O ARGUMENTO DE J. RAWLS PARA A PRIORIDADE DAS LIBERDADES BÁSICAS

2010 ◽  
Vol 36 (114) ◽  
pp. 131
Author(s):  
Antonio Frederico Saturnino Braga
Keyword(s):  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Liberal Conception ◽  
Deontological Theory ◽  
Previous Argument ◽  
The Face ◽  
Utilitarian Theory

Este artigo analisa o argumento para a prioridade das liberdades básicas apresentado por J. Rawls em sua obra Liberalismo Político, em resposta às críticas feitas por H. Hart ao argumento exposto em Uma Teoria da Justiça. Uma vez que as críticas de Hart apontam para a insuficiência da primeira obra de Rawls no confronto com argumentos de teor utilitarista, o artigo analisa o capítulo VIII de Liberalismo Político à luz do debate entre o deontologismo rawlsiano e a teoria utilitarista. A grande novidade que Rawls introduz em relação à sua primeira obra consiste na tese de que a prioridade das liberdades funda-se numa concepção de pessoa admitidamente liberal. Além de apresentar as dificuldades que esta concepção acarreta para Rawls, identifico e discuto uma possível saída para estas dificuldades.Abstract: In this article I analyze the argument for the priority of the basic liberties presented by J. Rawls in Political Liberalism, responding to H. Hart’s criticisms to his previous argument, presented in A Theory of Justice. Since Hart’s criticisms point to the weakness of Rawls’ first book in the face of utilitarian arguments, I analyze chapter VIII of Political Liberalism bearing in mind the debate between Rawls’ deontological theory and the utilitarian theory. The great novelty introduced by Rawls concerning his first book is his claim that the priority of the liberties rests on a admittedly liberal conception of person. Besides presenting the difficulties that this conception entails, I identify and discuss a possible way out of them.

scholarly journals The Limits of Constructivism: Can Rawls Condemn Female Genital Mutilation?

2009 ◽  
Vol 71 (3) ◽  
pp. 459-482 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Koppelman
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
The Body ◽  
Political Life ◽  
The Good Life ◽  
Political Aspect ◽  
Genital Mutilation ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
The Face ◽  
Acceptable Theory ◽  
Female Genital

AbstractConstructivist political theory, championed most prominently by John Rawls, builds up a conception of justice from the minimal requirements of political life. It has two powerful attractions. It promises a kind of civic unity in the face of irresolvable differences about the good life. It also offers a foundation for human rights that is secure in the face of those same differences. The very parsimony that is its strength, however, deprives it of the resources to condemn some atrocities. Because it focuses on the political aspect of persons, it has difficulty cognizing violence done to those aspects of the person that are not political, preeminently the body. Constructivism thus can be only a part of an acceptable theory of justice.

La Idea de “Razón Publica” (y su Revisión) en el Último Rawls

2003 ◽  
Vol 11 (22) ◽  
pp. 5-31
Author(s):  
Fernando Aranda Fraga ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Public Good ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Public Reason ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
The Political ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Key Topics ◽  
Political Philosopher

In 1993 John Rawls published his main and longest work since 1971, where he had published his reknowned A Theory of Justice, book that made him famous as the greatest political philosopher of the century. We are referring to Political Liberalism, a summary of his writings of the 80’s and the first half of the 90’s, where he attempts to answer the critics of his intellectual partners, communitarian philosophers. One of the key topics in this book is the issue of “public reason”, whose object is nothing else than public good, and on which the principles and proceedings of justice are to be applied. The book was so important for the political philosophy of the time that in 1997 Rawls had to go through the 1993 edition, becoming this new one the last relevant writing published before the death of the Harvard philosopher in November 2002.

Utilitarian Strategies in Bentham and John Stuart Mill

Utilitas ◽  
1990 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 245-266 ◽  
Author(s):  
P. J. Kelly
Keyword(s):  
Distributive Justice ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Recent Scholarship ◽  
Careful Scrutiny ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
Theories Of Justice ◽  
The Common ◽  
Utilitarian Theory

