scholarly journals Challenges of Western Balkan Countries on Their Road to EU Integration

Author(s):  
Mirvan Xhemaili

Western Balkans is one of the regions that has experienced the worst and the longest transition after the Cold War. The dissolution of Yugoslavia at the beginning of 1990s was associated by destructive interethnic conflicts, by local and regional wars, and also by political and ethnic accidents. Western Balkans is also closely related to Europe politically and economically. The historical period to be considered in this research is the post-Cold War period, after the immense changes in central Europe, and the southeast Europe, i.e. the Balkans. The international factor has actively intervened in the Balkans. The international presence is both military and civil. Various international mechanisms have played a determining factor through direct activities in the region. The process of dissolution of former Yugoslavia has fragmentized the Western Balkans in many spheres, starting from the border changes to demographic changes. This process also resulted in creation of new states that changed the geopolitics of the region. The fragmentation was caused by many factors: historical, political, economic, military, geopolitical, and strategic. Also, this development was determined by the political concepts that are leading the region in respect to EU integration. The development of the regional political process has now conditioned and oriented the Western Balkans towards integration in Euro Atlantic structures. Knowing that these countries have as a strategic aim the full membership in the EU, I can say that this makes the process more dynamic and faster, because we are dealing with a process that entails the same principles and same values that are closely related to regional interests. Regardless of the same orientation on values and geopolitical interest, the Western Balkans is currently in a fragmentized level in regards to EU integration

2018 ◽  
Vol 53 (3) ◽  
pp. 301-319 ◽  
Author(s):  
Oliver P Richmond

What does it mean to mediate in the contemporary world? During the Cold War, and since, various forms of international intervention have maintained a fragile strategic and territorially sovereign balance between states and their elite leaders, as in Cyprus or the Middle East, or built new states and inculcated new norms. In the post-Cold War era intervention and mediation shifted beyond the balance of power and towards the liberal peace, as in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Timor Leste. In the case of Northern Ireland, identity, territorial sovereignty, and the nature of governance also began to be mediated, leading to hints of complex, post-liberal formulations. This article offers and evaluates a genealogy of the evolution of international mediation.


2017 ◽  
Vol 23 (79) ◽  
pp. 5-39
Author(s):  
Josip Glaurdić

AbstractApart from relations with its neighbours, Croatia’s relations with the United Kingdom (UK) were undoubtedly its greatest international challenge since it won its independence in the early 1990s. Relations between the two countries during this period were frequently strained partly due to Zagreb’s democratic shortcomings, but partly also due to competing visions of post-Cold War Southeast Europe and due to long-lasting biases rooted in Croatia’s and Britain’s conflicting policies during Yugoslavia’s breakup and wars. Croatia’s accession to the EU in 2013 offered an opportunity for the two countries to leave the burdens of their past behind, since Zagreb and London had similar preferences on a number of crucial EU policy fronts. However, Brexit changed everything. Croatia’s future relations with the UK are likely to be determined by the nature of Brexit negotiations and the evolution of British policy toward the pace and direction of EU integration.


2003 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 209-227 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jim Headley

This article analyses the Russian reaction to the Sarajevo crisis of February 1994 when NATO threatened air strikes in response to the market-place mortar explosion. I argue that Russia's shift to a realist great-power policy led to a crisis with the West as Russia sought to demonstrate its great power credentials, protect what it saw as specific Russian interests in the Balkans, and limit the role of NATO in conflict resolution, while Western leaders aimed to demonstrate NATO credibility and its new post-Cold War role as peace-keeper/peace-maker. This was the first major East-West crisis since the end of the Cold War, and Russian responses and actions foreshadowed its reactions to the Kosovo crisis.


