Clawbacks and Earnings Management

2018 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 129-151 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carolyn B. Levine ◽  
Michael J. Smith
Keyword(s):  
Numerical Analysis ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Cash Flows ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Real Earnings Management ◽  
Interim Report ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Period Model ◽  
Jel Classifications

ABSTRACT This study addresses the effect of clawbacks on earnings management (EM). In a two-period model, the manager can report truthfully or distort an interim report using either accrual or real EM. The principal can make short-term payments based on a manipulable accounting signal and long-term payments based on unmanipulable cash flows. The strength of the clawbacks determines the likelihood that the manager's compensation is reclaimed when the interim report was managed. Stronger clawback provisions may result in (1) a substitution between accrual and real earnings management, or (2) earnings management when no earnings management was optimal with weak clawbacks, and (3) lower expected profits for the principal. Numerical analysis suggests that strong clawbacks do not reduce aggregate earnings management. JEL Classifications: J33; M48; M52; G38. Data Availability: All data are simulated.

Long-Term Orientation and Earnings Management Strategies

2019 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 97-119 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jesper Haga ◽  
Fredrik Huhtamäki ◽  
Dennis Sundvik
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
High Precision ◽  
Management Strategy ◽  
Management Strategies ◽  
Real Earnings Management ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Country Level ◽  
Earnings Benchmarks ◽  
Jel Classifications

ABSTRACT In this study, we investigate how country-level long-term orientation affects managers' willingness to engage in earnings management and choice of earnings management strategy. Using a comprehensive dataset of 47 countries for the period from 2003 to 2015, we find that firms in long-term-oriented cultures rely relatively more on earnings management through accruals, while firms in short-term-oriented cultures engage in relatively more real earnings management. Furthermore, we find a larger discontinuity around earnings benchmarks in long-term-oriented cultures suggesting that manipulation of accruals enables benchmark beating with high precision. JEL Classifications: M14; M16; M21; M41.

scholarly journals Earnings Management And Privatisations: Evidence From Pakistan Evidence From Pakistan

2015 ◽  
Vol 54 (2) ◽  
pp. 79-96 ◽  
Author(s):  
Abdullah Muhammad Iqbal ◽  
Iram Khan ◽  
Zeeshan Ahmed
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Discretionary Accruals ◽  
Cash Flows ◽  
Jel Classification ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Jones Model ◽  
Reported Earnings

This study examines the incidence of earnings management around the time of the privatisation of State Owned Enterprises in Pakistan during 1991-2005. Using the modified Jones model and a sample of large privatisations (minimum US$1 million), it shows that the sampled firms experienced increase in earnings, decrease in cash flows, and increase in current discretionary accruals in the year prior to and/or in the year of privatisation. The SOEs used both short term and long term accruals to inflate reported earnings. These accruals were reversed in the post-privatisation period. These findings suggest that managers of the firms slated for privatisation were engaged in earnings management to inflate their firms‘ financial worth to maximise the privatisation proceeds. Hence, we cannot reject the incidence of earnings management during privatisations in Pakistan. The results imply that the investors should carefully evaluate the to-be-privatised firms and keep in view the possibility of earnings management by the SOEs. JEL Classification: G14, G34, G38, L33, M41 Keywords: Earnings Management, Privatisations, SOEs, Pakistan, Accruals

The Relationship between Aggressive Real Earnings Management and Current and Future Audit Fees

2016 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 85-107 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam Greiner ◽  
Mark J. Kohlbeck ◽  
Thomas J. Smith
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Firm Value ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Cash Flows ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Real Earnings Management ◽  
Increased Risk ◽  
Pricing Behavior ◽  
Reported Earnings ◽  
The Relationship

SUMMARY We examine the relationship between aggressive income-increasing real earnings management (REM) and current and future audit fees. Managers pursue REM activities to influence reported earnings and, as a consequence, alter cash flows and sacrifice firm value. We posit that the implications of REM are considered in auditors' assessments of engagement risk related to the client's economic condition and result in higher audit fees. We find that, with the exception of abnormal reductions in SG&A, aggressive income-increasing REM is positively associated with both current and future audit fees. Additional analyses provide evidence consistent with increased effort combined with increased risk contributing to the current pricing effect, with increased business risk primarily driving the future pricing effect. We, therefore, provide evidence that aggressive income-increasing REM activities have a significant influence on auditor pricing behavior, consistent with the audit framework associating engagement risk with audit fees. JEL Classifications: G21; G34; M41. Data Availability: The data in this study are available from public sources indicated in the paper.

