scholarly journals An Account of Ethics, Deontological Theory and its Applications in Understanding Ethical Impermissibility of Euthanasia

2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Kumar Neeraj Sachdev
Keyword(s):  
Neuroethics ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 43-60 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Dean
Keyword(s):  

2018 ◽  
pp. 115-135 ◽  
Author(s):  
Monika Betzler ◽  
Jörg Schroth

This chapter critically discusses the hitherto most radical and ambitious proposal for accommodating consequentialism with our commonsense moral intuitions. According to this proposal, which has been most forcefully developed by Douglas Portmore, it is possible to consequentialize every plausible deontological moral theory, i.e., to translate a deontological theory into a consequentialist theory that yields exactly the same moral verdicts as the original deontological theory. The hoped for result of this move is a moral theory that (i) retains the compelling idea of consequentialism, (ii) has no counterintuitive moral implications, and (iii) avoids the paradox of deontology. After describing some of the details of the consequentializing procedure the chapter mounts several objections that lead to the conclusion that the consequentializing project cannot achieve any of its goals.


2021 ◽  
pp. 18-28
Author(s):  
Jay L. Garfield

This chapter argues that Buddhist ethics does not fit into any of the standard Western metaethical theories. It is neither an instance of a virtue theory, nor of a deontological theory, nor of a consequentialist theory. It is closer to a sentimentalist theory, but different from those as well. Instead, it defends a reading of Buddhist ethics as a moral phenomenology and as particularist, utilizing casuistic reasoning. That is, Buddhist ethics is concerned primarily with the transformation of experience, of the way we perceive ourselves and other moral agents and patients. This chapter also argues that the metaphor of path structures Buddhist ethical thought.


Author(s):  
Sami Al-Heeh

This small-scale study investigates the optimal features of good Muslim woman. It aims to describe, interpret, and explain the rhetorical features of the properties the Qur’anic discourse (QD) maintains for both sexes and those it excludes for the good Muslim woman. The study benefits from corpus, i.e. text, linguistics for data collection. It also applies a critical discourse analysis (CDA) approach to the Quotes collected from the Noble Qur’an (NQ). The paper builds on Van Dijk’s 1998 model of analysis at the syntactic, semantic and schematic levels of the properties identified for a good Muslim woman. It has been found that the QD assigns ten properties to describe a good Muslim man and woman; they include submission, belief, obedience, truthfulness, faithfulness, humbleness, alms giving, fasting, chastity, and turning to Allah. Among these, the QD exclusively and inclusively lists ‘being resigned, believing, always turning to Him, being devoted to worship, fasting’, and ‘being a widow or a virgin’ as general semantic features for a good Muslim wife. It has been concluded that the properties identified for a good Muslim woman have directive, informative, meta-linguistic and affective functions. They are part of the sociology of Islam which accommodates the ontological principle of creating women as a different sex having other roles to play with the deontological theory of moral obligation to obey freely the other sex. The Qur’anic engineering tactfully goes beyond reconciling both sexes’ needs and roles to repair some social norms established and entrenched against the woman who has already experienced marriage before. 


Author(s):  
Yanguang WANG

LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese; abstract also in English.女性主義倫理學家將生命倫理學諸理倫,如 Engelhardt 的把自主性放在第一位的“世俗多元倫理學”,Veatch的“契約論倫理學”,Pellegrino以有利或行善原則為基礎的倫理學,羅爾斯的“正義倫”倫理學;道義論倫理學,後果論倫理學,以及Beauchamp 和Childress的原則倫理學等統稱為“正義倫理學”(Ethics of Justice),其理論模型稱“工程模型”(Engineering Model),將它們與“關懷倫理學”(Ethics of Care)及“關懷模型”(Caring Model)相對立,以女性主義的視角,對生命倫理學理論和實踐進行了批評。審視女性主義對生命倫理學的批評,對照和比較女性主義關懷倫理學與生命倫理學,我們發現女性主義關懷倫理學的理論和內涵,確實給人以清新的感覺,女性主義關懷倫理學與生命倫理學如能互補,將對倫理推理和倫理難題的解決,提供較好的倫理理論和實踐方法。Feminists find that females tend to focus on details about the relationships among the persons involved and to seek innovative solutions that protect everyone's interest. In contracts, males typically try to identify and apply a relevant principle or rule (which they take to be universal or valid from an impartial perspective), even if doing so means sacrificing someone's interest. Feminists call the former approach an ethics of care (or responsibility) and the latte an ethics of justice.Feminism thinks ethics of justice includes bioethical theories such as Engelhardt's "Secular Bioethics", Veatch's "Contract Ethics", Deontological Theory, Utilitarianism, Beauchamp and Childress' principlism, Pellegrino's virtue and duty-based ethics, and so on. Feminists criticize ethics of justice or all of bioethical theories seriously. The ethics of care challenges all of these dominant bioethical theories as deductivism and principle-based ethics. Feminists down play the role of rights and allegedly universal principles and rules, in favor of an emphasis on caring, interpersonal relationships, and context.I think a view about ethics of care and ethics of justice should meet each other in the practice of bioethics arrived after reviewing the criticism of feminists. The essay concludes that there is no reason to consider the ethics of care inferior or the ethics of justice inferior. An ideal bioethics should incorporate both approaches. DOWNLOAD HISTORY | This article has been downloaded 86 times in Digital Commons before migrating into this platform.


2010 ◽  
Vol 36 (114) ◽  
pp. 131
Author(s):  
Antonio Frederico Saturnino Braga

Este artigo analisa o argumento para a prioridade das liberdades básicas apresentado por J. Rawls em sua obra Liberalismo Político, em resposta às críticas feitas por H. Hart ao argumento exposto em Uma Teoria da Justiça. Uma vez que as críticas de Hart apontam para a insuficiência da primeira obra de Rawls no confronto com argumentos de teor utilitarista, o artigo analisa o capítulo VIII de Liberalismo Político à luz do debate entre o deontologismo rawlsiano e a teoria utilitarista. A grande novidade que Rawls introduz em relação à sua primeira obra consiste na tese de que a prioridade das liberdades funda-se numa concepção de pessoa admitidamente liberal. Além de apresentar as dificuldades que esta concepção acarreta para Rawls, identifico e discuto uma possível saída para estas dificuldades.Abstract: In this article I analyze the argument for the priority of the basic liberties presented by J. Rawls in Political Liberalism, responding to H. Hart’s criticisms to his previous argument, presented in A Theory of Justice. Since Hart’s criticisms point to the weakness of Rawls’ first book in the face of utilitarian arguments, I analyze chapter VIII of Political Liberalism bearing in mind the debate between Rawls’ deontological theory and the utilitarian theory. The great novelty introduced by Rawls concerning his first book is his claim that the priority of the liberties rests on a admittedly liberal conception of person. Besides presenting the difficulties that this conception entails, I identify and discuss a possible way out of them.


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