The Role and Nature of Freedom in Two Normative Theories of Democracy

Human Affairs ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Šimsa
Keyword(s):  
Normative Concepts ◽  
Hans Kelsen ◽  
Concepts Of Democracy

The Role and Nature of Freedom in Two Normative Theories of DemocracyThe article examines the role and the nature of freedom in two normative concepts of democracy, in the work of Hans Kelsen and of Emanuel Rádl. Both authors wrote their work on democracy between the two world wars. Kelsen formulated his concept of democracy in

Kepastian Hukum Hak Komunal Berdasarkan Peraturan Menteri Agraria dan Tata Ruang/Kepala Badan Pertanahan Nasional Republik Indonesia Nomor 10 Tahun 2016 ditinjau dari Hukum Pertanahan Indonesia

2018 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 28-44
Author(s):  
Aniza Dessy Daldiani
Keyword(s):  
Hans Kelsen

Tulisan ini dilatarbelakangi oleh pengakuan hak ulayat dalam Pasal 3 Undang-undang No. 5 Tahun 1960 tentang Peraturan Dasar Pokok-Pokok Agraria. Tujuan dari tulisan ini adalah mengetahui kepastian hukum hak komunal berdasarkan Peraturan Menteri ATR/Kepala BPNRI No. 10 Tahun 2016 yang ditinjau dari hukum pertanahan Indonesia. Kesimpulan dari tulisan ini adalah bahwa tidak terdapat kepastian hukum bagi masyarakat hukum adat dan masyarakat yang berada dalam kawasan tertentu yaitu kawasan hutan atau perkebunan yang akan mengajukan hak komunal atas tanah. PMATR/KBPN No. 10/2016 tidak memiliki tempat bergantung, dikarenakan hak komunal atas tanah yang diatur oleh PMATR/KBPN No. 10/2016 tidak sesuai dengan Pasal 16 ayat (1) huruf h UUPA, dimana UUPA sebagai dasar hukum ditetapkannya PMATR/KBPN No. 10/2016, selain itu pelaksanaan pendaftaran hak komunal atas tanah juga tidak sesuai dengan Pasal 9 ayat (1) PP No. 24/1997. Tidak adanya tempat bergantung PMATR/KBPN No. 10/2016 sebagaimana teori Hans Kelsen mengenai jenjang norma hukum (stufentheorie) dan Teori Adolf Merkl mengenai norma hukum selalu mempunyai dua wajah (das Doppelte Rechstanilitz).

Riccardo Saccenti, Debating Medieval Natural Law: A Survey. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2016, XIII, pp. 155.

Mediaevistik ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 318-320
Author(s):  
Scott L. Taylor
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
Natural Law ◽  
Natural Rights ◽  
Legal Positivism ◽  
Great Chain Of Being ◽  
History Of ◽  
History Of Concepts ◽  
Hans Kelsen ◽  
University Of Notre Dame ◽  
Conceptual Shift

Saccenti’s volume belongs to the category of Begriffsgeschichte, the history of concepts, and more particularly to the debate over the existence or nonexistence of a conceptual shift in ius naturale to encompass a subjective notion of natural rights. The author argues that this issue became particularly relevant in mid-twentieth century, first, because of the desire to delimit the totalitarian implications of legal positivism chez Hans Kelsen; second, in response to Lovejoy’s The Great Chain of Being and its progeny; and third, as a result of a revival of neo-Thomistic and neo-scholastic perspectives sometimes labelled “une nouvelle chrétienté.”

Introduction

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Chodat
Keyword(s):  
Natural Sciences ◽  
Focused Attention ◽  
Literary Works ◽  
High Modernism ◽  
Normative Concepts ◽  
Unique Experience

Literary works since the rise of high modernism have been intensely hostile to abstract generalization, and have focused attention on the unique experience and singular expression. This nominalist impulse—summed up in the cry “show, don’t tell!”—has encouraged a deep wariness toward broad normative concepts: “good,” “bad,” “courage,” “justice,” etc. More than is often recognized, however, this literary skepticism parallels the skepticism toward such concepts in the natural sciences, which accords no place to such abstract “high words” in a world of matter and calculable motions. Against this dual literary and scientific inheritance, the postwar sage offers a “weak realism” about normative concepts and a “reflective” mode of composition: a movement between the particular and the general, art and argument. Such a literary–intellectual project is risky, and opens the sage to charges of sentimentalism. Closely attending to their works, however, suggests that we should avoid entering this protest too quickly.

