Aristotelian Ethics and Veganism

Author(s):  
Samantha Gamero

I argue that ethical veganism and animal rights activism is preferable to a moral relativist approach to vegetarianism and animal use, even in cases of activism labeled “extreme.” The moral relativist says that being a vegetarian or a meat eater is a matter of personal choice. I argue that the strong commitments of ethical vegans and animal rights activists are admirable from a virtue ethics perspective; they are not extreme. On the contrary, they accord with the ideal that Aristotle called the "Golden Mean." Aristotle himself was not vegan. He viewed the universe in a fundamentally hierarchical way and would have had no objections to the human use of animals. However, he believed in the idea of a Natural Law, and this can be used to support contemporary ethical veganism and animal rights activism. If animals possess rights, then it is the moral duty (rather than personal choice) of every human to stop his or her consumption of animal products. From this perspective, the harms that may be caused by veganism (particularly economic harms) are of lesser significance than the value of veganism and animal rights activism. The moral relativist argument against the alleged extremism of ethical vegans is improper. The highly controversial tactics employed by some vegan and animal rights activists including the use of violence, harassment and property damage can be understood as reasonable and morally necessary from a virtue ethics perspective if we extend our concept of moral community to include all sentient beings.

2015 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 1-28
Author(s):  
M. Ashraf Adeel

This article looks at some of the salient analyses of the concept of wasaṭīyah (moderation) in the ancient Greek and the Islamic traditions and uses them to develop a contemporary view of the matter. Greek ethics played a huge role in shaping the ethical views of Muslim philosophers and theologians, and thus the article starts with an overview of the revival of contemporary western virtue ethics, in many ways an extension of Platonic-Aristotelian ethics, and then looks briefly at the place of moderation or temperance in Platonic-Aristotelian ethics. This sets the stage for an exposition of the position taken by Ibn Miskawayh and al-Ghazali, which is then used as a backdrop for suggesting a revival of the Qur’an’s virtue ethics. After outlining a basis for its virtue ethics, the Qur’anic view of the virtue of wasaṭīyah is discussed briefly and its position on this virtue’s nature in terms of the individual and the community is presented.


2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (18) ◽  

The aim of this study is to develop a scale compatible with current animal ethics studies to measure the phenomenon of speciesism, that is marginalization of animals and prejudice and discrimination against animals. In order to develop the Ambivalent Speciesism Scale, an item pool was created by examining the animal ethics literature and social psychology studies on human-animal relations, and then the items were edited by taking the opinions of people studying animal rights and experts in measurement and evaluation in psychology. The scale is designed in 7-point Likert type. The trial form was applied to the participants together with the Speciesism Scale, the Social Dominance Orientation Scale and the Basic Empathy Scale. Participants were selected from individuals representing different lifestyles in the context of animal use, using the snowball sampling technique. The study was conducted with 288 participants; 64 men, 217 women and, 7 of whom are not of both genders. While there were 24 items in the trial form of the scale, nine of these items were eliminated as a result of the factor analysis. The final form of the scale with 15 items has a high reliability (.90). The items of the scale are divided into three dimensions: belief in human superiority, protective speciesism, and speciesism in language. It was determined that the scores obtained from the scale were in positive correlation with the scores obtained from the other scale measuring speciesism and the social dominance orientation scale, as expected. The scores obtained from the scale are distributed as expected among the groups that include lifestyles related to animal use. These data were evaluated as findings showing the validity of the scale. Keywords Speciesism, ambivalent speciesism scale, animal rights, discrimination, animal ethics


Author(s):  
Sarah M. Pike

Chapter Six analyzes the efforts of activists to create community by bringing together people with different agendas and backgrounds and the resultant tensions and conflicts that come about in the process. I look closely at activists’ work to connect environmental and animal rights activism with concerns about social justice, especially with regard to people of color. Activist gatherings are imagined as free and open spaces of inclusivity and equality and yet they set up their own patterns of conformity and expectation. This chapter looks closely at how putting the “Earth first” comes in conflict with “anti-oppression” work and vice-versa, as activists try hard, drawing on empathy and compassion, to decolonize their communities and dismantle patriarchy and transphobia within their movements.


