Riccardo Saccenti, Debating Medieval Natural Law: A Survey. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2016, XIII, pp. 155.

Mediaevistik ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 318-320
Author(s):  
Scott L. Taylor

Saccenti’s volume belongs to the category of Begriffsgeschichte, the history of concepts, and more particularly to the debate over the existence or nonexistence of a conceptual shift in ius naturale to encompass a subjective notion of natural rights. The author argues that this issue became particularly relevant in mid-twentieth century, first, because of the desire to delimit the totalitarian implications of legal positivism chez Hans Kelsen; second, in response to Lovejoy’s The Great Chain of Being and its progeny; and third, as a result of a revival of neo-Thomistic and neo-scholastic perspectives sometimes labelled “une nouvelle chrétienté.”

Author(s):  
Kenneth Pennington

One of the most notable characteristics of Western societies has been the development of individual and group rights in legal, theological, and philosophical thought of the first two millennia. It has often been noted that thinkers in Non-Western societies have not had the same preoccupation with rights. The very concept of rights is laden with numerous problems. Universality is the most basic and difficult. If human rights are only a product of Western ideas of justice, they cannot have universality. In an age that is dominated by conceptions of law embracing some form of legal positivism, many scholars recognize only individual rights that have been established by the constitutional jurisprudence of individual countries or their legal systems. Historically, the emergence of rights in European jurisprudence is intimately connected with the terms ius naturale and lex naturalis in Western jurisprudence and theological thought. Human beings may never agree on universal rules of a natural law, but they might agree on universal precepts that shape the penumbra of rights surrounding natural rights.


2012 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 78-128 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann ◽  
Kathrin Kollmeier ◽  
Willibald Steinmetz ◽  
Philipp Sarasin ◽  
Alf Lüdtke ◽  
...  

Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe Reloaded? Writing the Conceptual History of the Twentieth Century Guest editors: Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann and Kathrin KollmeierIntroduction Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann and Kathrin KollmeierSome Thoughts on the History of Twentieth-Century German Basic Concepts Willibald SteinmetzIs a “History of Basic Concepts of the Twentieth Century“ Possible? A Polemic Philipp SarasinHistory of Concepts, New Edition: Suitable for a Better Understanding of Modern Times? Alf LüdtkeReply Christian Geulen


Legal Studies ◽  
1982 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 14-33 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip Milton

Natural law is discussed by almost every modern writer on jurisprudence; but with a few exceptions - of which John Finnis' Natural Law and Natural Rights is the most substantial - the impression given is that it is of historical interest only, that it has in some way been discredited, or at least superseded, by legal positivism. The implicit idea - and here legal positivism borrows from Comte - is that natural law represented some earlier ‘metaphysical’ stage which was then followed by ‘scientific’ legal positivism. This account requires the existence of a natural law theory that dominated juristic and philosophical thinking until the eighteenth century, when it was overthrown by Hume and Bentham. Hume, the story goes, found the decisive argument against the natural law theory; while Bentham created the new theory oflegal positivism. The argument Hume discovered was that ought cannot be derived from is; and this, it is widely supposed, is fatal to all varieties of natural law.


1996 ◽  
Vol 58 (2) ◽  
pp. 299-322 ◽  
Author(s):  
William E. Scheuerman

Despite growing interest in the ideas of Carl Schmitt, twentieth-century Germany's premier right-wing authoritarian political thinker, most American scholars continue to downplay the centrality of Schmitt's legal thinking to his overall theory. This article attempts to overcome this lacuna by critically scrutinizing Schmitt's influential critique of liberal constitutionalism. However provocative, Schmitt's critique ultimately proves untenable because (1) it relies on an overly selective, even caricatured reading of the history of liberal jurisprudence and (2) it reproduces the most worrisome methodological claims of Schmitt's main intellectual opponent, Hans Kelsen's legal positivism.


Author(s):  
Dennis Klimchuk

This chapter argues for the continued relevance of the natural law tradition to inquiry into the philosophical foundations of private law. It focuses on the arc in the history of political philosophy that starts in Hugo Grotius and ends in Immanuel Kant. The original community of property on Grotius’s account and throughout the early modern tradition is a conceptual starting point, a representation of how people stand with respect to one another in the world abstracted from the institutions through which people administer the regime of private property. Grotius and others in the natural law tradition cast the moral aspect of that standing in terms of the natural laws that protected the natural rights of equals. The chapter then looks at two debates. Grotius’s and John Locke’s disagreements about the foundations of property rights and Grotius’s and Samuel von Pufendorf’s about the foundations of the right of necessity are, at their core, disagreements about how to render private ownership consistent with equality. The common ground against which these disagreements is framed is the view that, through its doctrines, the institution of private property inevitably expresses some view on this question, and in this way reveals its connection to the rest of people’s moral lives.


1967 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 301-311
Author(s):  
John R. Carnes

The life history of certain philosophical and theological terms and concepts constitutes in itself an interesting matter for consideration and reflection. None is more interesting than that of natural law. Many studies have traced the development of natural law philosophy from its early precursors among the Pre-Socratics through Plato and Aristotle, the Stoics, St Thomas, and the early British empiricists; have noted its demise in the nineteenth century, largely as a result of the criticism of Hume; and have observed its renaissance in the twentieth century. Despite this undeniable revival of interest in the theory (if, indeed it can be called a theory, given the wide diversity of philosophers who have identified themselves with it) in the present century, a moral philosopher uses the term only at great risk, for no philosophical theory has been so vigorously attacked and so thoroughly ‘refuted’ as natural law.


2020 ◽  
Vol 6(161) ◽  
pp. 169-187
Author(s):  
Michał Wendland

he article addresses, in the perspective of the history of modern philosophy, the issue of the transformation to which the concept of natural law was subject in the 17th and 18th centuries. The author shares the views of, among others, Habermas and Bobbio, according to which the modern concept of natural law has been made “more positive” or “disenchanted” (after Weber), and thus the traditionally understood law of nature was transformed into the concept of natural rights. The article distinguishes three forms of this process: the first one, i.e., the so-called bourgeois school of natural law (Grotius, Thomasius, Pufendorf); the second one, developed by representatives of the early (moderate) Enlightenment (Hobbes, Locke, Montesquieu); the third one, the most radical one, represented by the thinkers the late Enlightenment, mainly French encyclopaedists and materialists (La Mettrie, Holbach, Condorcet, Paine). Their common feature was the gradual abandonment of the metaphysical or theological foundations of natural law in favour of a naturalised ethic.


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