The Rough and Ready Leadership of Zachary Taylor

Author(s):  
Fred I. Greenstein ◽  
Dale Anderson

This chapter assesses the strengths and weaknesses of Zachary Taylor, focusing on six realms: public communication, organizational capacity, political skill, policy vision, cognitive style, and emotional intelligence. Taylor was accomplished career officer who lived up to the nickname “Old Rough and Ready.” By February 1847, he had won a series of battles at Palo Alto, Resaca de la Palma, Monterrey, and Buena Vista. The last victory, in which Taylor's forces won despite being outnumbered three to one, earned the general instant fame. On December 2, 1847, Taylor returned to the United States and began his transition from soldier to would-be politician. After being elected president, it comes as no surprise that Taylor governed the nation in a manner better suited for the battlefield than the White House.

Author(s):  
Fred I. Greenstein ◽  
Dale Anderson

This chapter assesses the strengths and weaknesses of Millard Fillmore, focusing on six realms: public communication, organizational capacity, political skill, policy vision, cognitive style, and emotional intelligence. Vice President Fillmore unexpectedly became the thirteenth president of the United States following the death of Zachary Taylor on July 9, 1850. Fillmore had been sidelined in his predecessor's administration, but in his capacity as presiding officer of the Senate, he had carefully followed the heated congressional debate over the status of slavery in the Mexican Cession. Plunged immediately into a crisis when he assumed the presidency, Fillmore played a critical part in the enactment of compromise legislation that appeared at the time to have averted the threat of a war between the slave and free states.


Author(s):  
Fred I. Greenstein ◽  
Dale Anderson

This chapter assesses the strengths and weaknesses of Abraham Lincoln, focusing on six realms: public communication, organizational capacity, political skill, policy vision, cognitive style, and emotional intelligence. Lincoln entered the White House following a mere eight years as a state legislator and two years in the House of Representatives. He excelled in all of the qualities used here to assess leadership. In the realm of communication, he showed acumen in the way he managed his message, the vision conveyed in his statements, and the clarity of his rhetoric. His organizational methods were unsystematic but effective, and were driven by his political acumen. Lincoln was also a master politician who could cooperate with others regardless of their viewpoints.


Author(s):  
Fred I. Greenstein ◽  
Dale Anderson

This chapter assesses the strengths and weaknesses of Franklin Pierce, focusing on six realms: public communication, organizational capacity, political skill, policy vision, cognitive style, and emotional intelligence. Pierce won the Democratic Party's 1852 presidential nomination after a forty-eight ballot impasse in which none of the party's top three leaders was able to muster the two-thirds vote needed to become the Democratic flag bearer. A gregarious nonentity, he took office amid growing anger over the Fugitive Slave Act and passed on to his successor an acutely polarized nation. Pierce's historical reputation is captured in a survey of sixty-four historians conducted by C-SPAN in which he ranked fortieth in a field of forty-two.


Author(s):  
Fred I. Greenstein ◽  
Dale Anderson

This chapter assesses the strengths and weaknesses of James Buchanan, focusing on six realms: public communication, organizational capacity, political skill, policy vision, cognitive style, and emotional intelligence. Buchanan was a Northern politician with Southern principles—a common phenomenon of the Civil War era. He had been a presence in American politics for more than four decades when he assumed the presidency. It was widely expected that his extensive political experience would enable him to reverse the spiral of conflict between the free and slave states, but when he stepped down, several Southern states had left the Union and war was imminent, in no small part because of his pro-Southern policies.


2020 ◽  
pp. 216747952095077
Author(s):  
Evan L. Frederick ◽  
Ann Pegoraro ◽  
Samuel Schmidt

When asked if she would go to the White House if invited, Megan Rapinoe stated, “I’m not going to the fucking White House.” The next morning, President Donald Trump posted a series of tweets in which he criticized Rapinoe’s statements. In his tweets, Trump introduced issues around race in the United States and brought forth his own notion of nationalism. The purpose of this study was to conduct an analysis of users’ tweets to determine how individuals employed Twitter to craft a narrative and discuss the ongoing Rapinoe and Trump feud within and outside the bounds of Critical Race Theory (CRT) and nationalism. An inductive analysis of 16,137 users’ tweets revealed three primary themes: a) Refuse, Refute, & Redirect Racist Rhetoric b) Stand Up vs. Know your Rights, and c) #ShutUpAndBeALeader. Based on the findings of this study, it appears that the dialogue regarding racism in the United States is quickly evolving. Instead of reciting the same refrain (i.e., racism no longer exists and systematic racism is constructed by Black people) seen in previous works, individuals in the current dataset refuted those talking points and clearly labeled the President as a racist. Additionally, though discussions of nationalism were evident in this dataset, the Stand Up vs. Know Your Rights theme was on the periphery in comparison to discussions of race. Perhaps, this indicates that some have grown tired of Trump utilizing nationalism as a means to stoke racism.


2013 ◽  
Vol 56 (2) ◽  
pp. 185-191
Author(s):  
Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja

Abstract:While Africans are generally satisfied that a person of African descent was reelected to the White House following a campaign in which vicious and racist attacks were made against him, the U.S. Africa policy under President Barack Obama will continue to be guided by the strategic interests of the United States, which are not necessarily compatible with the popular aspirations for democracy, peace, and prosperity in Africa. Obama’s policy in the Great Lakes region provides an excellent illustration of this point. Since Rwanda and Uganda are Washington’s allies in the “war against terror” in Darfur and Somalia, respectively, the Obama administration has done little to stop Kigali and Kampala from destabilizing the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and looting its natural resources, either directly or through proxies. Rwanda and Uganda have even been included in an international oversight mechanism that is supposed to guide governance and security sector reforms in the DRC, but whose real objective is to facilitate Western access to the enormous natural wealth of the Congo and the Great Lakes region.


Significance The Vietnam analogy implies that President Joe Biden’s decision to leave Afghanistan will have deeply negative consequences for the United States. However, Afghanistan is not Vietnam and the Biden withdrawal needs to be considered within the wider context of his administration’s review of US commitments abroad. Impacts The White House will be pressured to clarify the future of other US military commitments, particularly in Iraq. Biden will seek to reassure allies, particularly those in NATO, that his commitment to multilateralism will not diminish. Biden may seek an opportunity for a military show of force, possibly in the Middle East, to refute accusations of weakness.


2005 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 757-795
Author(s):  
Claude Cadart

« From the Sino-Soviet strategic project to the Sino-American strategic project » is a purposely schematic interpretative essay on the evolution of Chinese foreign policy from 1949 to 1979 with emphasis on, the latter phase of that evolution, that of the 1969—1979 period, and more particularly on the last year of that decade, 1979. The project, both defensive and offensive, of American and Chinese co-leadership of the planet that Mao had undertaken to carry out in 1971-1972 with the encouragement of Nixon had to be more or less put aside from 1973 to 1978 because of the seriousness of the domestic crises that were successively shaking both China and the United States during those years. In 1978—79, it was able to be reactivated by Deng Xiaoping who sought, with the benediction of the White House, to add an economic and a cultural dimension to Us diplomatic and strategic dimension. It is unlikely however in the near future that the United States will consider China as other than an auxiliary aspect of the fundamental game of their relations with the most powerful of their adversary-partners, the U.S.S.R. As in the case of the Sino-Soviet strategic project that China promoted from 1949 to 1959, the Sino-American strategic project that China has sought to « sell » the United States since 1969 has not, therefore, much chance of success.


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