scholarly journals “Censorship of the orthodox press in communism. Case study: “Glasul wBisericii” Journal”

Sæculum ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 49 (1) ◽  
pp. 86-95
Author(s):  
Silviu-Constantin Nedelcu

AbstractThe present study treats a very little researched subject in the specialized literature, respectively the censorship of the orthodox press in communism. We turned our attention to the periodical publication “Glasul Bisericii”, the official magazine of the Metropolitan Church of Ungrovlahia. During the communist regime, the religious press was doubly censored. This was exercised by two institutions, namely: the Department of Cults and the General Directorate of Press and Printing. The censors of the Department of Cults who dealt with the journals of religious cults did not necessarily have theological studies, for which reason they could not understand certain specialized terms or phrases. This thing can be seen into the report signed by the censor Ecaterina Durosov Macheev, from 1971. Another example would be the typing mystakes that escaped from the watchful eye of censorship, and that could have affected the relations between Romanian Orthodox Church and Russian Orthodox Church and, implicitly, with the Soviet Union.

2006 ◽  
pp. 73-79
Author(s):  
Olena V. Katunina

During the Second World War, two new government bodies were established in the Soviet Union to deal with religious communities: on September 14, 1943, the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church was formed, and on May 19, 1944, the Council for Religious Cults. Their formation was linked to the liberalization of Stalin's policy on the church, which supported the state in its fight against fascism. The creation of two independent structures was also due to the fact that the communist regime paid special attention to cooperation with the leadership of the Orthodox Church, whose leaders not only raised funds for the needs of the front, but also were leaders of Stalin's political line, both within the state and in the its borders. In order to coordinate these activities more effectively, a Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church was set up, headed by intelligence officers. In recent years, a large number of ground works have been published, which analyze the issues of interaction between the Orthodox Church and the state during the years of Soviet power. N.Hordienko, Yu.Katunin, M.Korzun, V.Paschenko, D.Pospelovsky, V.Tsipin and many other Ukrainian and foreign authors dealt with these issues.


Author(s):  
Konrad Kuczara

Relations between the Ukrainian Church and Constantinople were difficult. This goes back as far as 988, when the Christianisation of the Rus created a strong alliance between Kiev and the Byzantine Empire. There were times when Constantinople had no influence over the Kiev Metropolis. During the Mongolian invasion in 1240, the Ukranian region was broken up and Kiev lost its power. The headquarters of the Kiev Metropolis were first moved to Wlodzimierz nad Klazma in 1299 and then to Moscow in1325. In 1458 the Metropolis of Kiev was divided into two; Kiev and Moscow, but Kiev still remained under the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate of Constantinople. Since that time, the orthodox hierarchs of Moscow no longer adhered to the title Bishop of Kiev and the whole of Rus and in 1588 the Patriarchate of Moscow was founded. In 1596 when  the Union of Brest was formed,  the orthodox church of the Polish Lithuanian Commonwealth was not liquidated. Instead it was formally revived in 1620 and in 1632 it was officially recognized by king Wladyslaw Waza. In 1686 the Metropolis of Kiev which until that time was under the Patriarchate of Constantinople was handed over to the jurisdiction of Moscow. It was tsarist diplomats that bribed the Ottoman Sultan of the time to force the Patriarchate to issue a decree giving Moscow jurisdiction over the Metropolis of Kiev. In the beginning of the 19th century, Kiev lost its Metropolitan status and became a regular diocese of the Russian Orthodox Church. Only in the beginning of the 20thcentury, during the time of the Ukrainian revolution were efforts made to create an independent Church of Ukraine. In 1919 the autocephaly was announced, but the Patriarchate of Constantinople did not recognize it. . The structure of this Church was soon to be liquidated and it was restored again after the second world war at the time when Hitler occupied the Ukraine. In 1992, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, when Ukraine gained its independence, the Metropolitan of Kiev requested that the Orthodox Church of Ukraine becomes autocephalous but his request was rejected by the Patriarchate of Moscow. Until 2018 the Patriarchate of Kiev and the autocephalous Church remained unrecognized and thus considered schismatic. In 2018 the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople looked  into the matter and on 5thJanuary 2019, the Orthodox Church of Ukraine received it’s tomos of autocephaly from Constantinople. The Patriarchate of Moscow opposed the decision of Constantinople and as a result refused to perform a common Eucharist with the new Church of Ukraine and with the Patriarchate of Constantinople.