Capital Structure, Earnings Management, and Sarbanes-Oxley: Evidence from Canadian and U.S. Firms

2013 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 301-318 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kelly E. Carter
Keyword(s):  
Capital Structure ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Cost Of Debt ◽  
Equity Financing ◽  
Percentage Points ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
The U.S ◽  
Jel Classifications

SYNOPSIS I examine Sarbanes-Oxley's (SOX) effect on capital structure. I find that SOX is associated with higher long-term debt ratios, as firms listed in the U.S. raise their long-term debt ratios by 2 to 3 percentage points. This finding is consistent with the idea that, although the reduction in information asymmetry associated with SOX could prompt managers to increase equity financing, debt is still safer and less costly than equity in the SOX era. Further analysis shows that the increase in debt occurs in the two quarters prior to SOX, suggesting that firms anticipate a higher cost of debt after SOX and acquire debt while it is relatively cheap. Also, firms that heavily (lightly) manage earnings prior to SOX use less (more) debt after SOX. This result is consistent with the view that firms that aggressively manage earnings before SOX reveal intrinsically weaker earnings after SOX, casting doubt on those firms' ability to repay debt and relegating those firms to issue equity for financing purposes. JEL Classifications: G32; G38. Data Availability: Data available upon request.

Characteristics and Implications of Long-Term Earnings Guidance

2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-54
Author(s):  
Andrew C. Call ◽  
Adam M. Esplin ◽  
Bin Miao
Keyword(s):  
Voluntary Disclosure ◽  
Earnings Forecasts ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Real Earnings Management ◽  
Limited Attention ◽  
Earnings Guidance ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Operating Environments ◽  
Growth Forecasts

ABSTRACT We examine a form of voluntary disclosure that has received limited attention to date, namely, managers' long-term guidance for earnings three to five years in advance. We identify 1,739 long-term earnings forecasts issued by 295 unique firms from 2000 to 2012 and find that relative to firms that issue only short-term earnings guidance, those that also issue long-term guidance are larger, have more certain operating environments, and are followed by analysts who are more likely to issue long-term growth forecasts. Long-term guidance is informative to investors and analysts incorporate the news contained in these forecasts into their own long-term growth forecasts. We also document that the issuance of long-term guidance is associated with more (less) investor focus on long-term (short-term) earnings news. Last, we find mixed evidence on the association between long-term guidance and real earnings management decisions. Our study adds to the literature on managers' voluntary disclosure choices. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: G17; M41.

scholarly journals The Effect Of Short-Term Debt On Accrual Based Earnings Management And Real Earnings Management

2016 ◽  
Vol 32 (4) ◽  
pp. 1287-1300
Author(s):  
Sun-young Park
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Financial Institutions ◽  
Liquidity Risk ◽  
Discretionary Accruals ◽  
Debt Financing ◽  
Real Earnings Management ◽  
Financing Constraints ◽  
Total Current ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Management Method

This study investigates whether short-term debt is related to earnings management. Short-term debt is divided into total current liabilities, debt in current liabilities and short-term borrowings. In addition, this study examines how short-term debt is related to how firms manage their earnings. I use discretionary accruals and real operating decisions as the earnings management method. The study finds that debt in current liabilities only has a statistically significant impact on accrual earnings management, and short-term borrowings are only shown to have a statistically significant impact on real earnings management. These results indicate that managers engage in accrual earnings management of debt included in current liabilities and use real earnings management of short-term borrowings from financial institutions.Therefore, this evidence indicates that managers engage in accrual earnings management of debt in included current liabilities when they face the liquidity risk of short-term debt, and the firms with debt financing constraints are likely to manage real earnings in spite of enhanced firm monitoring by lenders such as financial institutions. The findings in this study may have implications in the debate about the monitoring function of financial institutions such as banks.

