Characteristics and Implications of Long-Term Earnings Guidance

2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-54
Author(s):  
Andrew C. Call ◽  
Adam M. Esplin ◽  
Bin Miao
Keyword(s):  
Voluntary Disclosure ◽  
Earnings Forecasts ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Real Earnings Management ◽  
Limited Attention ◽  
Earnings Guidance ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Operating Environments ◽  
Growth Forecasts

ABSTRACT We examine a form of voluntary disclosure that has received limited attention to date, namely, managers' long-term guidance for earnings three to five years in advance. We identify 1,739 long-term earnings forecasts issued by 295 unique firms from 2000 to 2012 and find that relative to firms that issue only short-term earnings guidance, those that also issue long-term guidance are larger, have more certain operating environments, and are followed by analysts who are more likely to issue long-term growth forecasts. Long-term guidance is informative to investors and analysts incorporate the news contained in these forecasts into their own long-term growth forecasts. We also document that the issuance of long-term guidance is associated with more (less) investor focus on long-term (short-term) earnings news. Last, we find mixed evidence on the association between long-term guidance and real earnings management decisions. Our study adds to the literature on managers' voluntary disclosure choices. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: G17; M41.

Clawbacks and Earnings Management

2018 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 129-151 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carolyn B. Levine ◽  
Michael J. Smith
Keyword(s):  
Numerical Analysis ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Cash Flows ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Real Earnings Management ◽  
Interim Report ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Period Model ◽  
Jel Classifications

ABSTRACT This study addresses the effect of clawbacks on earnings management (EM). In a two-period model, the manager can report truthfully or distort an interim report using either accrual or real EM. The principal can make short-term payments based on a manipulable accounting signal and long-term payments based on unmanipulable cash flows. The strength of the clawbacks determines the likelihood that the manager's compensation is reclaimed when the interim report was managed. Stronger clawback provisions may result in (1) a substitution between accrual and real earnings management, or (2) earnings management when no earnings management was optimal with weak clawbacks, and (3) lower expected profits for the principal. Numerical analysis suggests that strong clawbacks do not reduce aggregate earnings management. JEL Classifications: J33; M48; M52; G38. Data Availability: All data are simulated.

Concurrent Earnings Announcements and Analysts' Information Production

2019 ◽  
Vol 95 (1) ◽  
pp. 165-189 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Driskill ◽  
Marcus P. Kirk ◽  
Jennifer Wu Tucker
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Announcements ◽  
Financial Analysts ◽  
Earnings Forecasts ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Limited Attention ◽  
Conference Calls ◽  
Stock Recommendations ◽  
Rich Information ◽  
Sample Firm ◽  
Jel Classifications

ABSTRACT We examine whether financial analysts are subject to limited attention. We find that when analysts have another firm in their coverage portfolio announcing earnings on the same day as the sample firm (a “concurrent announcement”), they are less likely to issue timely earnings forecasts for the sample firm's subsequent quarter than analysts without a concurrent announcement. Among the analysts who issue timely earnings forecasts, the thoroughness of their work decreases as their number of concurrent announcements increases. In addition, analysts are more sluggish in providing stock recommendations and less likely to ask questions in earnings conference calls as their number of concurrent announcements increases. Moreover, when analysts face concurrent announcements, they tend to allocate their limited attention to firms that already have rich information environments, leaving behind firms in need of attention. Overall, our evidence suggests that even financial analysts, who serve as information specialists, are subject to limited attention. JEL Classifications: G10; G11; G17; G14. Data Availability: Data are publicly available from the sources identified in the paper.

Long-Term Orientation and Earnings Management Strategies

2019 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 97-119 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jesper Haga ◽  
Fredrik Huhtamäki ◽  
Dennis Sundvik
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
High Precision ◽  
Management Strategy ◽  
Management Strategies ◽  
Real Earnings Management ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Country Level ◽  
Earnings Benchmarks ◽  
Jel Classifications

ABSTRACT In this study, we investigate how country-level long-term orientation affects managers' willingness to engage in earnings management and choice of earnings management strategy. Using a comprehensive dataset of 47 countries for the period from 2003 to 2015, we find that firms in long-term-oriented cultures rely relatively more on earnings management through accruals, while firms in short-term-oriented cultures engage in relatively more real earnings management. Furthermore, we find a larger discontinuity around earnings benchmarks in long-term-oriented cultures suggesting that manipulation of accruals enables benchmark beating with high precision. JEL Classifications: M14; M16; M21; M41.

