Strategic Campaign Management in Apportionment Elections
In parliamentary elections, parties compete for a limited, typically fixed number of seats. We study the complexity of the following bribery-style problem: Given the distribution of votes among the parties, what is the smallest number of voters that need to be convinced to vote for our party, so that it gets a desired number of seats. We also run extensive experiments on real-world election data and measure the effectiveness of our method.
1998 ◽
Vol 39
(6)
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pp. 935-936
2010 ◽
Vol 20
(3)
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pp. 100-105
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2015 ◽
Vol 25
(1)
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pp. 39-45
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Keyword(s):
2001 ◽
Vol 10
(2)
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pp. 13-15
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Keyword(s):
Keyword(s):