scholarly journals The Civil War in Syria and the International Response

Author(s):  
Luljeta Kodra

Both parties involved in the civil war in Syria, reached to secure the support of other states and the control over considerable parts of the territory, but none of them could trigger a comprehensive military defeat against the other. The cost of the conflict where government forces as well as armed rebels continue to commit atroccities has been shocking. Security Council with regard to the problem of Syria was divided between a majority who wanted a strong response to implement the Responsibility to Protect and some who did not want. The debate between Western democracies was based on the fact if foreign governments should militarily intervene in Syria, being that they thought military intervention could aggravate the conflict and could increase the sufferings of ordinary Syrians. However individual countries and regional organizations took actions to maintain their responsibility to protect. The use of the veto by the permanent members of the Security Council to prevent the implementation of the "Responsibility to Protect " which aims to end the massive atrocities is inconsistent with the goals of the United Nations and makes the Security Council inappropriate on the situation when his involvement to resolve conflict situations is an urgent need. State sovereignty can no longer constitute an unrestricted license to mass killings and other atrocity crimes.

2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 459-487 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bolarinwa Adediran

Since the adoption of the principles of the Responsibility to Protect (r2p) in 2005, proponents and critics alike have accepted that it has not brought about a consistent and effective response to mass atrocity crimes. The incapacity that the Security Council exhibits in addressing the Syrian conflict provides a compelling justification for the need to examine alternative mechanisms through which the principles of the doctrine can be implemented. This paper argues that regional organisations should be considered legitimate authorising mechanisms in place of the Security Council in implementing r2p. The use of regional institutions as authorising mechanisms has not been properly considered or rigorously defended. In the paper, I make a case for regional organisations in authorising international action during mass atrocity situations by first establishing the legitimacy of regional organisations to act in response to local disputes. I propose and defend four arguments that provide justification and establish the utility of regional arrangements as alternative authorising mechanisms. I also examine and respond to three key objections that can be made against regional organisations. Finally, I outline a set of criteria that should determine which regional organisations are considered legitimate actors during mass atrocity situations.


2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 50
Author(s):  
Arsalan H. AlMizory

Over the past few years, the question whether international law permits the use of force not in response to existing violence but to avert and prevent mass atrocity crimes occurring within the boundaries of a sovereign State has taken on added significant in the aftermath of the humanitarian tragedies of the 1990s. Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is a complicated and emerging norm of international law, which represents the start of a new era for the United Nations (UN), seeks to provide a means for the Security Council to take enforcement measures under Chapter VII to prevent mass atrocity crimes. The research discusses that when the Security Council is deadlock and peaceful measures have been exhausted, it is important to have a legal basis of using limited armed force as a last resort in the name of humanitarian intervention, to avert overwhelmingly atrocity crimes that a government has shown it is unwilling or unable to prevent. The research analyzes the case of Syria as a case study, which demonstrates that the presence of certain conditions enables the UN Security Council to implement R2P norm to save civilian populations from mass human rights violations.


2013 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 137-159 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aidan Hehir

Many observers heralded the Security Council—sanctioned intervention in Libya in March 2011 as evidence of the efficacy of the responsibility to protect (R2P). Although there is no doubt that the intervention was significant, the implications of Resolution 1973 are not as profound as some have claimed. The intervention certainly coheres with the spirit of R2P, but it is possible to situate it in the context of a trajectory of Security Council responses to large-scale intrastate crises that predate the emergence of R2P. This trajectory is a function of the decisionmaking of the five permanent members of the Security Council (P5), a group guided by politics and pragmatism rather than principles. As a consequence, the Security Council's record in dealing with intrastate crises is characterized by a preponderance of inertia punctuated by aberrant flashes of resolve and timely action impelled by the occasional coincidence of interests and humanitarian need, rather than an adherence to either law or norms. The underlying factors that contributed to this record of inconsistency—primarily the P5's veto power—remain post-Libya, and thus the international response to intrastate crises likely will continue to be inconsistent.


2017 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 205316801770298 ◽  
Author(s):  
Juraj Medzihorsky ◽  
Milos Popovic ◽  
Erin K. Jenne

This paper introduces a spatial model of civil conflict management rhetoric to explore how the emerging norm of responsibility to protect shapes major power rhetorical responses to civil war. Using framing theory, we argue that responsibility to protect functions like a prescriptive norm, such that representing a conflict as one of (1) human rights violations (problem definition), implies rhetorical support for (2) coercive outside intervention (solution identification). These dimensions reflect the problem-solution form of a prescriptive norm. Using dictionary scaling with a dynamic model, we analyze the positions of UN Security Council members in debates over the Syrian Civil War separately for each dimension. We find that the permanent members who emphasized human rights violations also used intervention rhetoric (UK, France, and the US), and those who did not used non-intervention rhetoric (Russia and China). We conclude that, while not a fully consolidated norm, responsibility to protect appears to have structured major power rhetorical responses to the Syrian Civil War.


