Audit Fees after Remediation of Internal Control Weaknesses

2011 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-105 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vishal Munsif ◽  
K. Raghunandan ◽  
Dasaratha V. Rama ◽  
Meghna Singhvi
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Internal Controls ◽  
Future Research ◽  
First Year ◽  
Section 404 ◽  
The Third ◽  
Material Weaknesses ◽  
Audit Fee

SYNOPSIS: In this study, we examine audit fees for SEC registrants that remediate previously disclosed material weaknesses in internal control. We find that remediating firms have lower audit fees when compared to firms that continue to report material weaknesses in internal control. However, the remediating firms continue to pay, in the year of remediation as well as one and two years subsequent to remediation, a significant audit fee premium compared to firms that have clean Section 404 reports in each of the first four years. Firms that had an adverse Section 404 report only in the first year, but remediated the problems in year two and had clean Section 404 reports in years three and four, pay an audit fee premium of 32 (21) percent in the third (fourth) year when compared to firms that had clean Section 404 reports in each of the first four years. The results, thus, suggest that audit fees are “sticky” for firms that have material weaknesses in internal controls over financial reporting, and suggest some interesting questions for future research.

SOX Section 404 Material Weakness Disclosures and Audit Fees

2006 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 99-114 ◽  
Author(s):  
K. Raghunandan ◽  
Dasaratha V. Rama
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Internal Controls ◽  
Fiscal Year ◽  
Section 404 ◽  
Control Material ◽  
Material Weakness ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
The Mean

Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Auditing Standard No. 2 (PCAOB 2004) require management and the auditor to report on internal controls over financial reporting. Section 404 is arguably the most controversial element of SOX, and much of the debate around the costs of implementing section 404 has focused on auditors' fees (Ernst & Young 2005). In this paper, we examine the association between audit fees and internal control disclosures made pursuant to section 404. Our sample includes 660 manufacturing firms that have a December 31, 2004 fiscal year-end and filed the section 404 report by May 15, 2005. We find that the mean (median) audit fees for the firms in our sample for fiscal 2004 is 86 (128) percent higher than the corresponding fees for fiscal 2003. Audit fees for fiscal 2004 are 43 percent higher for clients with a material weakness disclosure compared to clients without such disclosure; however, audit fees for fiscal 2003 are not associated with an internal control material weakness disclosure (in the 10-K filed following fiscal 2004). We also find that the association between audit fees and the presence of a material weakness disclosure does not vary depending on the type of material weakness (systemic or non-systemic).

SOX 404 Reported Internal Control Weaknesses: A Test of COSO Framework Components and Information Technology

2009 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-23 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bonnie K. Klamm ◽  
Marcia Weidenmier Watson
Keyword(s):  
Information Technology ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Negative Impact ◽  
Internal Controls ◽  
First Year ◽  
Section 404 ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Material Weaknesses ◽  
Assessment And Monitoring ◽  
Internal Control Weaknesses

ABSTRACT: This paper examines internal controls, from both an information technology (IT) and non-IT perspective, in relation to the five components of the Committee of Sponsoring Organization's Internal Control-Integrated Framework (COSO 1992), as well as the achievement of one of COSO's three objectives-reporting reliability. Our sample consists of 490 firms with material weaknesses reported under Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404 during the first year of compliance. We classify the weaknesses by COSO component and as IT-related or non-IT-related. Our results support the interrelationships of the COSO Framework. The results also show that the number of misstated accounts is positively related to the number of weak COSO components (i.e., scope) and certain weak COSO components (i.e., existence). Firms with IT-related weak components report more material weaknesses and misstatements than firms without IT-related weak components, providing evidence on the pervasive negative impact of weak IT controls, especially in control environment, risk assessment, and monitoring.

Unexpected Fees and the Prediction of Material Weaknesses in Internal Control Over Financial Reporting

2016 ◽  
Vol 33 (4) ◽  
pp. 485-505 ◽  
Author(s):  
Susan M. Albring ◽  
Randal J. Elder ◽  
Xiaolu Xu
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Financial Statement ◽  
Section 404 ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Material Weaknesses ◽  
New Material ◽  
Internal Control Weaknesses ◽  
Section 302

We investigate whether prior year unexpected audit fees help predict new material weaknesses in internal control over financial reporting reported under Section 404 of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX). Predicting material weaknesses may be useful to investors and other financial statement users because these disclosures have adverse economic impacts on disclosing firms. Unexpected fees are significantly associated with material weaknesses reported under Section 404, even after controlling for Section 302 disclosures and other factors associated with internal control weaknesses. Unexpected fees are associated with company-level weaknesses but are not significantly associated with account-specific weaknesses, consistent with differences in the nature and severity of the two types of material weaknesses. Our results are consistent with unexpected audit fees containing information on unobserved audit costs and client control risks, which help predict future internal control weaknesses.

