CEO Sports Hobby and Firms' Tax Aggressiveness

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shuqing Luo ◽  
Terry Shevlin ◽  
Lirong Shi ◽  
Aimee Shih
Keyword(s):  
Risk Taking ◽  
Financial Incentives ◽  
Tax Planning ◽  
The Self ◽  
Psychology Research ◽  
Corporate Tax ◽  
Tax Aggressiveness ◽  
Self Selection ◽  
Alternative Measures ◽  
Selection Of

Recent accounting research suggests that individual executives play a significant role in shaping a firm's tax planning. Building on psychology research that finds sports interests reflect an individual's risk-taking preferences, we develop a novel measure of innate and non-pecuniary CEO risk attitudes based on the riskiness of CEOs' sports hobbies and examine whether the measure is associated with corporate tax aggressiveness. We find that firms managed by CEOs with riskier sports hobbies are more aggressive in their tax planning. This association is more pronounced for CEOs with greater financial incentives and greater power in making decisions. Our results are robust to using alternative measures of CEO sports risks, and after accounting for the self-selection of the disclosure of CEO sports hobbies.

Women on the board of directors and corporate tax aggressiveness in Australia

2016 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 313-331 ◽  
Author(s):  
Grant Richardson ◽  
Grantley Taylor ◽  
Roman Lanis
Keyword(s):  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Selection Bias ◽  
Tax Avoidance ◽  
Multivariate Regression Analysis ◽  
Corporate Tax ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Tax Aggressiveness ◽  
Self Selection ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
The Impact

Purpose This paper aims to investigate the impact of women on the board of directors on corporate tax avoidance in Australia. Design/methodology/approach The authors use multivariate regression analysis to test the association between the presence of female directors on the board and tax aggressiveness. They also test for self-selection bias in the regression model by using the two-stage Heckman procedure. Findings This paper finds that relative to there being one female board member, high (i.e. greater than one member) female presence on the board of directors reduces the likelihood of tax aggressiveness. The results are robust after controlling for self-selection bias and using several alternative measures of tax aggressiveness. Research limitations/implications This study extends the extant literature on corporate governance and tax aggressiveness. This study is subject to several caveats. First, the sample is restricted to publicly listed Australian firms. Second, this study only examines the issue of women on the board of directors and tax aggressiveness in the context of Australia. Practical implications This research is timely, as there has been increased pressure by government bodies in Australia and globally to develop policies to increase female representation on the board of directors. Originality/value This study is the first to provide empirical evidence concerning the association between the presence of women on the board of directors and tax aggressiveness.

A Statistical Review of the Evidence for the Existence of Temporary Selection

1959 ◽  
Vol 85 (2) ◽  
pp. 165-210 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hilary L. Seal
Keyword(s):  
The Self ◽  
Classical View ◽  
Statistical Review ◽  
Self Selection ◽  
Initial Selection ◽  
Selection Of

The theory of ‘temporary selection’ is concerned with the variation, for fixed x, of q[x–t]+t the observed rate of mortality at age x during the t+1th year after the issue of an assurance or annuity contract. The classical view is that—apart from chance variations—q[x–t]+t increases gradually with increasing t until the effects of selection have disappeared after which time q[xx–t]+t is a constant depending on x only.Various reasons have been suggested for the persistence of temporary selection in an observed series of values of q[xx–t]+t. The chief of these are:(1) The continuing effects of an initial selection on the part of the assurance company or by the annuitant (Morgan, 1834);(2) The gradual withdrawal from assurance of healthy lives (Higham, 1851); and(3) Secular improvements in medicals election or in the self-selection of annuitants (Karup, 1903).

scholarly journals Unintended Effects of Anonymous Résumés

2015 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 1-27 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luc Behaghel ◽  
Bruno Crépon ◽  
Thomas Le Barbanchon
Keyword(s):  
The Self ◽  
Experimental Program ◽  
Unintended Effects ◽  
Public Employment ◽  
Employment Service ◽  
Public Employment Service ◽  
Self Selection ◽  
To Receive ◽  
Selection Of

We evaluate an experimental program in which the French public employment service anonymized résumés for firms that were hiring. Firms were free to participate or not; participating firms were then randomly assigned to receive either anonymous résumés or name-bearing ones. We find that participating firms become less likely to interview and hire minority candidates when receiving anonymous résumés. We show how these unexpected results can be explained by the self-selection of firms into the program and by the fact that anonymization prevents the attenuation of negative signals when the candidate belongs to a minority. (JEL J15, J68, J71)

The Role of Auditors, Non-Auditors, and Internal Tax Departments in Corporate Tax Aggressiveness

2015 ◽  
Vol 91 (1) ◽  
pp. 179-205 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth J. Klassen ◽  
Petro Lisowsky ◽  
Devan Mescall
Keyword(s):  
Tax Compliance ◽  
Tax Planning ◽  
Internal Revenue Service ◽  
Corporate Tax ◽  
Tax Aggressiveness ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Confidential Data ◽  
Tax Preparer ◽  
Tax Returns

ABSTRACT Using confidential data from the Internal Revenue Service on who signs a corporation's tax return, we investigate whether the party primarily responsible for the tax compliance function of the firm—the auditor, an external non-auditor, or the internal tax department—is related to the corporation's tax aggressiveness. We report three key findings: (1) firms preparing their own tax returns or hiring a non-auditor claim more aggressive tax positions than firms using their auditor as the tax preparer; (2) auditor-provided tax services are related to tax aggressiveness even after considering tax preparer identity, which supports and extends prior research using tax fees as a proxy for tax planning; and (3) Big 4 tax preparers, in particular, are linked to less tax aggressiveness when they are the auditor than when they are not the auditor. Our findings help policymakers and researchers better understand an important feature of tax compliance intermediaries; particularly, how the dual role via audits is related to observable corporate tax outcomes.

The Self Selection of Complexity in Choice Experiments

2012 ◽  
Vol 94 (3) ◽  
pp. 786-800 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Burton ◽  
Dan Rigby
Keyword(s):  
Choice Experiments ◽  
The Self ◽  
Self Selection ◽  
Selection Of

Tax Amnesties and the Self-Selection of Risk-Averse Taxpayers

2004 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 319-341 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carla Marchese ◽  
Fabio Privileggi
Keyword(s):  
The Self ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Self Selection ◽  
Selection Of

scholarly journals Do the best go west? An analysis of the self-selection of employed East-West migrants in Germany

Empirica ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 34 (4) ◽  
pp. 371-395 ◽  
Author(s):  
Herbert Brücker ◽  
Parvati Trübswetter
Keyword(s):  
The Self ◽  
Self Selection ◽  
East West ◽  
Selection Of
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