Normative Concepts

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matti Eklund
Keyword(s):  
Positive Answer ◽  
Thick Concepts ◽  
Normative Concepts ◽  
The Right ◽  
The Way

What is it for a concept to be normative? Some possible answers are explored and rejected, among them that a concept is normative if it ascribes a normative property. The positive answer defended is that a concept is normative if it is in the right way associated with a normative use. Among issues discussed along the way are the nature of analyticity, and there being a notion of analyticity—what I call semantic analyticity—such that a statement can be analytic in this sense while failing to be true. Considerations regarding thick concepts and slurs are brought to bear on the issues that come up.

Nietzsche’s Mountain

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Derek Parfit
Keyword(s):  
Normative Beliefs ◽  
Normative Concepts

This chapter discusses the convergence claim. This claim argues that, if everyone knew all of the relevant non-normative facts, used the same normative concepts, understood and carefully reflected on the relevant arguments, and was not affected by any distorting influence, we would nearly all have similar normative beliefs. It also discusses some counterpoints to attempts to reconcile some of Friedrich Nietzsche's claims with what most of us believe. Though Nietzsche sometimes denies that suffering is in itself bad, and even suggests that suffering may be in itself good, that was not, in most of his life, what Nietzsche believed. The chapter goes on to discuss further arguments for and against the Convergence Claim.

The Value of Rationality

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ralph Wedgwood
Keyword(s):  
Mental State ◽  
Practical Reason ◽  
Bad News ◽  
Central Concept ◽  
Substantive Theory ◽  
Normative Concept ◽  
Normative Concepts

Rationality is a central concept for epistemology, ethics, and the study of practical reason. But what sort of concept is it? It is argued here that—contrary to objections that have recently been raised—rationality is a normative concept. In general, normative concepts cannot be explained in terms of the concepts expressed by ‘reasons’ or ‘ought’. Instead, normative concepts are best understood in terms of values. Thus, for a mental state or a process of reasoning to be rational is for it to be in a certain way good. Specifically, rationality is a virtue, while irrationality is a vice. What rationality requires of you at a time is whatever is necessary for your thinking at that time to be as rational as possible; this makes ‘rationally required’ equivalent to a kind of ‘ought’. Moreover, rationality is an “internalist” normative concept: what it is rational for you to think at a time depends purely on what is in your mind at that time. Nonetheless, rationality has an external goal—namely, getting things right in your thinking, or thinking correctly. The connection between rationality and correctness is probabilistic: if your thinking is irrational, that is bad news about your thinking’s degree of correctness; and the more irrational your thinking is, the worse the news is about your thinking’s degree of correctness. This account of the concept of rationality indicates how we should set about giving a substantive theory of what it is for beliefs and choices to be rational.

Democracy in the Plural?

2012 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 12-35
Author(s):  
Anna Friberg
Keyword(s):  
The Political ◽  
Social Democrats ◽  
Political Issues ◽  
Political Sphere ◽  
Universal Suffrage ◽  
The Social ◽  
Concepts Of Democracy ◽  
Positive Concept

The article explores some of the composite concepts of democracy that were used in Sweden, primarily by the Social Democrats during the interwar years. Should these be seen as pluralizations of the collective singular democracy or as something qualitatively new? By showing how these concepts relate to each other and to democracy as a whole, the article argues that they should be considered statements about democracy as one entity, that democracy did not only concern the political sphere, but was generally important throughout the whole of society. The article also examines the Swedish parliamentarians' attitudes toward democracy after the realization of universal suffrage, and argues that democracy was eventually perceived as such a positive concept that opponents of what was labeled democratic reforms had to reformulate the political issues into different words in order to avoid coming across as undemocratic.

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