Clinical Ethics and Disorder of Consciousness

2021 ◽  
Vol 66 (Special Issue) ◽  
pp. 42-42
Author(s):  
Chiara-Camilla Derchi ◽  
◽  
Silvia Ceruti ◽  
Ilaria Giubbilo ◽  
◽  
...  

"Disorders of Consciousness (DOCs) identify a diverse group of dysfunctions affecting individuals who have survived severe brain damage. Although the clinical evaluation of patients with DOC normally depends on their residual ability to create a connection with the outside world through motor behavior, in the last ten years neuroscientists have made a great effort to better characterize the patient’s consciousness even in the case of reduced or no motor reactivity. Often, in fact, patients with DOCs are not able to perform any type of movement or adequately understand the command required but they might be still conscious or at least minimally conscious. The gap between patients’ motor capability and their residual brain complexity raises important moral issues, especially about appropriateness and proportionality of interventions and treatments. We argue that Clinical Ethics Consultation may be crucial in addressing these clinical scenarios, which assume aspects of further drama when the DOC derives from a sudden and unexpected acute event such as a trauma or a cerebrovascular accident in healthy patients. In these situations, given the particular vulnerability of the patients and the unpredictability of the diseases, Ethics Consultants should be involved in the therapeutic process in order to improve the standard of care, ensuring compliance with the inclinations and desires of the patients. Moreover, Ethics Consultants should monitor that the procedures are rigorously managed in the context of fully understood consent of those who are legally entitled to make decision. "

2009 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 347-359 ◽  
Author(s):  
STELLA REITER-THEIL

Clinical ethics consultation (CEC) not only interprets moral issues at the bedside and is not restricted to giving support for the “technical” handling of these moral issues, but it has to substantively address moral values, norms, and conflicts in the process of discussing cases and problems. We call this the normative dimension and use normative in the sense of embracing moral values and convictions of persons and groups, norms, and relevant professional and ethical guidelines as well as legal frameworks. The roles and activities of the consultant as a person and the quality of CEC as a process are discussed in the American Society of Bioethics and Humanities’ (ASBH) Core Competences for Healthcare Ethics Consultation.


2010 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 76-82 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin M. Monti ◽  
Adrian M. Owen

Recent evidence has suggested that functional neuroimaging may play a crucial role in assessing residual cognition and awareness in brain injury survivors. In particular, brain insults that compromise the patient’s ability to produce motor output may render standard clinical testing ineffective. Indeed, if patients were aware but unable to signal so via motor behavior, they would be impossible to distinguish, at the bedside, from vegetative patients. Considering the alarming rate with which minimally conscious patients are misdiagnosed as vegetative, and the severe medical, legal, and ethical implications of such decisions, novel tools are urgently required to complement current clinical-assessment protocols. Functional neuroimaging may be particularly suited to this aim by providing a window on brain function without requiring patients to produce any motor output. Specifically, the possibility of detecting signs of willful behavior by directly observing brain activity (i.e., “brain behavior”), rather than motoric output, allows this approach to reach beyond what is observable at the bedside with standard clinical assessments. In addition, several neuroimaging studies have already highlighted neuroimaging protocols that can distinguish automatic brain responses from willful brain activity, making it possible to employ willful brain activations as an index of awareness. Certainly, neuroimaging in patient populations faces some theoretical and experimental difficulties, but willful, task-dependent, brain activation may be the only way to discriminate the conscious, but immobile, patient from the unconscious one.


2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (5) ◽  
pp. 665
Author(s):  
Rocco Salvatore Calabrò ◽  
Loris Pignolo ◽  
Claudia Müller-Eising ◽  
Antonino Naro

