scholarly journals THE NOTIONS «MECHANISM» AND «ORGANISM» IN THE SOCIAL ONTOLOGY OF S.L. FRANK

2021 ◽  
pp. 118-141
Author(s):  
Виктор Александрович Куприянов
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Social Ontology ◽  
German Idealism ◽  
Social Philosophy ◽  
Western Philosophy ◽  
General Context ◽  
The Social ◽  
Xixth Century ◽  
Social Organism ◽  
Organic Theory

Статья посвящена анализу понятий «механизм» и «организм» в социальной философии С.Л. Франка. Социально-философская концепция Франка помещается в широкий контекст философии XIX-начала XX вв. В статье исследуются связи социальной философии Франка и органических теорий государства и общества. Автор статьи приводит обзор органических теорий: демонстрируется их генезис в немецком классическом идеализме и анализируются подходы, наиболее распространенные в XIX в. В статье обосновывается, что органические теории государства исторически связаны с телеологией И. Канта. Именно в философии Канта впервые появляется важное для философии XIX в. противопоставление организма и механизма. В статье указывается, что специфика этого подхода заключается не столько в естественнонаучной аналогии, сколько в интерпретации отношений части и целого. Автор показывает, что оппозиция механизма и организма сыграла важную роль в истории органических представлений об обществе. Русская социально-философская и политологическая мысль рассматривается в контексте общего развития социальных наук XIX в. Русские философы и обществоведы позаимствовали из западной философии идею оппозиции социального механизма и органицизма. На этой основе в России были выработаны аналогичные философско-правовые концепции, которые также можно отнести к традиции органицизма. Автор относит социально-философскую концепцию С.Л. Франка также к указанной традиции социального органицизма. В статье приводится реконструкция социальной философии Франка и отмечается, что его подход близок к идеям, получившим развитие в немецком классической идеализме. Указывается, что Франк критиковал не органическую теорию как таковую, а распространенную в его время натуралистическую концепцию, отождествлявшую общество с организмом. В этой связи автор показывает вклад Франка в историю органических представлений об обществе. The article is devoted to the analysis of the notions «mechanism» and «organism» in S.L. Frank’s social philosophy. The sociophilosophical conception of S.L. Frank is considered in the context of the philosophy of the XIXth - beginning of the XXth centuries. The article deals with the relations of S.L. Frank’s philosophy to the organic theories of society. The author gives an overview of the organic theories: their genesis in the German idealism and analysis of the widespread approaches in the XIXth century philosophy. The article shows that the organic theories were historically connected with the teleology of I. Kant. I. Kant was the first to propose the very opposition of organism and mechanism. The author points out that the speceficity of this approach consists rather in the interpretation of the relations between the part and the whole, than in the scientific analogy. The author shows that this opposition played a significant role in the organic theory of society. Russian social philosophy and political science are considered in the general context of the social sciences of the XIXth century. Russian philosophers and social sciences borrowed the idea of mechanism and organism from the western philosophy. Based on this approach they developed their own conceptions which can also be referred to the organic tradition. The author refers S.L. Frank’s social philosophy to the tradition of social organism. The article reconstructs the Frank’s social philosophy and points out that his approach is derived from the German classical idealism. It is shown that Frank did not criticized the very organic theory, his criticism was directed against naturalistic theories of his time. The author of the article shows the Frank’s contribution to the organic theory of society.

Social Ontology and Model-Building: A Response to Epstein

2021 ◽  
Vol 51 (2) ◽  
pp. 176-192
Author(s):  
Nadia Ruiz
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Social Science ◽  
Model Building ◽  
Social Ontology ◽  
Model Construction ◽  
Ontological Commitments ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
The Social

Brian Epstein has recently argued that a thoroughly microfoundationalist approach towards economics is unconvincing for metaphysical reasons. Generally, Epstein argues that for an improvement in the methodology of social science we must adopt social ontology as the foundation of social sciences; that is, the standing microfoundationalist debate could be solved by fixing economics’ ontology. However, as I show in this paper, fixing the social ontology prior to the process of model construction is optional instead of necessary and that metaphysical-ontological commitments are often the outcome of model construction, not its starting point. By focusing on the practice of modeling in economics the paper provides a useful inroad into the debate about the role of metaphysics in the natural and social sciences more generally.

Charisma and social phenomenology: Gerda Walther, Herman Schmalenbach and Aron Gurwitsch

2021 ◽  
pp. 1468795X2110496
Author(s):  
Dominik Zelinsky
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Max Weber ◽  
Social Philosophy ◽  
Emotional Dimension ◽  
The Social ◽  
Charismatic Authority ◽  
German Speaking ◽  
Aron Gurwitsch ◽  
Social Phenomenology

This paper explores the contribution of early social phenomenologists working in the 1920s and 1930s in Germany to charisma theory. Specifically, I focus on the works of Gerda Walther, Herman Schmalenbach and Aron Gurwitsch, whose work is now being re-appreciated in the field of social philosophy. Living in the interbellum German-speaking space, these authors were keenly interested in the issue of charismatic authority and leadership introduced into the social sciences by Max Weber, with whom they engaged in an indirect intellectual dialogue. I argue that their phenomenological background equipped them well to understand the intricacies of the experiential and emotional dimension of charisma, and that their insights remain valid even a century after they have been first published.