1955 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 329-344 ◽  
Author(s):  
N. S. Timasheff

During the years 1939–45, a spectacular change occurred in the anti-religious policy of the Soviet government. The pattern of direct persecution was discarded and replaced by a more subtle pattern of ostentatious compromise in combination with indirect pressure. The compromise was publicly demonstrated at the meeting of the National Council of the Russian Orthodox Church (January-February 1945) convoked, by permission of the Soviet government, to elect a new Patriarch in place of the deceased Sergius. The Council was attended by a number of high dignitaries of the non-Russian Orthodox Churches; many of them were flown to the Council in Soviet bombers. At the end of the Council, a gala reception was organized for its members by G. Karpov, the chairman of the Council for the Affairs of the Orthodox Church; during that reception two choirs could be heard, the Patriarch's choir and the Moscow Philharmonic choir sponsored by the Soviet government. The enthroning of the new Patriarch Alexei was filmed and the film displayed in all the movie theaters of the Union.


2021 ◽  
Vol 56 (3) ◽  
pp. 7-38
Author(s):  
Maria Avanesova

The Russian Orthodox Church has become a significant actor in Russia after the fall of the Soviet Union. This text is dedicated to its role in Russiaʼs foreign policy, specifically to the topic of the Russian interest in problems and protection of Christians, which is one of the most essential parts of the cooperation between the state and the Church. Analyzing primary sources (state and Church documents), the author shows when and under what circumstances this topic became relevant to both actors, what role the Russian Orthodox Church played in this regard and how the topic of protecting Christians is used by the Russian regime today. The study shows that the interest in protection of Christians did not arise simultaneously on both sides and that it is connected mainly with situations where a threat for Christians is posed by unfriendly actors.


Author(s):  
Jo. Junbae

Korean historiography of Perestroika and its resulting dissolution of the Soviet Union shows in what way a country under the dual system of cold war and division sought to understand the historical experience of an alien and even opposing regime in the northern world. Generally, Korean scholars’ recognitions and analyses of such history were very partial and did not reach at a high level, although some of them demonstrated fine achievements equipped with fresh methodologies and a lot of various materials. Ideological foundations of the Soviet regime came under inspection in Korea as early as in the middle of Perestroika. Many of social scientists and historians actively jumped into the study of the dynamics of Soviet statecraft as politics was the main stage where Gorbachev’s reform was vigorously carried out. The changes of the Soviet economy under Perestroika were another subject for Korean scholars to research from its early years as they formed the heart of Gorbachev’s reform, especially in the late 1980s. Nationalities question and the Russian orthodox church of the Perestroika era were the area in which professional research was undertaken relatively later in Korea, contrary to their role in maintaining or strengthening identity and nationalism among the Soviet population. However, it is evident that Perestroika provided Koreans with an invaluable opportunity for a full-scale study on the Soviet Union as both countries established diplomatic ties with each other in 1990. In addition, the story of Soviet socialism and its demise allowed Korean intellectuals to think over what prospect and possibility the humanity could have for their future lives. In conclusion, the Soviet times gave an indication about what direction they would take and what efforts they should make.


2011 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 31-40
Author(s):  
Jordan Hupka

It has been said that the Second World War saved the Russian Orthodox Church from extermination. Ever since the Revolution of 1917, the religious peoples of Russia were constantly persecuted by Soviet ideologists and politicians. Prior to Operation Barbarossa, in 1941, it seemed that the days of the Russian Orthodox Church, the largest religious institution in the Soviet Union, were numbered. However, the unique climate of the Second World War forced the Soviet government to end its war against the church. The Kremlin soon saw the Church as a useful tool to help aid in the re- occupation of Eastern Europe.