The Effect of Auditing Standard No. 5 on Audit Fees

2011 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 1-27 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jagan Krishnan ◽  
Jayanthi Krishnan ◽  
Hakjoon Song
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Cost Savings ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Audit Efficiency ◽  
Material Weaknesses ◽  
Audit Fee ◽  
The Impact ◽  
First Time ◽  
General Reduction

SUMMARY In June 2007, the PCAOB issued Auditing Standard No. 5 (AS5), superseding Auditing Standard No. 2 (AS2). AS5 significantly changed the rules relating to audits of internal control over financial reporting (ICFR). Policymakers expected AS5 to lead to improvements in audit efficiency and thus a general reduction in audit costs, and specifically a reduction in fees for smaller and less complex companies that were disproportionately affected by AS2. We investigate the impact of the change from AS2 to AS5 on audit fees. We restrict our analysis to stable client-auditor combinations to ensure that auditors had prior AS2 experience with the client before the transition to AS5. We find that, after controlling for other factors, audit fees were lower in the first two years of implementation of AS5 relative to the last year of AS2. The decrease in fees was the highest for companies that had remediated material weaknesses in their internal control and thus moved from an adverse opinion under AS2 to a clean opinion under AS5. Further, firms that received first-time adverse opinions on their internal control in the AS5 period paid lower fee premiums (relative to firms with clean opinions) than did firms with adverse reports in the last AS2 year. Finally, in contrast to policymakers' expectations that AS5 would generate cost savings by allowing the ICFR audits to be “scaled” for small and less complex firms, there is no evidence that the smallest firms benefited. Specifically, audit fee savings were found only for relatively more complex firms (measured by multiple segments and international operations).

The Severity of Internal Controls over Financial Reporting Deficiencies: Differences among Types and Industries

2014 ◽  
pp. 55-77
Author(s):  
Tatiana Mazza ◽  
Stefano Azzali
Keyword(s):  
Information Technology ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Service Industry ◽  
Listed Companies ◽  
Internal Controls ◽  
Service Companies ◽  
Finance Industry ◽  
Material Weaknesses ◽  
Fixed Assets

This study analyzes the severity of Internal Control over Financial Reporting deficiencies (Deficiencies, Significant Deficiencies and Material Weaknesses) in a sample of Italian listed companies, in the period 2007- 2012. Using proprietary data the severity of the deficiencies is tested for account-specific, entity level and information technology controls and for industries (manufacturing and services vs finance industries). The results on ICD severity is compared with one of the most frequent ICD (Acc_Period End/Accounting Policies): for account-specific, ICD in revenues, purchase, fixed assets and intangible, loans and insurance are more severe while ICD in Inventory are less severe. Differences in ICD severity have been found in the characteristic account: ICD in loan and insurance for finance industry and ICD in revenue, purchase for manufacturing and service industry are more severe. Finally, we found that ICD in entity level and information technology controls are less severe than account specific ICD in all industries. However, the results on entity level and information technology deficiencies could also mean that the importance of these types of control are under-evaluated by the manufacturing and service companies.

Auditor Attestation under SOX Section 404 and Earnings Informativeness

2012 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-84 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lucy Huajing Chen ◽  
Jayanthi Krishnan ◽  
Heibatollah Sami ◽  
Haiyan Zhou
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Control Sample ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Test Sample ◽  
Section 404 ◽  
Earnings Informativeness ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Audit Reports ◽  
Section 302

SUMMARY Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires managers to assess, and their auditors to express an opinion on, the effectiveness of internal controls over financial reporting (ICFR). Policymakers expect the ICFR audits to enhance the credibility of firms' financial statements. Prior research argues that audit characteristics that enhance the credibility of financial reporting are associated with stronger earnings-return associations. We examine whether earnings accompanied by the first-time Section 404 ICFR reports were associated with higher informativeness compared with earnings in the prior year when only financial statement audit reports were available. We conduct our analysis for a test sample of accelerated filers with clean ICFR reports and clean previous Section 302 disclosures. Using a difference-in-differences approach, we compare the change in earnings informativeness for the test sample with that for a control sample of non-accelerated filers. We find that earnings informativeness for companies with clean internal control reports was greater in the Section 404 adoption year than in the previous year, while there was no change in earnings informativeness for the non-accelerated filers. Also, there is no difference in the increase in earnings informativeness across firms with small and large compliance costs (measured by change in audit fees), suggesting that both groups benefited from the Section 404 ICFR audits.

scholarly journals Does Control Self-Assessment Influence Financial Reporting Quality?

