scholarly journals Game-theoretic Analysis of Effort Allocation of Contributors to Public Projects

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jared Soundy ◽  
Chenhao Wang ◽  
Clay Stevens ◽  
Hau Chan
Keyword(s):  
Price Of Anarchy ◽  
Price Of Stability ◽  
Software Projects ◽  
Allocation Model ◽  
Effort Allocation ◽  
Public Projects ◽  
Game Theoretic Analysis ◽  
Feature Request ◽  
Original Goal ◽  
Game Theoretic

Public projects can succeed or fail for many reasons such as the feasibility of the original goal and coordination among contributors. One major reason for failure is that insufficient work leaves the project partially completed. For certain types of projects anything short of full completion is a failure (e.g., feature request on software projects in GitHub). Therefore, project success relies heavily on individuals allocating sufficient effort. When there are multiple public projects, each contributor needs to make decisions to best allocate his/her limited effort (e.g., time) to projects while considering the effort allocation decisions of other strategic contributors and his/her parameterized utilities based on values and costs for the projects. In this paper, we introduce a game-theoretic effort allocation model of contributors to public projects for modeling effort allocation of strategic contributors. We study the related Nash equilibrium (NE) computational problems and provide NP-hardness results for the existence of NE and polynomial-time algorithms for finding NE in restricted settings. Finally, we investigate the inefficiency of NE measured by the price of anarchy and price of stability.

scholarly journals A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Bandwidth Allocation under a User-Grouping Constraint

2013 ◽  
Vol 2013 ◽  
pp. 1-9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shun-Pin Hsu ◽  
Shun-Liang Hsu ◽  
Alan Shenghan Tsai
Keyword(s):  
Equilibrium Point ◽  
Utility Function ◽  
Bandwidth Allocation ◽  
Decision Space ◽  
Allocation Model ◽  
Joint Decision ◽  
Limited Bandwidth ◽  
User Grouping ◽  
Game Theoretic Analysis ◽  
Game Theoretic

A new bandwidth allocation model is studied in this paper. In this model, a system, such as a communication network, is composed of a finite number of users, and they compete for limited bandwidth resources. Each user adopts the decision that maximizes his or her own benefit characterized by the utility function. The decision space of each user is subject to constraints. In addition, some users form a group, and their joint decision space is also subject to constraints. Under the assumption that each user’s utility function satisfies some continuity and concavity conditions, the existence, uniqueness, and fairness, in some appropriate sense, of the Nash equilibrium point in the allocation game are proved. An algorithm yielding a sequence converging to the equilibrium point is proposed. Finally, a numerical example with detailed analysis is provided to illustrate the effectiveness of our work.

scholarly journals Two-Stage Facility Location Games with Strategic Clients and Facilities

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simon Krogmann ◽  
Pascal Lenzner ◽  
Louise Molitor ◽  
Alexander Skopalik
Keyword(s):  
Facility Location ◽  
Waiting Time ◽  
Price Of Anarchy ◽  
Price Of Stability ◽  
Client Behavior ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Location Games ◽  
Facility Location Models ◽  
Subgame Perfect Equilibria ◽  
Perfect Equilibria

We consider non-cooperative facility location games where both facilities and clients act strategically and heavily influence each other. This contrasts established game-theoretic facility location models with non-strategic clients that simply select the closest opened facility. In our model, every facility location has a set of attracted clients and each client has a set of shopping locations and a weight that corresponds to its spending capacity. Facility agents selfishly select a location for opening their facility to maximize the attracted total spending capacity, whereas clients strategically decide how to distribute their spending capacity among the opened facilities in their shopping range. We focus on a natural client behavior similar to classical load balancing: our selfish clients aim for a distribution that minimizes their maximum waiting time for getting serviced, where a facility’s waiting time corresponds to its total attracted client weight. We show that subgame perfect equilibria exist and we give almost tight constant bounds on the Price of Anarchy and the Price of Stability, which even hold for a broader class of games with arbitrary client behavior. Since facilities and clients influence each other, it is crucial for the facilities to anticipate the selfish clients’ behavior when selecting their location. For this, we provide an efficient algorithm that also implies an efficient check for equilibrium. Finally, we show that computing a socially optimal facility placement is NP-hard and that this result holds for all feasible client weight distributions.

scholarly journals Why You Should Charge Your Friends for Borrowing Your Stuff

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kijung Shin ◽  
Euiwoong Lee ◽  
Dhivya Eswaran ◽  
Ariel D. Procaccia
Keyword(s):  
Social Networks ◽  
Social Network ◽  
Theoretical Analysis ◽  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Price Of Anarchy ◽  
Price Of Stability ◽  
Free Riders ◽  
The Social ◽  
Access Cost ◽  
Game Theoretic

We consider goods that can be shared with k-hop neighbors (i.e., the set of nodes within k hops from an owner) on a social network. We examine incentives to buy such a good by devising game-theoretic models where each node decides whether to buy the good or free ride. First, we find that social inefficiency, specifically excessive purchase of the good, occurs in Nash equilibria. Second, the social inefficiency decreases as k increases and thus a good can be shared with more nodes. Third, and most importantly, the social inefficiency can also be significantly reduced by charging free riders an access cost and paying it to owners, leading to the conclusion that organizations and system designers should impose such a cost. These findings are supported by our theoretical analysis in terms of the price of anarchy and the price of stability; and by simulations based on synthetic and real social networks.

scholarly journals A game theoretic approach reveals that discretizing clinical information can reduce antibiotic misuse

2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Maya Diamant ◽  
Shoham Baruch ◽  
Eias Kassem ◽  
Khitam Muhsen ◽  
Dov Samet ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Antibiotic Prescription ◽  
Clinical Information ◽  
Social Optimum ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Theoretic Analysis ◽  
Game Theoretic Analysis ◽  
Optimal Output ◽  
The Social ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Approach

AbstractThe overuse of antibiotics is exacerbating the antibiotic resistance crisis. Since this problem is a classic common-goods dilemma, it naturally lends itself to a game-theoretic analysis. Hence, we designed a model wherein physicians weigh whether antibiotics should be prescribed, given that antibiotic usage depletes its future effectiveness. The physicians’ decisions rely on the probability of a bacterial infection before definitive laboratory results are available. We show that the physicians’ equilibrium decision rule of antibiotic prescription is not socially optimal. However, we prove that discretizing the information provided to physicians can mitigate the gap between their equilibrium decisions and the social optimum of antibiotic prescription. Despite this problem’s complexity, the effectiveness of the discretization solely depends on the type of information available to the physician to determine the nature of infection. This is demonstrated on theoretic distributions and a clinical dataset. Our results provide a game-theory based guide for optimal output of current and future decision support systems of antibiotic prescription.

A Game-theoretic Analysis of Hybrid Threats

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Pieter Balcaen ◽  
Cind Du Bois ◽  
Caroline Buts
Keyword(s):  
Theoretic Analysis ◽  
Game Theoretic Analysis ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Hybrid Threats
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