2015 ◽  
Vol 7 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 398-421 ◽  
Author(s):  
Justin Morris

Since the un’s 2005 adoption of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) the five permanent members (P5) of the organisation’s Security Council have been burdened with a special dual responsibility, entailing a special responsibility to maintain international peace and security, and a special responsibility to assist those imperilled by the mass atrocity crimes of their home state. The tensions which can arise within this dual responsibility is a largely under-explored aspect of the R2P literature. But consideration of it helps explain why, despite differing views over how best to balance individual and state rights, at times accentuated by clashing interests, the P5 have nevertheless found common R2P ground, most particularly in their largely concerted opposition to the idea of a ‘responsibility not to veto’ R2P-related resolutions within the Council.


2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-32
Author(s):  
Rosemary Foot

Abstract There has been a lack of recourse to the language of ‘The Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P) in respect of reports that the Chinese government is perpetrating mass atrocity crimes against the Muslim minorities that reside in Xinjiang. What does this suggest about the overall normative power of R2P, and is the neglect of R2P reflective of a more general weakening in provisions designed to deal with wide-scale human rights abuses?


2009 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 156-184 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jürgen Haacke

AbstractThis paper is concerned with the invocation of the responsibility to protect (RtoP) in the face of the Myanmar authorities' problematic response to Cyclone Nargis. It is animated by four main questions: (1) What were the dynamics leading to calls for the application of the responsibility to protect? (2) In what ways did the invocation of the RtoP affect the provision of humanitarian assistance to cyclone survivors? (3) How has the international response to Cyclone Nargis compared to the way in which Western powers in particular have responded to Myanmar's armed ethnic conflict? (4) What implications and conclusions follow from the Myanmar case for putting RtoP into practice? The article argues that while the applicability of RtoP was much in doubt with respect to the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis, its principles nevertheless served as a rhetorical device for Western countries to influence both Naypyidaw and ASEAN as regards the practical need of facilitating humanitarian relief. Noting the available diplomatic support Myanmar enjoys in the UNSC, the paper suggests that the variation characterizing the international response to Myanmar's practices in the Ayeyawady delta and in the ethnic areas is also partly due to the different scale of fatalities and insufficient independent verification of claims regarding atrocity crimes. Generally, the Myanmar case has nevertheless accentuated the need for considering further what practical assistance regional and international actors can render to protect those that are or may become caught up in atrocities.


AJIL Unbound ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 113 ◽  
pp. 273-278
Author(s):  
Colette Rausch

The doctrine of “responsibility to protect” obliges all states to protect populations from “atrocity crimes”—namely, genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing—under three “pillars” of protection. Pillar One requires a state to protect its own population from atrocity crimes. Pillar Two obliges the international community to help states to exercise this responsibility through diplomatic, humanitarian, and other peaceful means. When both of these approaches fail, states must pursue a “Pillar Three” strategy: the UN Security Council must “take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner.”


2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 385-414
Author(s):  
Richard Illingworth

Abstract This article examines reform to the ‘veto’ power held by the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. The responsibility to react to mass atrocity crimes under the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) lies predominantly in the hands of the Security Council, meaning that R2P and the veto are inseparable. Veto use can obstruct the Council from meeting its R2P, reflected by the ongoing crisis in Syria, over which 16 Council draft resolutions have been vetoed to date. This article applies a transitional cosmopolitan framework to offer an informal ‘Responsible Veto Restraint’ (rvr) recommendation for veto reform. This measure provides a more effective and feasible avenue for veto reform than the recommendations of the Accountability, Coherency, and Transparency Group’s Code of Conduct and the France-Mexico Joint initiative for veto restraint. rvr can help promote R2P action through the Security Council, offering an avenue for progress towards addressing the problem of atrocity crimes.


2021 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 227-243
Author(s):  
Jennifer M. Welsh

AbstractThe principle of the responsibility to protect (RtoP) conceives of a broad set of measures that can be employed in preventing and responding to atrocity crimes. Nevertheless, the UN Security Council remains an important part of the implementation architecture, given what the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty referred to as its authoritative position in international society as the “linchpin of order and stability.” As part of the roundtable “The Responsibility to Protect in a Changing World Order: Twenty Years since Its Inception,” this review of the Council's role in fulfilling its responsibility to protect advances two somewhat contrasting arguments about the original ICISS report. First, it suggests that the commissioners may have underestimated the Council's potential contribution, by concentrating on the authorization of coercive means to address crises of human protection. Over the past two decades, the Security Council has not only employed various diplomatic, political, and humanitarian measures to address atrocity crimes but also adjusted the purposes and practices of peace operations to advance protection goals and more subtly shaped discourses and expectations about state responsibilities for protection. However, I also argue that the willingness of the ICISS to identify potential alternatives to the Security Council when its members are paralyzed appears in retrospect to have been both bold and forward looking, in light of the Council's failures to act in a timely and decisive manner to protect amid crises and the contemporary realities of geopolitical rivalry. The article concludes by suggesting that future efforts to protect populations from atrocity crimes should focus not only on the herculean task of trying to change the behavior of P5 members of the Council but also on encouraging a new institutional balance between the Security Council and other intergovernmental bodies.


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