scholarly journals CORPORATE GOVERNANCE DAN MANAJEMEN LABA RIIL PERBANKAN ISLAM INDONESIA DAN MALAYSIA

2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
M. Zubaedy Sy ◽  
Nuryati Nuryati ◽  
Surifah Surifah
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Cash Flows ◽  
Profit Sharing ◽  
Least Square ◽  
Real Earnings Management ◽  
Annual Reports ◽  
Islamic Banks

 The main objective of this research is to create good corporate governance that is able to restrictopportunistic REM. The specific objectives of this study are 1) to provide evidence of difference inthe practices of CG and REM in Indonesian and Malaysian Islamic banks,and 2) to provide empirical evidence of the influence of CG on the REM of Indonesian and Malaysian Islamic banks.           The study was conducted on Indonesian and Malaysian Islamic banks from 2011 to 2016by using purposive samplingmethod. The research data is secondary data in the form of annual reports and financial reports originating from the Indonesian Banking Directory, the Indonesia Stock Exchange and the Malaysia Stock Exchange. The analysis method used to test the differences between CG and real earnings management is the Man Whitney test whilethe method used to test the effect of CG on the REM of Islamic Banks in Indonesia and Malaysia is the multiple regression analysiswithordinary least square.            The results show that the practices of corporate governance in Indonesia and Malaysia have their own strengths and weaknesses. CG mechanism of Indonesia and Malaysia shows lower level in some parts and higher level in other parts. Malaysia’s REM islower than Indonesia’sREM through operating cash flow, investment profit sharing, and discretionary costs. The experimental results show that CG generally does not affect real earnings management and only the independent audit committee who is able to restrictreal earnings management through operating cash flows.            Riset ini  menguji  hubungan antara corporate governance (CG) dan manajemen laba berdasar aktivitas riil  atau disebut real earnings management (REM) bank-bank Islam  di Indonesia dan Malaysia. Tujuan jangka panjang riset ini adalah terciptanya good corporate governace yang mampu membatasi REM oportunistik. Target khusus penelitian ini adalah 1) memberi bukti empiris perbedaan praktik CG dan REM bank Islam  Indonesia dan Malaysia. 2) memberi bukti empiris pengaruh CG terhadap REM bank Islam  Indonesia dan Malaysia.             Metode penelitian menggunakan metode ilmiah - kuantitatif, dengan membangun satu atau lebih hipotesis berdasarkan pada suatu struktur  atau kerangka teori dan kemudian menguji hipotesis-hipotesis tersebut secara empiris. Penelitian dilakukan pada bank Islam  Indonesia dan Malaysia periode waktu 2011 sampai 2016. Metode pengambilan sampel secara purposive sampling. Data penelitian merupakan data sekunder berupa  annual report dan laporan keuangan yang berasal dari Directory Perbankan Indonesia, Bursa Efek Indonesia  dan Bursa Efek Malaysia.  Teknik analisis untuk menguji perbedaan CG dan manajemen laba riil adalah uji beda Man Whitney, sedangkan untuk menguji pengaruh CG terhadap REM Bank Islam  Indonesia dan Malaysia menggunakan analisis regresi berganda ordinary least square.            Hasil menunjukkan bahwa praktik corporate governance Negara Indonesia dan Malaysia, masing masing memiliki kelebihan dan kelemahan. Mekanisme CG ada yang lebih rendah, maupun lebih tinggi antara Negara Indonesia dengan Malaysia. REM Malaysia lebih rendah signifikan dari pada Indonesia, baik melalui arus kas operasi, bagi hasil investasi, maupun biaya diskresioner. Hasil uji menunjukkan bahwa pada umumnya mekanisme CG tidak berpengaruh terhadap manajemen laba riil. Hanya Independensi komite audit yang mampu menekan manajemen laba riil melalui arus kas operasi.Keywords:Corporate governance, real earnings management, Islamic banking.

scholarly journals The impact of ownership type on the relationship between corporate governance and earnings management: An empirical study

2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 31-44
Author(s):  
Ahmed Boghdady
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Cash Flows ◽  
Real Earnings Management ◽  
Ownership Type ◽  
Moderation Effect ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Privately Owned

