Normative Ethics of Two Categories of Offenders

1983 ◽  
Vol 53 (2) ◽  
pp. 443-446 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph L. Wolff ◽  
Kathi S. Smith
Keyword(s):  
Moral Reasoning ◽  
Normative Ethics ◽  
Personality Measures ◽  
Intensive Supervision ◽  
Moral Content

Previous research has established that various measures of moral reasoning and axiological orientation are capable of differentiating criminal from noncriminal populations and between probationers convicted of various types of offenses. Traditional personality measures (such as the MMPI), by comparison, do not seem to discriminate so reliably. In the present study a new measure of moral reasoning, the Moral Content Components Test, was explored as a possible aid for the classification of probationers requiring different degrees of supervision. Two scales reliably distinguished probationers requiring regular or intensive supervision. It was concluded that the test has potential as an aid to probationary classification.

scholarly journals Deontic Moral Reasoning Task

2019 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 483-506
Author(s):  
Mislav Sudić ◽  
Pavle Valerjev ◽  
Josip Ćirić
Keyword(s):  
Moral Reasoning ◽  
Qualitative Difference ◽  
Blind Spot ◽  
Superior Performance ◽  
Abstract Reasoning ◽  
Reasoning Task ◽  
Confidence Levels ◽  
Deontic Reasoning ◽  
Moral Content ◽  
Rule Type

Domain theory suggests that moral rules and conventions are perceived differently and elicit a different response. A special procedure was designed to test this hypothesis in a laboratory setting using a deontic reasoning task. The goal was to gain insight into the cognitive and metacognitive processes of deontic reasoning from simple deontic premises. In the 3x2x2 within-subjects design, we varied rule-content (moral, conventional, abstract), rule-type (obligation, permission) and the induced dilemma (punishment dilemma, reward dilemma). Participants (N = 78) were presented with 12 laws. After memorizing a law, eight cases were presented to participants so that they make a quick judgment. Participants were tasked with punishing rule-violators, ignoring rule-conformists, and rewarding rule-supererogation. Response times (RT) and accuracy were measured for each judgment, and final confidence was measured after a set of judgments. No differences were expected between rule-types, except for superior performance for moral content and punishment dilemmas. RT correlated negatively with confidence levels, while accuracy correlated positively. Moral reasoning was more accurate than conventional and abstract reasoning, and produced higher confidence levels. Better performance was found for punishment dilemmas than reward dilemmas, likely due to the presence of a cheater-detection module; but the differences were not found in moral reasoning. Moral reasoning was also independent of rule-type, while conventional and abstract reasoning produced superior performance in obligation-type than in permission-type rules. A large drop-off in accuracy was detected for rules that allowed undesirable behaviour, a phenomenon we termed the "deontic blind spot". However, this blind spot was not present in moral reasoning. Three lines of evidence indicate a qualitative difference between the moral and other deontic domains: (1) performance for moral content was independent of rule-type, (2) moral content produced an equal activation of violator- and altruist-detection modules, and (3) moral content produces higher levels of confidence.

Bioethics Testimony: Untangling the Strands and Testing Their Reliability

2005 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 222-233 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bethany J. Spielman
Keyword(s):  
Moral Reasoning ◽  
Normative Ethics ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
A Chain

In The Abuse of Casuistry Jonsen and Toulmin describe one view of moral reasoning as follows:Those who take a rhetorical view of moral reasoning… do not assume that moral reasoning relies for its force on single chains of unbreakable deductions which link present cases back to some common starting point. Rather (they believe), this strength comes from accumulating many parallel, complementary considerations, which have to do with the current circumstances of the human individuals and communities involved and lend strength to our conclusions, not like links to a chain but like strands to a rope or roots to a tree.Whether or not all moral reasoning resembles “strands to a rope,” bioethics testimony certainly does. Bioethics testimony is eclectic, a composite of many loosely woven strands. Rarely, if ever, is bioethics testimony “a chain of unbreakable deductions.” Rarely is it “pure” ethics, much less pure normative ethics.

Ethical basis of the preliminary investigation

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aleksey Zakomoldin ◽  
Dmitry Kudzilov
Keyword(s):  
High Schools ◽  
Law Enforcement ◽  
Preliminary Investigation ◽  
Criminal Procedure ◽  
Criminal Cases ◽  
Procedural Law ◽  
Moral Content ◽  
Ethical Basis

The monograph deals with the current problems of the ethical element of procedural activity at the stage of preliminary investigation in the modern criminal procedure of Russia. It approaches to the classification of norms governing moral content of pre-trial proceedings in criminal cases, analyses the ethical basis of application of measures of criminal procedural enforcement and production of investigative actions during the preliminary investigation. The publication is intended for students, postgraduates, scientists and teachers of law high schools, judges, prosecutors, investigators, inquirers and other law enforcement and judicial officials, as well as all people interested in the problems of modern criminal procedural law.

The Use of Developmental Psychology in Ethics

2015 ◽  
pp. 1828-1848
Author(s):  
Craig Steven Titus
Keyword(s):  
Moral Development ◽  
Common Good ◽  
Moral Agency ◽  
Developmental Psychology ◽  
Moral Character ◽  
Integrated Approach ◽  
Normative Ethics ◽  
Moral Content ◽  
The Common ◽  
Ethical Norms

This chapter argues that a developmental psychology based in a wider notion of reason and ultimate flourishing can employ both duty and virtue in the service of the common good. It identifies several important differences between cognitive structuralism and virtue-based approaches concerning the pre-empirical priority paid to either duty or virtue in moral development. It brings to light several challenges concerning the use of developmental psychology in ethics: (1) a weakness in schools of cognitive structuralism, such as that of Lawrence Kohlberg, inasmuch as they do not move beyond the theory of stages and structures that focus only on the cognitive judgment of justice and on duty; (2) a weakness in developmental virtue approaches, such as that of Martin Seligman, inasmuch as they do not employ moral content in the operative notions of virtues and values. This article concludes that a heartier notion of developmental psychology and normative ethics will need to recognize the interrelated nature of ethical acts (moral agency), ethical agents (moral character), and ethical norms (duties and law). Such an integrated approach must also attend to the input that diverse philosophical and religious presuppositions make toward understanding the place of developmental psychology in the practice of ethics.