Author(s):  
Bejtush Gashi ◽  
Gurakuç Kuçi

The Western Balkans is dominated by its geographical position, which, after the end of the Cold War in the 1990s, was one of the regions that experienced the most difficult transition because this process was accompanied by bilateral and multilateral conflicts, with local and regional wars, with political and ethnic clashes. As a consequence, it was also politically fragmented on its map. The international community actively intervened in the Balkans with various civilian and military missions, respectively during the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and North Macedonia (former FYROM). These international interventions have yielded concrete results in the process of overall democratic reforms of the countries of the region, with particular emphasis on the security field, as well as the aspect of integration reforms in both NATO and the EU. Fragmentation of the Western Balkans came for many historical, political, economic, military, geopolitical and strategic reasons. This process also had consequences for the integration process of this region. But it is currently fully oriented towards European and Euro-Atlantic structures. No Balkan countries including Kosovo have any other orientations besides these (there are doubts about Serbia). Serbia has stated that it does not want NATO membership, while Russia has tried and is constantly trying to cause chaos in the Western Balkans. How this chaos is caused and how the cooperation of the countries of this region has affected and is influenced is the essence of our work that will draw conclusions about how to act in the future.


1995 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 579-583
Author(s):  
John Horvath

With the cold war officially “over,” political scientists are busy settingthe stage for the next pattern of conflict. Cold war ideology, best describedas “a perpetual war for perpetual peace,” has left an unexpected vacuumin world politics. With the post-cold war world order more unstable anddangerous than at any time since the end of the Second World War, manyin the West find themselves struggling with an identity crisis. The goldenage that was to arise from the defeat of communism has not come-oneither side of the Iron Curtain-and prospects for world peace are moreunlikely now than at any time during the cold war. In order to come toterms with this bankruptcy of present-day foreign policy, western societyhas begun to search for pariahs. As Kunstler observes, “it seems that theAmerican public perennially needs identifiable villains to stimulate itsgastric juices.” Consequently, Islam and Muslims have become the latesttarget.Unlike previous enemies and opponents, which were based onnation-states and stimulated through nationalism and calls for patriotism,today’s “evil empire” is based on civilizations and fueled byracism. According to Huntington, “the fault lines between civilizationswill be the battle lines of the future.” Hence Islam is seen as a distinctthreat. The cultural fault lines between Islamic civilization and other civilizationsaround the world, from the Balkans and the bulge of Africa toCentral Asia, are considered the most violent and unstable areas onearth. In Huntington’s words, “Islam has bloody borders.”’ Such a viewof Islam and Islamic civilization as something cancerous to global stabilityis a perfect replacement for the former enemy and its ideology: theex-Soviet Union and communism. Once again, the American (and westem)military-industrial complex can justify the continued need to producearms while “defense” budgets continue to divert monies fromsocial expenditures.In Europe, as elsewhere, there is a basic misunderstanding of whatIslam is and represents. Stereotypes of “Muslim terrorists” have permeatedsociety. Anyone with a beard and/or a dark complexion is often treated assuspect. Muslims are generally seen as fanatics, worshipping the likes ofAyatollah Khomeini and Saddam Hussein and wanting nothing more in lifethan to kill Salman Rushdie. While many Westerners consider Muslims tobe fundamentalists, Muslims can view Westerners as being just as ...


1991 ◽  
Vol 85 (2) ◽  
pp. 475-493 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ted Hopf

Bipolar systems are inherently more stable than multipolar configurations of power, Kenneth Waltz argues. His empirical justification for this conclusion relies on the multipolar systems that preceded the two world wars and the bipolar Cold War. The weakness of Waltz's argument is the small number of cases and the failure to consider alternative explanations for different levels of war in the three periods. In another historical period of both multi- and bipolarity—Europe from 1495 to 1559—I have found that polarity cannot account for the constant level of instability across a change in polarity in the system. Instead, the offense-defense balance, which includes the technical military balance, the cumulativity of power resources, and strategic beliefs, explains instability in the period. Drawing on this alternative theory, I reassess the high level of stability associated with the Cold War and speculate on the level of stability we can expect in the post-Cold War period.