Analysts’ Incentives to Overweight Management Guidance When Revising Their Short-Term Earnings Forecasts

2010 ◽  
Vol 85 (5) ◽  
pp. 1617-1646 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mei Feng ◽  
Sarah McVay
Keyword(s):  
Forecast Accuracy ◽  
Earnings Forecasts ◽  
Investment Banking ◽  
Equity Offerings ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Management Guidance ◽  
Banking Business

ABSTRACT: We document that, when revising their short-term earnings forecasts in response to management guidance, analysts wishing to curry favor with management weight the guidance more heavily than predicted, based on the credibility and usefulness of the guidance. This overweighting of guidance is present prior to equity offerings and other events that could lead to investment banking business. Although analysts sacrifice their forecast accuracy by overweighting management guidance, they appear to benefit, on average, by subsequently gaining the underwriting business for their banks. Thus, while analysts wishing to please managers are optimistic in their long-term earnings forecasts, they take their cue from management when determining their short-term earnings forecasts.

scholarly journals Information Externalities and Voluntary Disclosure: Evidence from a Major Customer's Earnings Announcement

2020 ◽  
Vol 95 (6) ◽  
pp. 73-96
Author(s):  
Young Jun Cho ◽  
Yongtae Kim ◽  
Yoonseok Zang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Voluntary Disclosure ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Earnings Guidance ◽  
Future Prospects ◽  
Earnings Announcement ◽  
Supply Chain Relationships ◽  
Information Transfers ◽  
Positive Effect

ABSTRACT We examine the relation between information externalities along the supply chain and voluntary disclosure. Information transfers from a major customer's earnings announcement (EA) can substitute for its supplier's disclosure. Conversely, if the customer's EA increases uncertainties regarding the supplier's future prospects, it can increase the demand for disclosure. After controlling for information incorporated in supplier returns, we find that the supplier is more likely to issue earnings guidance after the customer's EA when the EA news deviates more from the market's expectation. The positive effect of the customer's news on earnings guidance is weaker when common investors, supply-chain analysts, or a common industry allow investors to better understand the value implications of the news, while the effect increases with the importance of the customer to the supplier. The effect is also stronger when EA news is negative rather than positive. Collectively, the results suggest that supply-chain relationships influence voluntary disclosure. Data Availability: All data are publicly available from sources indicated in the text.

Technological Peer Pressure and Product Disclosure

2018 ◽  
Vol 93 (6) ◽  
pp. 95-126 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sean Shun Cao ◽  
Guang Ma ◽  
Jennifer Wu Tucker ◽  
Chi Wan
Keyword(s):  
Product Development ◽  
Voluntary Disclosure ◽  
Earnings Forecasts ◽  
Peer Pressure ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Test Results ◽  
Management Earnings Forecasts ◽  
Press Releases ◽  
Negative Relation ◽  
Proprietary Costs

ABSTRACT We introduce a firm-specific measure of the technological aspect of competition—technological peer pressure—and examine firm-initiated product development-related press releases. We argue that empirical examinations of the theorized negative relation between competition and disclosure require the type of voluntary disclosure to be relevant to the dimension of competition under examination to ensure that firms incur significant proprietary costs of disclosure. In other words, many types of disclosure do not provide actionable information to competitors and, thus, should not be affected by that dimension of competition. We expect a negative relation between technological peer pressure and product disclosure because the latter reveals firms' strategies, allocations, and progress of technological investments in product development to competitors. In contrast, we do not expect a negative relation between technological peer pressure and management earnings forecasts—the most common type of voluntary disclosure used in accounting research. Our test results are consistent with these expectations. Data Availability: All data are available from public sources. Our TPP Measure is available for download, please see the link in Appendix G.

(Dis)aggregated earnings forecasts and acquisition financing

2019 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 255-271
Author(s):  
Paul Ordyna
Keyword(s):  
Voluntary Disclosure ◽  
Logistic Model ◽  
Earnings Forecasts ◽  
Merger And Acquisition ◽  
Management Forecasts ◽  
Earnings Guidance ◽  
Content Type ◽  
True Value ◽  
Acquiring Firms ◽  
Management Guidance