Do advanced moral reasoners also show wisdom? Linking moral reasoning and wisdom-related knowledge and judgement

2001 ◽  
Vol 25 (5) ◽  
pp. 401-415 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. Pasupathi ◽  
U. M. Staudinger
Keyword(s):  
Moral Reasoning ◽  
Psychological Functioning ◽  
Threshold Model ◽  
Empirical Relation ◽  
Personality Measures ◽  
Divergent Validity ◽  
Person Characteristics ◽  
High Level ◽  
Open Question ◽  
Very High

Wisdom and morality are both discussed as developmental ideals. They are often associated in theoretical contexts but the nature of their empirical relation is still an open question. We hypothesised that moral reasoning (one facet of morality), would be related to wisdom-related knowledge and judgement, but that the two represent different facets of high level psychological functioning. A sample of 220 adults ranging in age from 20 to 87 years completed measures of wisdom-related performance, moral reasoning, and a battery of cognitive and personality measures. As predicted, moral reasoning was positively associated with wisdom-related performance, although we also found evidence for divergent validity of these two constructs. This association was mediated by person characteristics (e.g., personality, intelligence, and additional measures). In addition, as predicted by a threshold model, very high levels of wisdom-related performance were unlikely among those with very low moral reasoning performance. In line with neo-Piagetian conceptions, exploratory analyses suggested that higher age was associated with higher levels of wisdom-related knowledge and judgement only for those with high levels of moral reasoning. Results are discussed in terms of a lifespan model of wisdom-related knowledge and judgement.

The Use of Developmental Psychology in Ethics

2013 ◽  
pp. 266-286 ◽  
Author(s):  
Craig Steven Titus
Keyword(s):  
Moral Development ◽  
Common Good ◽  
Moral Agency ◽  
Developmental Psychology ◽  
Moral Character ◽  
Integrated Approach ◽  
Normative Ethics ◽  
Moral Content ◽  
The Common ◽  
Ethical Norms

This chapter argues that a developmental psychology based in a wider notion of reason and ultimate flourishing can employ both duty and virtue in the service of the common good. It identifies several important differences between cognitive structuralism and virtue-based approaches concerning the pre-empirical priority paid to either duty or virtue in moral development. It brings to light several challenges concerning the use of developmental psychology in ethics: (1) a weakness in schools of cognitive structuralism, such as that of Lawrence Kohlberg, inasmuch as they do not move beyond the theory of stages and structures that focus only on the cognitive judgment of justice and on duty; (2) a weakness in developmental virtue approaches, such as that of Martin Seligman, inasmuch as they do not employ moral content in the operative notions of virtues and values. This article concludes that a heartier notion of developmental psychology and normative ethics will need to recognize the interrelated nature of ethical acts (moral agency), ethical agents (moral character), and ethical norms (duties and law). Such an integrated approach must also attend to the input that diverse philosophical and religious presuppositions make toward understanding the place of developmental psychology in the practice of ethics.

scholarly journals Morality, Normativity, and the Good System 2 Fallacy

Diametros ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 1-6
Author(s):  
Wim De Neys
Keyword(s):  
Moral Reasoning ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Process Model ◽  
Probabilistic Reasoning ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Dual Process Model ◽  
Good System ◽  
System 2

In this commentary, I warn against a possible dual process misconception that might lead people to conclude that utilitarian judgments are normatively correct. I clarify how the misconception builds on (1) the association between System 2 and normativity in the dual process literature on logical/probabilistic reasoning, and (2) the classification of utilitarian judgments as resulting from System 2 processing in the dual process model of moral reasoning. I present theoretical and empirical evidence against both premises.  

scholarly journals Automated Classification of Modes of Moral Reasoning in Judicial Decisions

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nischal Mainali ◽  
Elliott Ash ◽  
Daniel L. Chen ◽  
Liam Meier
Keyword(s):  
Moral Reasoning ◽  
Automated Classification ◽  
Judicial Decisions

Sex Differences in Moral Judgments? A Test of Gilligan's Theory

1987 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-46 ◽  
Author(s):  
William J. Friedman ◽  
Amy B. Robinson ◽  
Britt L. Friedman
Keyword(s):  
College Students ◽  
Sex Differences ◽  
Individual Differences ◽  
Moral Reasoning ◽  
Confidence Intervals ◽  
Moral Dilemmas ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Personality Measures ◽  
Men And Women ◽  
Rank Orders

This study was designed to test Gilligan's (1982) claim that men and women differ in moral judgments. One hundred and one college students read four traditional moral dilemmas and rated the importance of 12 considerations for deciding how the protagonist should respond. Six of the statements were derived from the description by Kohlberg et al. (1978) of post-conventional moral reasoning, and six were derived from Gilligan's description of women's style of moral reasoning. Subjects also rated themselves on a measure of sex-typed personality attributes. There were no reliable sex differences on either of the types of moral reasoning, and confidence intervals allowed the rejection of all but negligible differences in the directions predicted by Gilligan's model. Furthermore, men and women showed highly similar rank orders of the items for each dilemma. The personality measures also failed to predict individual differences in moral judgments.

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