The argument of this paper is part of a general defence of the claim that Bentham's moral theory embodies a utilitarian theory of distributive justice, which is developed in his Civil Law writings. Whereas it is a commonplace of recent revisionist scholarship to argue that J. S. Mill had a developed utilitarian theory of justice, few scholars regard Bentham as having a theory of justice, let alone one that rivals in sophistication that of Mill. Indeed, Gerald J. Postema in his bookBentham and the Common Law Tradition, argues that Bentham had no substantial concern with the concept of justice, and that what analysis of the concept there is in Bentham's thought is unlike the utilitarian theory of justice to be found in chapter five of J. S. Mill'sUtilitarianismAlthough Postema's interpretation is not the only one that will be addressed in this paper, it serves as an important starting point for any rival interpretation of Bentham's ethical theory for two reasons. Firstly, it is the most comprehensive and most penetrating discussion of Bentham's utilitarian theory, drawing as it does on a wide variety of published and unpublished materials written throughout Bentham's career. Secondly, it is interesting in this particular context because the contrast that Postema draws between Bentham's and Mill's theories of justice depends upon a particular reading of Mill's theory of justice and utility which is derived from recent scholarship and which is by no means uncontroversial. As part of the defence of the claim that Bentham had a sophisticated theory of distributive justice, it will be argued in this paper that the contrast drawn between Bentham and Mill does not stand up to careful scrutiny, for insofar as Mill's theory of justice can be consistently defended it is not significantly different from the utilitarian strategy that Bentham employed for incorporating considerations of distributive justice within his theory. This is not to claim that there are not significant differences between the theories of justice of Bentham and J. S. Mill, but it is to claim that whatever technical differences exist between their theories, both writers saw the need to incorporate the concept of justice within utilitarianism. Therefore, rather than showing that Mill is an interesting thinker to the extent that he abandons his early Benthamism, by demonstrating how close Mill's theory of utility and justice is to that of Bentham, it will be possible to argue that Bentham employed a sophisticated and subtle utilitarian theory that was responsive to the sort of problems which occupied Mill a generation later.

O Liberalismo em John Rawls e a Resposta aos Comunitaristas

2007 ◽  
Vol 15 (30) ◽  
pp. 61-82
Author(s):  
Denis Coitinho Silveira ◽  
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Ethical Theories ◽  
Justice As Fairness ◽  
Theory Of Justice

The aim of this article is to characterize the John Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness developed in A Theory of Justice (1971), Political Liberalism (1993), Replay to Habermas (1995) and Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (2001), with a view to identifying the convergent points between deontological conception with teleological characteristics and identify a substantive conception of justice, not purely procedural, which is universalist albeit not transcendental, making possible an approach between communitarian and liberal ethical theories.

Taking Utilitarianism Seriously

Utilitas ◽  
1996 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 341-355
Author(s):  
P. J. Kelly
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Significant Challenge ◽  
Insufficient Attention ◽  
Adequate Response ◽  
Mutual Advantage ◽  
Important Sense ◽  
Utilitarian Theory ◽  
The Way

With a book as wide ranging and insightful as Barry's Justice as Impartiality, it is perhaps a little churlish to criticize it for paying insufficient attention to one's own particular interests. That said, in what follows I am going to do just that and claim that in an important sense Barry does not take utilitarianism seriously. Utilitarianism does receive some discussion in Barry's book, and in an important section which I will discuss he even appears to concede that utilitarianism provides a rival though ultimately inadequate theory of justice. Nevertheless, utilitarianism is not considered a rival to ‘justice as impartiality’ in the way that ‘justice as mutual advantage’ and ‘justice as reciprocity’ are. One response, and perhaps the only adequate response, would be to construct a rival utilitarian theory. I cannot provide such a theory in this paper, and I certainly would be very cautious about claiming that I could provide such a theory elsewhere. What I want to suggest is that utilitarianism is a genuine third theory to contrast with ‘justice as mutual advantage’ and ‘justice as impartiality’ – ‘justice as reciprocity’ being merely a hybrid of ‘justice as mutual advantage’, at least as Barry presents it (pp. 46–51). I also want to argue that it poses a more significant challenge to a contractualist theory such as Barry's than his discussion of utilitarianism reveals.

