Macroeconomic Trends in the New Member Countries of the European Union Before the Euro Area Debt Crisis

2014 ◽  
Vol 61 (2) ◽  
pp. 197-217
Author(s):  
Ivan Krumov Todorov

Abstract The objective of this paper is to outline the main macroeconomic trends in the new member countries of the European Union before the Euro Area debt crisis. In order to achieve this objective, the developments in a wide range of macroeconomic indicators (exchange rates, foreign trade, monetary policy, inflation, price levels, and fiscal balances, sovereign debt, GDP, labour productivity, composition of output and current account balances) have been analyzed. The analysis results in recommendations on the macroeconomic policies the new member countries should have implemented under global crisis condition in accordance with the peculiarities of their economies and their specific national priorities.

2020 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Nicoletta Layher ◽  
Eyden Samunderu

This paper conducts an empirical study on the inclusion of uniform European Collective Action Clauses (CACs) in sovereign bond contracts issued from member states of the European Union, introduced as a regulatory result of the European sovereign debt crisis. The study focuses on the reaction of sovereign bond yields from European Union member states with the inclusion of the new regulation in the European Union. A two-stage least squares regression analysis is adopted in order to determine the extent of impact effects of CACs on member states sovereign bond yields. Evidence is found that CACs in the European Union are priced on financial markets and that sovereign bond yields do respond to the inclusion of uniform CACs in the European Union.


2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhiyong An

Abstract Eurobonds, dubbed as Coronabonds in the context of the current coronavirus crisis, are being hotly debated among the euro area member states amid the COVID-19 pandemic. The debate is in many ways a retread of the euro area sovereign debt crisis of 2011–2012. As China’s “debt centralization/decentralization” experience is comparable with the introduction of Eurobonds in the European Union (EU) in terms of institutional mechanism design, we review our previous series of studies of China’s “debt centralization/decentralization” experience to shed some light on the Eurobonds debate. We obtain three key lessons. First, the introduction of Eurobonds in EU is likely to soften the budget constraint of the governments of the euro area member states. Second, it is also likely to strengthen the moral hazard incentives of the governments of the euro area member states to intentionally overstate their budget problems. Finally, the magnitudes of the moral hazard effects generated by the introduction of Eurobonds in EU are likely larger than their respective counterparts in China.


2016 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 227-240 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicos Souliotis ◽  
Georgia Alexandri

This article traces the transfer of competitiveness and cohesion policies from the European Union (EU) institutions to the national and subnational authorities in Greece, both before and after the sovereign debt crisis. We argue that prior to the crisis, the flexibilities of the EU governance system allowed the Greek central government to use the competitiveness and cohesion agenda, as well as the associated funds, to build a domestic socio-political consensus focused on the idea of ‘convergence’ with Europe. The crisis-induced bailout programme deepened neoliberal policies and reorganised vertical and horizontal power relations: policy-making powers have been upscaled towards the supranational level, while the national authorities have been socially disembedded.


2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (8) ◽  
pp. 362
Author(s):  
Agnieszka Gehringer ◽  
Jörg König

This paper studies the process of business cycle synchronization in the European Union and the euro area. As our baseline methodology we adopt rolling window correlation coefficients of various economic indicators, observed since 2000. Among the indicators, we distinguish between real economic indicators, like the real GDP growth and unemployment, and nominal indicators, like inflation and government budget. Given the direct implication of this kind of analysis for the common monetary policy of the European Central Bank (ECB), special attention is paid to the pattern of business cycle synchronization in the core and peripheral members of the euro area. Our analysis of quarterly data covering the first two decades of the euro area shows that there was a certain synchronization tendency in the first years of the common currency. However, the European debt crisis halted the economic integration within the European Union and—even more so—within the euro area. Since the ECB can to a large extent intervene only with “one-size-fits-all” monetary policy instruments, this renders increasingly cumbersome the conduct of stabilisation policies within the euro area.


2019 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 190-216
Author(s):  
Matteo De Poli ◽  
Pierre de Gioia Carabellese

With the birth of the Single Supervisory Mechanism came the emergence of a new regime of supervision of the banking industry in the Eurozone. The allocation of enforcement powers between the European Central Bank and the National Competent Authorities is the corollary of the unified supervision, which reverberates from the Single Supervisory Mechanism, and it is ultimately the main theme of this contribution. More specifically, the architecture of the enforcement, principally shaped by the SSM and its principles and rules, is assessed and analysed in this paper against the background of the general theory of enforcement, as developed in the legal literature. The enforcement discourse in the European Union banking sector is debated alongside its interaction with the related aspects of the regulation and supervision and the way these three notions have been integrated and codified in the European Union after the 2011 sovereign debt crisis.


Author(s):  
Lucinda Cadzow

The Eurozone was left reeling after the sovereign debt crisis in 2009. Huge bailouts to governments and banks to stabilise the Euro ensued and policymakers within the European Union (EU hereafter) sought to find a solution to the vulnerability of the Euro to volatility induced by currency speculation.1 In 2011, a Financial Transactions Tax (FTT hereafter) was proposed by the European Commission as both a method of recovering some of the funds that were lost due to the remedial fiscal policies that were implemented after the crisis, and also to be used as a corrective mechanism in order to reduce the volatility apparently caused by high frequency trades and currency speculators.2 The tax was to apply to trades in stocks and bonds, as well as derivatives, at a harmonised minimum of 0.1 per cent and a 0.01 per cent tax rate respectively.


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