Religions ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (7) ◽  
pp. 499
Author(s):  
Elena Grunt ◽  
Ilya Levchenko

Modern Russia is undergoing changes, including religion. In the Soviet Union, in contrast to the Western world, there was not only an active and rapid social secularization, but also a violent atheization of the population. As for the youth, due to the notorious atheism, there was a lack of youth’s religiosity. After the collapse of the USSR, it became necessary to implement effective measures so that Orthodoxy could adequately respond to the “challenge of the time”. Under these conditions, the organization of work with youth in the ROC began to revive. The major research objective was to study the Russian Orthodox Church’s main forms of work with youth in the post-Soviet period. Our research was conducted in the Ural region, one of the largest regions of the Russian Federation. The research methodology used a qualitative approach (in-depth interviews). Our research, based on informants’ opinions, has identified three forms of groups who work with the Russian youth through the Russian Orthodox Church. They are: traditional church forms (organizing groups for the study of the Holy Scriptures, doctrinal (catechism) classes, missionary activities, etc.), traditional secular forms (children’s and youth’s camps, young family clubs, sports and military-patriotic clubs, addiction prevention and social projects, etc.) and innovative forms (Internet projects, Internet communities, Orthodox forums, Orthodox cafes, bars, etc.). Our study has revealed that religious phenomena and manifestations of religiosity are observed in totally different areas, such as cultural, economic, educational, leisure, etc. The study has elucidated that the work of the Russian Orthodox Church fits into the framework of this paradigm, thus confirming T. Luckmann’s theory.


2012 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 52-57 ◽  
Author(s):  
Teuvo Laitila

After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the religious tide in Russia has been quick to rise. During the Soviet era, religion – particularly Orthodox Christianity and Islam – was considered to be one of the ‘enemies of the people’. Since the late 1990s however, Russian politicians at all levels of the power structure have associated themselves either with the Orthodox, or on some occasions with the Muslim, clergy. The present state of affairs in the relations between religion and the state are well illustrated by the cordial liaison of the late Patriarch Aleksii II with President Vladimir Putin and the equally warm involvement of President Dmitry Medvedev, and his wife Svetlana Medvedeva, with the new Patriarch Kirill, who was elected in January 2009. Some have even argued that ‘today’ (in 2004) the Church and state are so extensively intertwined that one can no longer consider Russia to be a secular state. Polls seem to support the claim. While in 1990 only 24 per cent of Russians identified themselves as Orthodox, in the sense that they felt themselves to be Russians as well, in 2008 the number was 73 per cent. However, less than 10 per cent, and in Moscow perhaps only 2 per cent do actually live out their religiosity.Why did Russia turn towards religion? Is religion chosen in an attempt to legitimise power, or in order to consolidate political rule after atheist-communist failure? My guess is that the answer to both is affirmative. Moreover, whatever the personal convictions of individual Russians, including politicians, religious, mainly Orthodox Christian, rhetoric and rituals are used to make a definitive break with the communist past and to create, or re-create, a Greater Russia (see Simons 2009). In such an ideological climate, atheism has little chance of thriving, whereas there is a sort of ‘social demand’ for its critique.I therefore focus on what the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) has had to say about atheism and how her statements can be related to a break with the past and the construction of a new Russia. Or, in my opinion, actually deleting the Soviet period from the history of Russia as an error and seeing present-day Russia as a direct continuation of the pre-Soviet imperial state.


2019 ◽  
pp. 236-249
Author(s):  
Вячеслав Александрович Гончаренко

В статье рассматриваются особенности советского документального кино о жизни и деятельности Русской Православной Церкви в советском государстве. Кинематограф является важным элементом идеологии и пропаганды, поэтому советское государство уделяло особое внимание смысловому содержанию выходящих на экран кинокартин. Несмотря на атеистическую идеологию и массу антирелигиозной литературы и кинопродукции, в СССР начиная с 1945 года были сняты фильмы с нейтральным или даже с позитивным отношением к Церкви, которые рассказывают о её существовании и деятельности. В начале статьи автор размышляет о месте и значении кинематографа в жизни общества и государства. Далее рассматривает и анализирует документальные фильмы, которые касаются жизни и деятельности Русской Православной Церкви. The article deals with the peculiarities of the Soviet documentary cinema about the life and activity of the Russian Orthodox Church in the Soviet state. Cinematography is an important element of ideology and propaganda, that is why the Soviet state paid special attention to the semantic content of the released films. Despite the atheistic ideology and the mass of anti-religious literature and films, from 1945 onwards, the Soviet Union made films, which presented the existence and work of the Church in a neutral or even positive light. At the beginning of the article the author reflects on the place and importance of cinematography in the life of society and the state. The author then examines and analyses documentaries which deal with the life and activities of the Russian Orthodox Church.


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