Why Tolerate Religion?

Author(s):  
Brian Leiter

This book addresses one of the most enduring puzzles in political philosophy and constitutional theory—why is religion singled out for preferential treatment in both law and public discourse? Why are religious obligations that conflict with the law accorded special toleration while other obligations of conscience are not? The book analyzes the concept of religious toleration, which has long been the paradigm of the liberal ideal of toleration of group differences, as reflected in both the constitutions of the major Western democracies and in the theoretical literature explaining and justifying these practice. The book shows why our reasons for tolerating religion are not specific to religion but apply to all claims of conscience, and why a government committed to liberty of conscience is not required by the principle of toleration to grant exemptions to laws that promote the general welfare.

Author(s):  
Brian Leiter

This chapter analyzes the concept of religious toleration. Religious toleration has long been the paradigm of the liberal ideal of toleration of group differences, as reflected in both the constitutions of the major Western democracies and in the theoretical literature explaining and justifying these practice. But while the historical reasons for the special “pride of place” accorded religious toleration are familiar, what may be more surprising is that no one has been able to articulate a credible principled argument for tolerating religion qua religion—that is, an argument that would explain why, as a matter of moral principle, we ought to accord special legal and moral treatment to religious practices. The answer in this book is: not because of anything that has to do with it being religion as such.


Author(s):  
Gerald M. Mara

This book examines how ideas of war and peace have functioned as organizing frames of reference within the history of political theory. It interprets ten widely read figures in that history within five thematically focused chapters that pair (in order) Schmitt and Derrida, Aquinas and Machiavelli, Hobbes and Kant, Hegel and Nietzsche, and Thucydides and Plato. The book’s substantive argument is that attempts to establish either war or peace as dominant intellectual perspectives obscure too much of political life. The book argues for a style of political theory committed more to questioning than to closure. It challenges two powerful currents in contemporary political philosophy: the verdict that premodern or metaphysical texts cannot speak to modern and postmodern societies, and the insistence that all forms of political theory be some form of democratic theory. What is offered instead is a nontraditional defense of the tradition and a democratic justification for moving beyond democratic theory. Though the book avoids any attempt to show the immediate relevance of these interpretations to current politics, its impetus stems very much from the current political circumstances. Since the beginning of the twenty-first century , a series of wars has eroded confidence in the progressively peaceful character of international relations; citizens of the Western democracies are being warned repeatedly about the threats posed within a dangerous world. In this turbulent context, democratic citizens must think more critically about the actions their governments undertake. The texts interpreted here are valuable resources for such critical thinking.


1996 ◽  
Vol 22 ◽  
pp. 235-260
Author(s):  
Geneviève Nootens

Asserting the relationship between liberalism and nationalism is no easy matter. Liberal philosophers have been very suspicious of the phenomenon of nationalism, partly for historical reasons (e.g., national socialism) and partly for philosophical ones (amongst which a belief that liberal principles would override people's need for identification with ethnocultural communities). But even if some still consider the expression ‘liberal nationalism’ to be an oxymoron, most of current Anglo-American liberal work on the subject leans toward a more nuanced approach, trying to specify how hospitable liberalism should be to nationalistic claims. The challenge, from this point of view, is to explain why and how political philosophy can incorporate national attachments to amoralargument on people's identity and distributive justice. In fact, it seems that nationalist rhetoric has found in identity politics a rather safe (even if narrow) way of entering liberal discourse.


2016 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 3-13 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lori G. Beaman

The European Court of Human Rights decision in <em>SAS</em> from France illustrates how a policy and national mantra that ostensibly aims to enhance inclusiveness, ‘living together’, is legally deployed in a manner that may have the opposite effect. In essence, despite acknowledging the sincerity of SAS’s religious practice of wearing the niqab, and her agency in making the decision to do so, the Court focuses on radicalism and women’s oppression amongst Muslims. Taking the notion of living together as the beginning point, the paper explores the normative assumptions underlying this notion as illustrated in the judgment of the Court. An alternative approach, drawing on the work of Derrida for the notion of ‘living well together’ will be proposed and its implications for social inclusion explicated. The paper’s aim is to move beyond the specific example of <em>SAS</em> and France to argue that the <em>SAS</em> pattern of identifying particular values as ‘national values’, the deployment of those values through law, policy and public discourse, and their exclusionary effects is playing out in a number of Western democracies, including Canada, the country with which the author is most familiar. Because of this widespread dissemination of values and their framing as representative of who ‘we’ are, there is a pressing need to consider the potentially alienating effects of a specific manifestation of ‘living together’ and an alternative model of ‘living well together’.


