The importance of IRS enforcement to stock price crash risk: The role of CEO power and incentives

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew M. Bauer ◽  
Xiaohua Fang ◽  
Jeffrey Pittman

We analyze whether tough IRS monitoring generates a positive externality by constraining managers' bad news hoarding activities. Supporting this prediction, we find a negative relation between the threat of an IRS audit and stock price crash risk. Our evidence is consistent with recent theory that outside investors learn more about firms when tax enforcement is stricter. Additionally, path analysis suggests that the monitoring channel (direct path) plays a critical role in shaping crash risk relative to information asymmetry channels of tax planning and accruals manipulation (indirect paths). Consistent with other predictions, we find that the monitoring role of IRS audits intensifies when firms experience worse agency conflicts stemming from CEO power and incentives. Collectively, our research implies that external monitoring by tax authorities protects shareholders against managers suppressing negative firm-specific information that engenders stock price crash risk, particularly when CEOs have wider scope and stronger incentives to hoard bad news.

2021 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 607-621
Author(s):  
Aon Waqas ◽  
Danish Ahmed Siddiqui

Purpose: The conservatism of accounting and robustness of accounting information disclosure may restrain the irrational behavior of investors and help to reduce the risk of stock price crashes. This study aims to explore this in the context of developing country Pakistan. More specifically, this study investigates the effect of accounting conservatism on stock price crash risk. We also examine the complementary role of managerial and institutional ownership in strengthening this effect. Design/Methodology/Approach: This study conducts the panel data analysis of 155 nonfinancial firms listed in PSX from 2007 to 2019. This study calculates the C-Score to measure accounting conservatism. This study measures the firm’s stock price crash risk by calculating the DUVOL of weekly share prices. Findings: This study finds that there is a significant negative effect of accounting conservatism on firms’ stock price crash risk. This study also finds that managerial ownership enhances the stock price crash risk of the sample firms significantly as a moderator while there is no significant moderating influence of institutional ownership. Implications/Originality/Value: The competent authorities of Pakistan should consider agency conflicts. They should direct the firms’ management to share equal information in time regardless of whether the information is good or bad for stock prices.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-31
Author(s):  
SHOUDONG CHEN ◽  
YUESHAN LI

Using manually collected samples on voluntary targeted poverty alleviation of 3418 Chinese firms for the period 2016–2019, we explore the impact of targeted poverty alleviation actions of listed companies on the stock price crash risk. Results show that listed companies participating in targeted poverty alleviation exhibited a lower risk of stock price crash risk; this conclusion is still valid after a series of robustness and endogeneity tests. This paper further explored its internal transmission routes. We found that the response of a public company to the targeted poverty alleviation policy will increase its positive coverages and plays the role of information intermediary and public supervision of media. Thus, the company’s behavior of hiding bad news is curtailed, and its future stock price crash risk is significantly reduced. For the government, China’s targeted poverty alleviation strategy is worthy of reference, while getting rid of poverty, the stock price crash risk of participating companies has also been effectively suppressed.


2020 ◽  
Vol 39 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-26
Author(s):  
Jeffrey L. Callen ◽  
Xiaohua Fang ◽  
Baohua Xin ◽  
Wenjun Zhang

SUMMARY This study examines the association between the office size of engagement auditors and their clients' future stock price crash risk, a consequence of managerial bad news hoarding. Using a sample of U.S. public firms with Big 4 auditors, we find robust evidence that local audit office size is significantly and negatively related to future stock price crash risk. The evidence is consistent with the view that large audit offices effectively detect and deter bad news hoarding activities in comparison with their smaller counterparts. We further explore two possible explanations for these findings, the Auditor Incentive Channel and the Auditor Competency Channel. Our empirical tests offer support for both channels. JEL Classifications: G12; G34; M49.


