countries, we find that there is variation in the extent and type of governance disclosures across audit firms. We, however, do not find an association with actual audit quality, apart from a weak association with an audit firm's statement on the effectiveness of its internal quality control system. Data Availability: All data are available from public sources indicated in the study.


2013 ◽  
Vol 88 (6) ◽  
pp. 1993-2023 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ferdinand A. Gul ◽  
Donghui Wu ◽  
Zhifeng Yang

ABSTRACT: We examine whether and how individual auditors affect audit outcomes using a large set of archival Chinese data. We analyze approximately 800 individual auditors and find that they exhibit significant variation in audit quality. The effects that individual auditors have on audit quality are both economically and statistically significant, and are pronounced in both large and small audit firms. We also find that the individual auditor effects on audit quality can be partially explained by auditor characteristics, such as educational background, Big N audit firm experience, rank in the audit firm, and political affiliation. Our findings highlight the importance of scrutinizing and understanding audit quality at the individual auditor level. Data Availability: Data used in this study are publicly available from the sources described herein.


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