2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 103-112
Author(s):  
Victor Adefarasin

The political ideas of John Locke have greatly influenced the modern world. His political ideas have actually given to the modern world the concepts of constitutional government, religious toleration, representative institutions, the freedom of individual and private property. In addition, the philosophical theories are embedded in the American and British Constitutions. It is against this background that Lockean political philosophy and its implications for Nigerian politics are discussed in this paper. The paper concludes that Lockean Political Philosophy is of vital importance to Nigerian politics.


The extraordinary breadth and depth of Leibniz’s intellectual vision commands ever increasing attention. As more texts gradually emerge from seemingly bottomless archives, new facets of his contribution to an astonishing variety of fields come to light. This volume provides a uniquely comprehensive, systematic, and up-to-date appraisal of Leibniz’s thought thematically organized around its diverse but interrelated aspects. Discussion of his philosophical system naturally takes place of pride. A cluster of original essays revisit his logic, metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of nature, moral and political philosophy, and philosophy of religion. The scope of the volume, however, goes beyond that of a philosophical collection to embrace all the main features of Leibniz’s thought and activity. Contributions are offered on Leibniz as a mathematician (including not only his calculus but also determinant theory, symmetric functions, the dyadic, the analysis situs, probability and statistics); on Leibniz as a scientist (physics and also optics, cosmology, geology, physiology, medicine, and chemistry); on his technical innovations (the calculating machine and the technology of mining, as well as other discoveries); on his work as an ‘intelligencer’ and cultural networker, as jurist, historian, editor of sources and librarian; on his views on Europe’s political future, religious toleration, and ecclesiastical reunification; on his proposals for political, administrative, economic, and social reform. In so doing, the volume serves as a unique cross-disciplinary point of contact for the many domains to which Leibniz contributed. By assembling leading specialists on all these topics, it offers the most rounded picture of Leibniz’s endeavors currently available.


Author(s):  
Allan Arkush

A Jewish disciple of Leibniz and Wolff, Mendelssohn strove throughout his life to uphold and strengthen their rationalist metaphysics while sustaining his ancestral religion. His most important philosophic task, as he saw it, was to refine and render more persuasive the philosophical proofs for the existence of God, providence and immortality. His major divergence from Leibniz was in stressing that ‘the best of all possible worlds’, which God had created, was in fact more hospitable to human beings than Leibniz had supposed. Towards the end of his life, the irrationalism of Jacobi and the critical philosophy of Kant shook Mendelssohn’s faith in the demonstrability of the fundamental metaphysical precepts, but not his confidence in their truth. They would have to be sustained by ‘common sense’, he reasoned, until future philosophers succeeded in restoring metaphysics to its former glory. While accepting Wolff’s teleological understanding of human nature and natural law, Mendelssohn placed far greater value on human freedom and outlined a political philosophy that protected liberty of conscience. His philosophic defence of his own religion stressed that Judaism is not a ‘revealed religion’ demanding acceptance of particular dogmas but a ‘revealed legislation’ requiring the performance of particular actions. The object of this divine and still valid legislation, he suggested, was often to counteract forces that might otherwise subvert the natural religion entrusted to us by reason. To resolve the tension between his own political liberalism and the Bible’s endorsement of religious coercion, Mendelssohn argued that contemporary Judaism, at any rate, no longer acknowledges any person’s authority to compel others to perform religious acts.


2017 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 23-38 ◽  
Author(s):  
Graeme Cross ◽  
Glenda Campbell-Evans ◽  
Jan Gray

Are religious schools fit to prepare students with the social competencies required for life in a pluralistic society, or do they offer a sheltered school experience, which deprives them of adequate socialization opportunities? This question has emerged in public discourse in response to the growing presence of religious schools in many western democracies, including Australia, where their growth has been prolific in the past 30 years. In this article, the tensions around the place of religion within Australia’s education system and the adequacy of religious schools to prepare students to contribute to the nation’s social cohesion and pluralistic workplaces are investigated.


2010 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 228-241 ◽  
Author(s):  
William A. Galston

AbstractThis essay explores the ways in which a broadly pluralist outlook can help illuminate longstanding issues of constitutional theory and practice. It begins with a common-sense understanding of pluralism as the diversity of observed practices within a general category (section 2). It turns out that many assumptions Americans and others often make about constitutional essentials are valid only locally but not generically. The essay then turns to pluralism in a more technical and philosophical sense—specifically, the account of value pluralism adumbrated by Isaiah Berlin and developed by his followers. Section 3 sketches this version of pluralism, and section 4 brings it to bear on a range of familiar constitutional issues. In the process, a distinction emerges between, on the one hand, areas of variation among constitutions and, on the other, some general truths about political life that define core constitutional functions. The essay concludes (section 5) with some brief reflections on the normative thrust of pluralist constitutional theory—in particular, a presumption in favor of the maximum accommodation of individual and group differences consistent with the maintenance of constitutional unity and civic order.


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