Rawls' Theory of Justice

Dialogue ◽  
1974 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 139-159 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. M. Macleod
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Viable Alternative ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Moral Conception ◽  
Modern Moral Philosophy ◽  
Utilitarian Theory ◽  
The Way

Rawls' main aim in A Theory of Justice is to provide a viable alternative to the utilitarianism which has dominated so much modern moral philosophy. Although philosophers have long recognised the difficulties in the way of acceptance of a utilitarian account of judgments of justice, they have often responded by seeking merely to reformulate the principle of utility. Other philosophers, with a juster appreciation of the seriousness of these difficulties, have been prepared to reject utilitarianism in all its guises, but they have failed (in Rawl's opinion) “to construct a workable and systematic moral conception to oppose it”. What is needed, beyond a powerful reaffirmation of the familiar objections to utilitarian accounts of justice, is the careful elaboration of a radically non-utilitarian theory of justice. It is this need which Rawls sets out to meet in his book.

scholarly journals Posição original e equilíbrio reflexivo em John Rawls: o problema da justificação

2009 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 139-157
Author(s):  
Denis Coitinho Silveira
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Justice As Fairness ◽  
Theory Of Justice

O objetivo deste artigo é estabelecer algumas considerações sobre o papel dos procedimentos de posição original e equilíbrio reflexivo na teoria da justiça como equidade de John Rawls, nas obras A Theory of Justice, Political Liberalism e Justice as Fairness: A Restatement. Eu pretendo mostrar que Rawls faz uso de um modelo coerentista-pragmático de justificação dos princípios de justiça em um âmbito público, que é não-fundacionalista em razão da interconexão entre estes procedimentos.

Political Liberalism and Cultural Diversity

1995 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 297-310 ◽  
Author(s):  
Margaret Moore
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Cultural Diversity ◽  
Culturally Diverse ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
The State ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Liberal Justice ◽  
Political Principles ◽  
Different Cultures

One of the most important and divisive issues facing heterogeneous or culturally diverse states—and most states are culturally diverse—is the relation between these different cultures and the state.This question was raised initially in contemporary liberal political philosophy in terms of the fruitful debate between liberals and communitarians. Sandel, for example, criticized Rawls’s A Theory of Justice and, by extension, all liberal theories for falsely abstracting from conceptions of the good, abstracting from culturallyspecific conceptions, and grounding his liberal principles in terms of an abstract Kantian individualism. Liberal theorists countered by complaining that communitarians falsely conceived of a single homogeneous community. Although Rawls’s revised defense of liberal justice in his 1993 book Political Liberalism does not refer directly to the liberal-communitarian debate, nevertheless, his new grounding of liberal political principles, as principles which would be acceptable to individuals with diverse conceptions of the good, seems to justify liberal principles in terms of contemporary conditions, and, at the same time, challenges the relevance of those theories which appeal to any notion of a homogeneous ‘community’.

scholarly journals O Construtivismo Político: Uma Teoria Pública da Razão Prática/Political Constructivism: a public theory of practical reason

2014 ◽  
Vol 5 (9) ◽  
pp. 17
Author(s):  
Everton Puhl Maciel
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Original Position ◽  
The Political ◽  
Public Justification ◽  
Moral Intuitionism ◽  
A Value ◽  
The Face ◽  
Political Constructivism ◽  
The Universe

RESUMO: Esse trabalho tem por objetivo analisar o construtivismo político da Terceira Conferência da obra Liberalismo Político, de John Rawls. Especificamente, vamos tentar compreender como, limitando o universo de construção aos parâmetros estabelecidos pelo discurso político, podemos estender o alcance dos princípios acordados na posição original para uma comunidade muito mais ampla frente às doutrinas morais abrangentes. Demonstraremos o construtivismo político coerentista não em oposição ao intuicionismo moral utilitarista nem ao construtivismo moral kantiano, mas como capaz de absorver modelos com esse grau de razoabilidade. Isso será disposto através de uma justificação pública tanto do conteúdo quanto da forma do modelo adotado. Assim, o consenso sobreposto apresentado por Rawls é responsável direto pelo resultado democrático que esperamos de uma sociedade onde a publicidade ocupa espaço enquanto fato e possui um valor aceito como legítimo. Nosso método de trabalho envolve uma leitura analítica do texto e de comentadores pertinentes ao assunto proposto.ABSTRACT: This study aims to objective analyze the political constructivism of the Third Conference of the work Political Liberalism, by John Rawls. Specifically, we understand how limiting the universe of construction to the parameters by the political discourse, we can extend the reach of the principles agreed in the original position to a much larger universe in the face of comprehensive moral doctrines. We demonstrate what political constructivism no consistent as opposed to utilitarian moral intuitionism or the Kantian moral constructivism, but as capable of absorbing models with this degree of reasonableness. This will be provided through a public justification of both the content and form of the model adopted. Thus, the overlapping consensus presented by Rawls is directly responsible for the democratic results we expect from a society where democracy takes up space as a fact and has a value accepted as legitimate. KEYWORDS: Constructivism; justification; liberalism.

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