This study investigates the effect of ownership type on the relation between corporate governance and earnings management. While previous literature has mainly examined the relationship between corporate governance and both accrual and real earnings management, no study to date, to the researcher’s best knowledge, focused on the moderation effect of ownership type on this relationship. Three proxies for measuring accrual and real earnings management, namely discretionary accruals (DA), abnormal cash flows (ACFO), and abnormal discretionary expenses (ADISX) are employed. Three empirical models (i.e. DA, ACFO, and ADISX) are developed in which the earnings management proxies represent the dependent variables and are tested using a sample of non-financial companies containing state-owned and privately owned companies over the period from 2010 to 2017, with 1030 firm-year observations. The results show a positive relationship between ownership type and both accruals manipulation and sales manipulation. In general, the results suggest that the ownership type moderates the relationship between corporate governance and earnings management. The results suggest also that corporate governance mechanisms may not play an almost the same role in monitoring and mitigating real earnings management (REM) practices as they do for accrual earnings management (AEM) in Egypt. Moreover, no evidence is found supportive of the trade-off effect which means that managers in Egyptian firms use both types of earnings management jointly to reach the target levels of earnings

Revisiting the (Mis)Pricing of Accruals

2019 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 141-156
Author(s):  
Bradley Lail ◽  
Robert C. Lipe ◽  
Han S. Yi
Keyword(s):  
Stock Returns ◽  
Null Hypothesis ◽  
Statistical Tests ◽  
Cash Flows ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Investor Behavior ◽  
Reliability Measures ◽  
Accrual Anomaly ◽  
Earnings Components ◽  
Jel Classifications

Our paper examines inconsistent conclusions regarding the accrual anomaly and demonstrates the importance of aligning regression specifications with hypotheses. Richardson, Sloan, Soliman, and Tuna (2005) conclude that accruals are mispriced and the mispricing seems to increase as accrual reliability decreases. Barone and Magilke (2009) and Ball, Gerakos, Linnainmaa, and Nikolaev (2016) conclude that cash flows rather than accruals are mispriced. We show that the divergent conclusions come from misalignment between the null hypothesis and regression specification in Richardson et al. (2005) . In addition, analysis of the contemporaneous relations between stock returns and components of earnings supports an initial underreaction to cash flows by investors. We fail to detect links between the reliability measures in Richardson et al. (2005) and investor behavior once we align the statistical tests with the null hypothesis. Our reexamination of prior findings benefits accounting academics, standard setters, and others interested in how investors use earnings components. JEL Classifications: M41. Data Availability: All data used in this study are publicly available from the sources identified in the text.

scholarly journals PENGARUH ASIMETRI INFORMASI TERHADAP MANAJEMEN LABA DENGAN GOOD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE SEBAGAI VARIABEL MODERASI

2017 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 64
Author(s):  
Andri Veno ◽  
Noer Sasongko
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Linear Regression ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Multiple Linear Regression ◽  
Linear Regression Analysis ◽  
Discretionary Accruals ◽  
Multiple Linear Regression Analysis ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Good Corporate Governance

The purpose of this study was to analyze the effect on earnings management information asymmetry, which was moderated by good corporate governance in 43 companies listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange (BEI). To 43 companies such as sample in this study included the top 10 best Corporate Governance Perception Index (CGPI) during the period 2004 - 2013. The sampling technique is purposive sampling. Earnings management as independent variables proxy through Short Term Discretionary Accruals (STDA) and Long Term Discretionary Accruals (LTDA), while moderating variable is a proxy through Corporate Governance Corporate Governance Perception Index (CGPI). This analysis using multiple linear regression that was previously done through classical assumption test. The results of multiple linear regression analysis on the model of the Short Term Discretionary Accruals (STDA) showed that the asymmetry of information and good corporate governance significantly positive effect on earnings management. The results of multiple linear regression analysis on the model of the Long-Term Discretionary Accruals (LTDA) showed that the asymmetry of information and good corporate governance significantly negative effect on earnings management. While variable existing office Good Governance can moderate the effect of asymmetry in earnings management in Short-Term Discretionary Accruals (STDA) and Long Term Discretionary Accruals (Ltda).

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