scholarly journals Use of Force in Cyberspace

2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 174-191
Author(s):  
Jozef Valuch ◽  
Ondrej Hamuľák

Summary The ban on the use of force in current international law is of mandatory character. The only exceptions are actions under the auspices of the UN Security Council and self-defence. The article addresses the issue of the use of force, with particular emphasis on cyberspace. As the nature of the conflicts has changed in recent years as well as the space where the individual operations have been moving, a number of fundamental questions arise in this context, which the authors will try to answer.

Author(s):  
Douglas Guilfoyle

This chapter examines the use of force against piracy in the context of international law, with particular reference to the pirates off Somalia. It discusses the counter-piracy activities by multinational military forces under the applicable public international law of the sea and as law enforcement operations. It also considers the issues raised by the use of force by private merchant vessels in self-defence, including the use of privately contracted armed security personnel. The chapter reviews the relevant UN Security Council resolutions and the legal regime applicable at sea and ashore within Somalia itself. It also analyses the Council’s authorization of states to use ‘all necessary means to repress acts of piracy and armed robbery’ within Somalia’s territorial sea.


Author(s):  
Ilias Bantekas ◽  
Efthymios Papastavridis

This chapter examines under what circumstances States may use armed force under customary international law and Arts 2(4) and 51 UN Charter. After noting that the use of armed force is generally prohibited and only limited to self-defence, and then only if the target State is under an armed attack, we show that several States have expanded the notion of armed attack. Besides self-defence, the Security Council may authorize the use of armed force through a process of collective security. Several examples of collective security are offered, as well as the ICJ’s position on what constitutes an armed attack. In recent years, the range of actors capable of undertaking an armed attack has included terrorists. Moreover, the development of the doctrine of the responsibility to protect is a significant achievement.


Author(s):  
Byers Michael

This chapter addresses the US and NATO-led intervention in Afghanistan from 2001 to the present day. It examines the different legal justifications advanced or available for the intervention, namely self-defence, UN Security Council authorization, and intervention by invitation. It explores the complex relationships between these justifications and, particularly, the strategies adopted by states in choosing between them. The chapter concludes by considering the effects of the intervention on the customary international law of self-defence as it concerns non-state actors located in “unaware or unable” states, and anticipatory or pre-emptive responses.


Author(s):  
Haidi Willmot ◽  
Ralph Mamiya

This chapter focuses on the conception and evolution of the UN Security Council mandate to protect civilians during peacekeeping operations from 1960 to the present. The chapter examines the normative and legal framework of the use of force to protect civilians in UN peacekeeping operations, with reference to Security Council resolutions and other bodies of international law such as humanitarian and human rights law. It considers Security Council practice between 1960 and 1999 and its emphasis on the concept of self-defence; Security Council practice from 1999 to 2007 regarding the inception and development of the explicit ‘protection of civilians’ mandate by the Council; Security Council practice from 2007 to 2011; and prioritization of the mandate in certain peacekeeping missions, specifically UNAMID (Sudan (Darfur)), MONUC (Democratic Republic of the Congo), UNOCI (Côte d’Ivoire), and UNMISS (South Sudan). Finally, the chapter describes Security Council practice from 2011 onwards and draws conclusions on impact that the protection of civilians mandate in peacekeeping operations has had on the evolution of the legitimate use of force under the UN Charter.