Author(s):  
Celia E. Deane-Drummond

This chapter sets out the philosophical context for current debates in animal ethics, including abolitionist versions of animal rights that are against all forms of animal use, including animal experimentation and agriculture. The author argues that while a more muted version of animal rights is more convincing, rights language has proved inadequate to the modest task of shifting to more humane treatments of other animals. There are also theoretical problems associated with the use of rights language that itself is premised on a particular approach to social justice. Utilitarian advocates following Peter Singer do not fare much better in that his liberationist agenda is ethically ambiguous by his association of speciesism with racist and even sexist views. This approach could just as easily diminish women and those of colour, or deny human dignity, all of which have a strong political and social agenda, rather than elevating concern for other animals. Even anti-speciesism still relies on a comparative approach that begins by widening the moral world of humans to sentient others, even while, ironically perhaps, denying the special significance of the human species. Christine Korsgaard has made the most convincing case so far for rehabilitating Immanuel Kant’s categorical imperative so that it is extended to other animals. Rather more promising is the largely theoretical approach of Peter Scott’s argument for postnatural right and Cynthia Willett’s interspecies ethics to begin to map out the multispecies frameworks.


2004 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 375-390 ◽  
Author(s):  
Heike Baranzke ◽  

Ever since Schopenhauer´s accusation, it has been disputed whether Kant´s few remarks concerning the ethical human-animal-relationship in the Lectures and in the Doctrine of Virtue fail to support ethical arguments on behalf of animals. One critique that plays a central role is whether Kant would have forbidden cruelty to brutes for educational purposes. In addition to these old objections, Kant´s ethics is charged to be speciesistic by animal ethicists and animal rights philosophers at present.The following article examines especially §17 of the Doctrine of Virtue, which is the only animal ethical text authorized by Kant himself. The interpretation starts by taking the context of §17 into account, particularly the “Episodic Section on an Amphiboly in Moral Concepts”. The systematic output of the cruelty-account and of the duty classes is then analyzed. Central for the understanding of Kant´s argumentation relating to animals are the perfect duties to oneself, which are linked to Kant´s foundation of human dignity. Finally the roles of the physical and emotional needs of brutes and humans in Kant´s ethics are compared with each other. Some conclusions are then drawn concerning human and animal rights in relation to a duty-based argumentation. The article therefore appreciates Kant´s integration of animal suffering into the very core of his virtue ethics, an integration that may be able to open the door for an enlightened animal ethics based on human responsibility.


ILAR Journal ◽  
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rebecca L Walker

Abstract This article appeals to virtue ethics to help guide laboratory animal research by considering the role of character and flourishing in these practices. Philosophical approaches to animal research ethics have typically focused on animal rights or on the promotion of welfare for all affected, while animal research itself has been guided in its practice by the 3Rs (reduction, refinement, replacement). These different approaches have sometimes led to an impasse in debates over animal research where the philosophical approaches are focused on whether or when animal studies are justifiable, while the 3Rs assume a general justification for animal work but aim to reduce harm to sentient animals and increase their welfare in laboratory spaces. Missing in this exchange is a moral framework that neither assumes nor rejects the justifiability of animal research and focuses instead on the habits and structures of that work. I shall propose a place for virtue ethics in laboratory animal research by considering examples of relevant character traits, the moral significance of human-animal bonds, mentorship in the laboratory, and the importance of animals flourishing beyond mere welfare.


2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 91
Author(s):  
Ashli Stokes

PETA is well known for creative animal rights activism, with studies exploring how its text-based advocacy creates change regarding societal treatment of animals. What is less explored is how PETA uses on the ground direct action strategies as public interest communications (PIC). For PIC scholars, these strategies are relevant, as direct action provides communicators with experiential ways to persuade stakeholders of new perspectives to push for social change. Building on previous studies in public relations activism and PIC, this essay argues that PETA’s direct-action strategies complement its text-based advocacy by shaping stakeholder perception through encounters with material realities, specifically by using embodied forms of persuasion. Answering how public interest communicators create effective persuasive messages on the ground is crucial in understanding contemporary social change. 


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