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine how a firm’s mergers and acquisitions (M&A) goals influence its voluntary disclosure policy. Specifically, this paper examines how a firm’s M&A financing intentions influence the degree of aggregation in management guidance prior to and after the M&A transaction. Design/methodology/approach Using a logistic model, this study tests the relation between M&A financing and the decision to issue disaggregate earnings guidance for 3,929 acquiring firms from 2007 to 2011. Findings The logistic regression results show that firms are more likely to provide disaggregate earnings guidance when using mostly stock to finance M&A and that the incentives to disaggregate guidance vary throughout the M&A transactional window. Alternatively, because the value of cash is independent of the true value of the acquirer, the results show that firms offering mostly cash to finance M&A are less likely to issue disaggregate earnings forecasts. Additional analysis reveals that the decision to issue disaggregate earnings guidance also influences post-merger outcomes such as CEO turnover. Research limitations/implications The choice to disaggregate earnings guidance and the choice to use stock as a means to finance an acquisition is made by management, thus are endogenous which could introduce bias. Originality/value This study provides insights into management’s incentives and attitudes toward the use of management forecasts to effect a potential merger and acquisition. Given the flexibility management has in issuing voluntary forecasts, management can tailor a financial message toward investors and potential targets in attempt to facilitate a merger and acquisition and to further the firm’s goals.

scholarly journals Updating great expectations: The effect of peer salary information on own-earnings forecasts

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sam Jones ◽  
Ricardo Santos
Keyword(s):  
Job Search ◽  
Cognitive Skills ◽  
Public Information ◽  
Earnings Forecasts ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Great Expectations ◽  
Earnings Expectations ◽  
Salary Information ◽  
The Impact

How jobseekers set their earnings expectations is central to job search models. To study this process, we track the evolution of own-earnings forecasts over 18 months for a representative panel of university-leavers in Mozambique and estimate the impact of a wage information intervention. We sent participants differentiated messages about the average earnings of their peers, obtained from prior survey rounds. Demonstrating the stickiness of (initially optimistic) beliefs, we find an elasticity of own-wage expectations to this news of around 7 per cent in the short term and 16 per cent over the long term, which compares to a 22 per cent elasticity in response to unanticipated actual wage offers. We further find evidence of heterogeneous updating heuristics, where factors such as the initial level of optimism, cognitive skills, perceived reliability of the information, and valence of the news shape how wage expectations are updated. We recommend institutionalizing public information about earnings.

scholarly journals The effect of takeover defenses on long term and short term analysts’ earnings forecasts: The case of poison pills

2007 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 140-144 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas A. Turk ◽  
Jeremy Goh ◽  
Candace E. Ybarra
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Forecasts ◽  
Security Analysts ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Takeover Defenses ◽  
Poison Pill ◽  
Poison Pills ◽  
One Year

This study examined the effect of poison pill adoption on long term and short earnings forecasts by security analysts. Our results provide no evidence of significant revisions in one-year or five-year earnings forecasts following the adoption of poison pills. We do find evidence, however, that firms adopt poison pills following a period of significant negative revisions in earnings forecasts. Our results suggest that poison pill adoptions may be a response to downward revisions in earnings forecasts

Benefits of management disclosure precision on analysts’ forecasts

2014 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 371-399 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yu-Ho Chi ◽  
David A. Ziebart
Keyword(s):  
Forecast Accuracy ◽  
Earnings Forecasts ◽  
Forecast Errors ◽  
Management Earnings Forecasts ◽  
Earnings Guidance ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Management Forecast ◽  
Forecast Precision ◽  
The Impact

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of management’s choice of forecast precision on the subsequent dispersion and accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecasts. Design/methodology/approach – Using a sample of 3,584 yearly management earnings per share (EPS) forecasts and 10,287 quarterly management EPS forecasts made during the period of 2002-2007 and collected from the First Call database, the authors controlled for factors previously found to impact analysts’ forecast accuracy and dispersion and investigate the link between management forecast precision and attributes of the analysts’ forecasts. Findings – Results provide empirical evidence that managements’ disclosure precision has a statistically significant impact on both the dispersion and the accuracy of subsequent analysts’ forecasts. It was found that the dispersion in analysts’ forecasts is negatively related to the management forecast precision. In other words, a precise management forecast is associated with a smaller dispersion in the subsequent analysts’ forecasts. Evidence consistent with accuracy in subsequent analysts’ forecasts being positively associated with the precision in the management forecast was also found. When the present analysis focuses on range forecasts provided by management, it was found that lower precision (a larger range) is associated with a larger dispersion among analysts and larger forecast errors. Practical implications – Evidence suggests a consistency in inferences across both annual and quarterly earnings forecasts by management. Accordingly, recent calls to eliminate earnings guidance through short-term quarterly management forecasts may have failed to consider the linkage between the attributes (precision) of those forecasts and the dispersion and accuracy in subsequent analysts’ forecasts. Originality/value – This study contributes to the literature on both management earnings forecasts and analysts’ earnings forecasts. The results assist in policy deliberations related to calls to eliminate short-term management earnings guidance.

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