Author(s):  
Ben Saul

International law has struggled to regulate terrorism for over a century, beginning with efforts to cooperate in the extradition and prosecution of suspects, including through unsuccessful League of Nations efforts to define and criminalize terrorism as such. Until 2001 most international attention focused on transnational criminal cooperation against terrorism, through the development of method-specific “prosecute or extradite” treaties (concerning, for instance, violence against aircraft or ships, hostage taking, or attacks on diplomats) but without defining terrorism as a general concept or crime. It may, however, be possible to qualify some terrorist acts as war crimes or crimes against humanity. Since the 1970s, there were ambivalent efforts through the UN General Assembly to develop normative frameworks to confront terrorism per se, which often came unstuck on the controversial issues of “state terrorism” and liberation movement violence. Greater consensus was achieved by 1994 with the General Assembly’s adoption of a declaration against terrorism. There appears to exist an international consensus that terrorism per se is wrongful, even if disagreement remains about identifying precisely what constitutes terrorism. The effort to deal with terrorism as such suggests that the international community views terrorism as more than its underlying physical parts, which are already crimes in most national legal systems and under certain transnational treaties. The special wrongfulness of terrorism is perhaps signified by its intimidation of civilian populations, its coercion of governments or international organizations, and its political, religious, or ideological aspect. Terrorist violence has also sometimes raised certain problems under the law of armed conflict and the law on the use of force, as well as occasionally attracted sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council. Terrorism was generally dealt with, however, through the application of general legal norms rather than through the emergence of terrorism-specific rules. After the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, sharper international focus was brought to bear on the legal challenges presented by terrorism and counter-terrorism in numerous specialized branches of international law (particularly in the law of state responsibility, the law on the use of force, and international humanitarian law), as well as in the institutional practices of the UN Security Council and the impacts of counter-terrorism measures on international human rights law. By 2011 the UN Special Tribunal for Lebanon even declared the existence of an international customary law crime of transnational terrorism, although that decision has proven highly controversial as not supported by state practice. Efforts to negotiate a comprehensive international convention against terrorism have continued since 2000, with disagreement remaining over the scope of exceptions. There is also now increasing debate about whether a field of international anti-terrorism law is emerging.


AJIL Unbound ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 112 ◽  
pp. 113-117
Author(s):  
Ian Johnstone

Monica Hakimi's article probes the legal significance of an interesting phenomenon: the UN Security Council condoning the use of force, as opposed to authorizing it. She offers an innovative perspective on this little-studied dimension of how the Council contributes to the development of jus ad bellum. While I applaud much in the article, I question her characterization of what the Council is condoning in the cases she reviews. She claims these are “fact-specific decisions,” whereas I argue that the Council is endorsing controversial interpretations of the law on the use of force. This disagreement does not detract from Hakimi's observations about the policy implications of the practice, or about the Council's role as a site for deliberation and argumentation about the content of international law. But it does cast doubt on her conceptual claim that there are two distinct “regulatory forms,” which together provide the content of jus ad bellum, one particularistic and procedural, the other general and substantive. All legal claims and justifications entail the application of general standards to particular facts, either explicitly or implicitly. Most of her case studies can be explained in those terms. Thus, while the Council's practice of condoning the use of force is important to understand, the “conventional account” she derides provides a more persuasive and parsimonious explanation of that phenomenon.


Author(s):  
Grant Tom

This chapter considers a particular aspect of the UN Security Council sanctions regime: the procedure for removing individuals or entities from the Sanctions List. The novelty of the delisting procedure justifies considering it in some detail. The delisting procedure is the main response at the international level to the human rights question raised by the Security Council sanctions regime. Because certain consequences for an individual follow at the national level from the fact of the individual having been listed, a procedure that goes to the listing itself holds particular interest for those to whom the regime might apply. The chapter concludes that the delisting procedure will continue to evolve as the Security Council grapples with procedural fairness and individual rights with which it has not historically had much to do.


Author(s):  
Nicole Scicluna

This chapter explores the justness, legitimacy, and legality of war. While 1945 was a key turning point in the codification of jus ad bellum (i.e. international law on the use of force), that framework did not emerge in a vacuum. Rather, it was the product of historical political contingencies that meant that codification of the laws of war was contemporaneous, both geographically and temporally, with the solidification of the norms of sovereign nation-statehood and territorial integrity. The chapter focuses on the UN Charter regime and how it has shaped the politics of war since 1945. Importantly, the Charter establishes a general prohibition on the use of force in international relations. It also grants two exceptions to the prohibition: actions undertaken with Security Council authorization and actions taken in self-defence. Today, many of the most serious challenges to the Charter regime concern the definition and outer limits of the concept of self-defence. Another set of challenges to the Charter regime concerns the contested concept of ‘humanitarian intervention’. The chapter then looks at the development of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ doctrine.


1992 ◽  
Vol 32 (287) ◽  
pp. 183-186
Author(s):  
Aristidis S. Calogeropoulos-Stratis

Recently, a number of armed conflicts have broken out in Europe or not far away: armed conflicts between States — the Gulf War, for example, authorized by UN Security Council resolution 678 — or wars of national liberation, such as the armed conflict in Yugoslavia or the revolt in Kurdistan. Whether or not the use of force was legitimate in each of these situations, and even though the classic notion of a “just war” no longer exists, all parties to any armed conflict have a moral, legal and humanitarian obligation to abide by the laws and customs of war in the conduct of hostilities and indeed throughout the entire conflict.


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