Pain perception in individuals with prolonged disorders of consciousness (PDOC) is still a matter of debate. Advanced neuroimaging studies suggest some cortical activations even in patients with unresponsive wakefulness syndrome (UWS) compared to those with a minimally conscious state (MCS). Therefore, pain perception has to be considered even in individuals with UWS. However, advanced neuroimaging assessment can be challenging to conduct, and its findings are sometimes difficult to be interpreted. Conversely, multichannel electroencephalography (EEG) and laser-evoked potentials (LEPs) can be carried out quickly and are more adaptable to the clinical needs. In this scoping review, we dealt with the neurophysiological basis underpinning pain in PDOC, pointing out how pain perception assessment in these individuals might help in reducing the misdiagnosis rate. The available literature data suggest that patients with UWS show a more severe functional connectivity breakdown among the pain-related brain areas compared to individuals in MCS, pointing out that pain perception increases with the level of consciousness. However, there are noteworthy exceptions, because some UWS patients show pain-related cortical activations that partially overlap those observed in MCS individuals. This suggests that some patients with UWS may have residual brain functional connectivity supporting the somatosensory, affective, and cognitive aspects of pain processing (i.e., a conscious experience of the unpleasantness of pain), rather than only being able to show autonomic responses to potentially harmful stimuli. Therefore, the significance of the neurophysiological approach to pain perception in PDOC seems to be clear, and despite some methodological caveats (including intensity of stimulation, multimodal paradigms, and active vs. passive stimulation protocols), remain to be solved. To summarize, an accurate clinical and neurophysiological assessment should always be performed for a better understanding of pain perception neurophysiological underpinnings, a more precise differential diagnosis at the level of individual cases as well as group comparisons, and patient-tailored management.


2020 ◽  
Vol 31 (8) ◽  
pp. 905-914 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yali Feng ◽  
Jiaqi Zhang ◽  
Yi Zhou ◽  
Zhongfei Bai ◽  
Ying Yin

AbstractNoninvasive brain stimulation (NIBS) techniques have been used to facilitate the recovery from prolonged unconsciousness as a result of brain injury. The aim of this study is to systematically assess the effects of NIBS in patients with a disorder of consciousness (DOC). We searched four databases for any randomized controlled trials on the effect of NIBS in patients with a DOC, which used the JFK Coma Recovery Scale-Revised (CRS-R) as the primary outcome measure. A random-effects meta-analysis was conducted to pool effect sizes. Fourteen studies with 273 participants were included in this review, of which 12 studies with sufficient data were included in the meta-analysis. Our meta-analysis showed a significant effect on increasing CRS-R scores in favor of real stimulation as compared to sham (Hedges’ g = 0.522; 95% confidence interval [CI], 0.318–0.726; P < 0.0001, I2 = 0.00%). Subgroup analysis demonstrated that only anodal transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) of the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) significantly enhances the CRS-R scores in patients with a DOC, as compared to sham (Hedges’ g = 0.703; 95% CI, 0.419–0.986; P < 0.001), and this effect was predominant in patients in a minimally conscious state (MCS) (Hedges’ g = 0.815; 95% CI, 0.429–1.200; P < 0.001). Anodal tDCS of the left DLPFC appears to be an effective approach for patients with MCS.


1999 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 351-357
Author(s):  
Edward Rudin

Fox, McGee, and Caplan's “Paradigms for Clinical Ethics Consultation Practice”, in the Summer 1998 issue of CQ, evoked memories and an image.


2021 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 77-79
Author(s):  
Aleksandra E. Olszewski ◽  
Maya Scott ◽  
Arika Patneaude ◽  
Elliott M. Weiss ◽  
Aaron Wightman

2011 ◽  
Vol 39 (4) ◽  
pp. 649-661 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lisa M. Rasmussen

A major obstacle to broad support of clinical ethics consultation (CEC) is suspicion regarding the nature of the moral expertise it claims to offer. The suspicion seems to be confirmed when the field fails to make its moral expertise explicit. In this vacuum, critics suggest the following:(1)Clinical ethics consultation's legitimacy depends on its ability to offer an expertise in moral matters.(2)Expertise in moral matters is knowledge of a singular moral truth which applies to everyone.(3)The claim that a clinical ethics consultant can offer knowledge of a singular moral truth in virtue of her professional training is absurd, false, or gravely immoral.Therefore,(4)The field is illegitimate.


2015 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-27 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fariba Asghari ◽  
Alireza Parsapoor ◽  
Khorshid Vaskooi ◽  
Saeedeh Saeedi Tehrani

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document