2016 ◽  
Vol 9 (5) ◽  
pp. 100
Author(s):  
Imen Lamiri ◽  
Adel Boubaker

<p>This article explores the informational role of three essential modern financial markets actors such IFRS norms, the Big”4” and the financial analysts for a panel of emergent and developed countries during the period from 2001 to 2010. We hypothesis that these mechanisms help improving the quality of specific information incorporated into stock prices measured by the stock price synchronicity (SPS). The main result is that both financial analyst’s coverage and IFRS adoption's effects seem to be stronger for emerging than developed markets. The results also show a negative relationship between auditors’ opinion and coefficient of determination (R<sup>2</sup>).</p>


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dichu Bao ◽  
Yongtae Kim ◽  
Lixin (Nancy) Su

The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) allows firms to redact information from material contracts by submitting confidential treatment requests, if redacted information is not material and would cause competitive harm upon public disclosure. This study examines whether managers use confidential treatment requests to conceal bad news. We show that confidential treatment requests are positively associated with residual short interest, a proxy for managers’ private negative information. This positive association is more pronounced for firms with lower litigation risk, higher executive equity incentives, and lower external monitoring. Confidential treatment requests filed by firms with higher residual short interests are associated with higher stock price crash risk and poorer future performance. Collectively, our results suggest that managers redact information from material contracts to conceal bad news.


2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jianmai Liu

Purpose As an important part of the disclosure of listed companies' annual reports, MD&A will disclose some "bad news" about the company. The purpose of this paper is to study whether such "bad news" can reduce information asymmetry and alleviate the risk of stock price crash remains to be seen. Design/methodology/approach Based on the sample of A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2016, the authors examine whether the negative information in MD&A could reduce stock price crash risk. Findings It is found that the negative information in MD&A does not reduce future crash, which indicates that the negative information in MD&A does not alleviate the information asymmetry. Further, it is also found this is due to the low readability of negative information which leads to the negative information not successfully released into the market timely. Only highly readable negative information can alleviate information asymmetry and suppress crash risk. In addition, the authors also find in the companies with more investor surveys negative tone is negatively correlated with crash risk, which means that investor surveys could help investors interpret the negative information in MD&A and alleviate stock price crash risk. Practical implications The practical significance of this article: this paper suggests that investors should carefully identify the quality of negative information in MD&A and pay attention to other quality characteristics besides credibility. This paper suggests that the regulator should pay attention not only to whether to disclose and the amount of disclosure but also to the quality of information disclosure, such as readability, so as to restrict management's strategic behavior in information disclosure. Originality/value First, different from previous studies on the impact of information disclosure on crash risk, this paper directly explores the impact of information in MD&A on stock price crash risk from the perspective of negative information disclosure that management most want to hide. It supplements the literature on the impact of information disclosure on stock price crash risk. Second, this paper studies the interaction between information tone and readability and its impact on the risk of stock price crash. Some studies believe that the credibility of negative news is higher and investors' reaction may be stronger. However, this paper finds that the disclosure of negative information may not be absorbed by the market because of the low readability. Third, this paper finds that investor surveys can help information users to interpret negative information and alleviate the risk of stock price crash, which shows that information disclosure of different channels will complement each other and improve information efficiency. Therefore, it advocates different information disclosure channels which has important practical significance for improving market pricing efficiency and reducing investment decision-making risk.


Author(s):  
Xi Fu ◽  
Xiaoxi Wu ◽  
Zhifang Zhang

Abstract This paper investigates whether and how the disclosure tone of earnings conference calls predicts future stock price crash risk. Using US public firms’ conference call transcripts from 2010 to 2015, we find that firms with less optimistic tone of year-end conference calls experience higher stock price crash risk in the following year. Additional analyses reveal that the predictive power of tone is more pronounced among firms with better information environment and lower managerial equity incentives, suggesting that extrinsic motivations for truthful disclosure partially explain the predictive power of conference call tone. Our results shed light on the long-term information role of conference call tone by exploring the setting of extreme future downside risk, when managers have conflicting incentives either to unethically manipulate disclosure tone to hide bad news or to engage in ethical and truthful communication.


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