2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 70-76
Author(s):  
Hiroshi Uemura
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Negative Relationship ◽  
Reporting Quality ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Internal Controls ◽  
Financial Reporting Quality ◽  
Control Environment ◽  
Self Assessment ◽  
Positive Effects

The aim of this study is to examine the effect of control self-assessment (CSA) on financial reporting quality by using CSA as a proxy of monitoring quality. CSA has an important feature that allows the employees themselves to become involved in the assessment of internal controls’ effectiveness. Moreover, CSA has two important monitoring functions. First, it can add value to internal auditing. Second, because all employees of operational units participate in the assessment of internal controls in CSA, that control environment is expected to be mature. The investigation of this study used data from 3,517 Japanese firms listed on the First Section, Second Section, Mothers, and JASDAQ of the Tokyo Stock Exchange. The result of 2SLS regression shows that CSA adoption has a negative relationship with the number of financial restatements and audit fees, and therefore, I conclude that CSA has positive consequences for financial reporting quality. This result indicates that the internal monitoring mechanism that continuously monitors internal control over financial reporting (ICFR) effectiveness and in which all employees participate has some positive effects on financial reporting quality. There are two reasons for this result. First, employees have easier access to negative information concerning ICFR effectiveness than outsiders and can share that information with the internal personnel in charge of monitoring (e.g., internal auditors). Moreover, CSA is expected raise an entity’s awareness of ICFR, that is, the control environment of ICFR components is made into an environment that prevents and detects impropriety in the accounting process. Keywords: Control

scholarly journals Material Weaknesses in Tax-Related Internal Controls and Last Chance Earnings Management

2017 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-44 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cristi A. Gleason ◽  
Morton Pincus ◽  
Sonja Olhoft Rego
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Internal Controls ◽  
Early Years ◽  
Control Material ◽  
Material Weaknesses ◽  
Implementation Period ◽  
Tax Expense

ABSTRACT We investigate the consequences of tax-related internal control material weaknesses (ICMWs) for financial reporting. We hypothesize that the presence of ineffective controls over the tax function makes earnings management through the income tax accrual (both income increasing and income decreasing) easier to implement relative to firms with effective controls. We also predict that the remediation of tax-related ICMWs has the effect of constraining earnings management through the tax accrual. The results provide support for our predictions. We also find that last chance earnings management via tax-related ICMWs is concentrated in the early years of our sample, during the initial SOX implementation period. Our results suggest that tax-related ICMWs were initially associated with greater tax-expense management but that SOX internal control assessments subsequently improved the quality of financial reporting by reducing opportunities for tax-expense management.

Are Material Weaknesses in Internal Controls Associated with Poor M&A Decisions? Evidence from Goodwill Impairment

2017 ◽  
Vol 37 (4) ◽  
pp. 49-74 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dennis H. Caplan ◽  
Saurav K. Dutta ◽  
Alfred Zhu Liu
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Internal Controls ◽  
Managerial Performance ◽  
Goodwill Impairment ◽  
Material Weaknesses

SUMMARY This paper examines the effect of the quality of a firm's internal control over financial reporting (ICFR) on the quality of corporate M&A decisions. We use material weaknesses in internal control (ICMWs) from SOX 404 audits as a proxy for the quality of a firm's ICFR and use future goodwill impairment to proxy for the quality of managers' M&A decisions. We find that goodwill recognized from acquisitions in years concurrent with ICMWs has a greater rate of impairment in subsequent years than goodwill recognized from acquisitions in years without ICMWs, thereby establishing a link between ICMW and goodwill impairment. We further show that disclosure and remediation of ICMWs appear to improve valuations of subsequent acquisitions. Our study contributes to the literature on internal controls by documenting unanticipated benefits of SOX 404 audits on managerial performance, and to the goodwill literature by identifying ICMWs as a determinant of goodwill impairment.

Control Self-Assessment and Costs of Compliance with Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404

2019 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 5-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lawrence J. Abbott ◽  
Susan Parker ◽  
Gary F. Peters ◽  
Theresa J. Presley
Keyword(s):  
Control Systems ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Negative Association ◽  
Management Control ◽  
Section 404 ◽  
Self Assessment ◽  
Internal Auditor ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley

ABSTRACT Control self-assessment (CSA) represents the practice of making operational-level managers responsible for internal control monitoring. We investigate the association between the use of CSA and certain costs incurred in maintaining internal control systems and complying with regulatory requirements. We find a negative association between CSA and external audit fees paid for the audit of internal control over financial reporting. Moreover, we find an incremental fee reduction resulting from the interaction between CSA and Section 404 assistance provided to the external auditor by the internal auditor. Additionally, we find a negative association between the use of CSA and some costs of the internal audit's own evaluation of operational and financial controls for managerial purposes. In sum, our study suggests that CSA can lessen at least some internal control costs while reducing control risk as proxied by external costs of internal control compliance. We discuss implications for broader management control systems.

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