Born in 1945, the United Nations (UN) came to life in the Arab world. It was there that the UN dealt with early diplomatic challenges that helped shape its institutions such as peacekeeping and political mediation. It was also there that the UN found itself trapped in, and sometimes part of, confounding geopolitical tensions in key international conflicts in the Cold War and post-Cold War periods, such as hostilities between Palestine and Iraq and between Libya and Syria. Much has changed over the past seven decades, but what has not changed is the central role played by the UN. This book's claim is that the UN is a constant site of struggle in the Arab world and equally that the Arab world serves as a location for the UN to define itself against the shifting politics of its age. Looking at the UN from the standpoint of the Arab world, this volume includes chapters on the potential and the problems of a UN that is framed by both the promises of its Charter and the contradictions of its member states.


Author(s):  
Thomas J. Christensen

In brute-force struggles for survival, such as the two world wars, disorganization and divisions within an enemy alliance are to one's own advantage. However, most international security politics involve coercive diplomacy and negotiations short of all-out war. This book demonstrates that when states are engaged in coercive diplomacy—combining threats and assurances to influence the behavior of real or potential adversaries—divisions, rivalries, and lack of coordination within the opposing camp often make it more difficult to prevent the onset of regional conflicts, to prevent existing conflicts from escalating, and to negotiate the end to those conflicts promptly. Focusing on relations between the Communist and anti-Communist alliances in Asia during the Cold War, the book explores how internal divisions and lack of cohesion in the two alliances complicated and undercut coercive diplomacy by sending confusing signals about strength, resolve, and intent. In the case of the Communist camp, internal mistrust and rivalries catalyzed the movement's aggressiveness in ways that we would not have expected from a more cohesive movement under Moscow's clear control. Reviewing newly available archival material, the book examines the instability in relations across the Asian Cold War divide, and sheds new light on the Korean and Vietnam wars. While recognizing clear differences between the Cold War and post-Cold War environments, the book investigates how efforts to adjust burden-sharing roles among the United States and its Asian security partners have complicated U.S. security relations with the People's Republic of China since the collapse of the Soviet Union.


2016 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 135
Author(s):  
Xhavit Sadrijaj

NATO did not intervene in the Balkans to overcome Yugoslavia, or destroy it, but above all to avoid violence and to end discrimination. (Shimon Peres, the former Israeli foreign minister, winner of Nobel Prize for peace) NATO’s intervention in the Balkans is the most historic case of the alliance since its establishment. After the Cold War or the "Fall of the Iron Curtain" NATO somehow lost the sense of existing since its founding reason no longer existed. The events of the late twenties in the Balkans, strongly brought back the alliance proving the great need for its existence and defining dimensions and new concepts of security and safety for the alliance in those tangled international relations.


This first-ever history of the US National Intelligence Council (NIC) is told through the reflections of its eight chairs in the period from the end of the Cold War until 2017. Coeditors Robert Hutchings and Gregory Treverton add a substantial introduction placing the NIC in its historical context going all the way back to the Board of National Estimates in the 1940s, as well as a concluding chapter that highlights key themes and judgments. The historic mission of this remarkable but little-understood organization is strategic intelligence assessment in service of senior American foreign policymakers. It has been at the center of every critical foreign policy issue during the period covered by this volume: helping shape America’s post–Cold War strategies, confronting sectarian conflicts around the world, meeting the new challenge of international terrorism, and now assessing the radical restructuring of the global order. Each chapter places its particular period of the NIC’s history in context (the global situation, the administration, the intelligence community) and assesses the most important issues with which the NIC grappled during the period, acknowledging failures as well as claiming successes. With the creation of the director of national intelligence in 2005, the NIC’s mission mushroomed to include direct intelligence support to the main policymaking committees in the government. The mission shift took the NIC directly into the thick of the action but may have come at the expense of weakening its historic role of providing over-the horizon strategic analysis.


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