Comprehending Sociality: Hegel Beyond his Appropriation in Contemporary Philosophy of Recognition

2017 ◽  
Vol 38 (2) ◽  
pp. 266-292
Author(s):  
Christian Krijnen
Keyword(s):  
Frankfurt School ◽  
German Idealism ◽  
Social Philosophy ◽  
The Other ◽  
Contemporary Philosophy ◽  
Substantial Modification ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Axel Honneth ◽  
The Social ◽  
The One

AbstractContemporary philosophy of recognition represents probably the most prominent direction that presently claims to introduce an updated version of classical German idealism into ongoing debates, including the debate on the nature of sociality. In particular, studies of Axel Honneth offer triggering contributions in Frankfurt School fashion while at the same time rejuvenating Hegel’s philosophy in terms of a philosophy of recognition. According to Honneth, this attempt at a rejuvenation also involves substantial modification of Hegelian doctrines. It is shown that Honneth underestimates the implications of Hegel’s thoughts about the theme, method and systematic form of philosophy. As a consequence, Honneth’s social philosophy is, on the one hand, in need of a plausible foundation. This leads, on the other hand, to a different construction of the social within philosophy than Honneth offers.

Ontology

2021 ◽  
pp. 194-199
Author(s):  
Eric Fabri
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Social Groups ◽  
Social Ontology ◽  
Human Mind ◽  
Social Phenomena ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Modes Of Existence ◽  
Objective Existence

This chapter addresses ontology, which is the branch of philosophy concerned with the nature of being. As a branch of metaphysics, ontology is mainly concerned with the modes of existence of different entities (tangible and intangible). Every subdiscipline in the social sciences relies on an ontology that defines which elements really matter when it comes to explaining the phenomenon they set out to elucidate. A specific branch of ontology is devoted to the modes of existence of social phenomena: social ontology. Two main positions emerge: realism and constructivism. Scientific realism assumes that social phenomena have an objective existence, independent of the subject. By contrast, constructivism claims that social phenomena have no objective existence and are a construction of the human mind. Its fundamental axiom is that, even if reality exists outside the subject’s perception, the subject cannot reach it without perceiving it. This implies the mediation of imaginary structures, which are provided by social groups. It is important to note, however, that many other positions exist apart from realism and constructivism.

Bridging the gap between the social science and the social ontology of collective memory

2019 ◽  
pp. 175069801987608
Author(s):  
Jeffrey Blustein
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Social Science ◽  
Collective Memory ◽  
Social Science Research ◽  
Social Ontology ◽  
Science Research ◽  
Margaret Gilbert ◽  
Social Media Site ◽  
The Social ◽  
Collective Remembering

It is commonplace to attribute memories to groups of individuals both large and small. Attributions of memories to groups are also found in social science research. This article proposes using philosophical accounts from the literature on social ontology to help clarify and deepen our understanding of how these terms are being employed in the social sciences. Two contrasting accounts of collective remembering are presented: the joint commitment account derived from the seminal work of Margaret Gilbert, and the participatory intentions account based on Christopher Kutz’s analysis of collective action. The implications of these accounts for clarifying notions of collective memory and remembering in the social sciences are explored through two case studies—one involving a social media site that promotes sharing of memories among users and the other concerning organizational remembering.

Philosophy as Social Philosophy

Philosophy ◽  
1967 ◽  
Vol 42 (159) ◽  
pp. 37-52 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicolas Haines
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Public Administration ◽  
Social Workers ◽  
Social Philosophy ◽  
Second World War ◽  
World War ◽  
The Social ◽  
Social Philosopher ◽  
Moral Attitudes ◽  
Second World

Just before the second world war, in a paper read to the British Association, Morris Ginsberg talked about the failure of social philosophy and the social sciences to work together in the universities ‘toward the rational ordering of society’. Some time after the war Alexander Macbeath complained to British sociologists of his own vain search for a social philosopher who could teach in a course on public administration. Then a few years later A. E. Teale told an inter-professional conference at Keele that people who teach and train teachers, those who train social workers of all kinds, were disappointed when philosophers professed themselves unable to help those who had to ‘equip students with the skill to change prevailing moral attitudes and standards’.

scholarly journals Fallibilism and Ontology in Tuukka Kaidesoja’s Critical Realist Social Ontology

2015 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 349-358 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Little
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Critical Realism ◽  
Social Ontology ◽  
Causal Powers ◽  
Valuable Contribution ◽  
Critical Realist ◽  
Naturalistic Approach ◽  
The Social

AbstractThis article addresses Tuukka Kaidesoja’s critique of the philosophical presuppositions of Roy Bhaskar’s theories of critical realism. The article supports Kaidesoja’s naturalistic approach to the philosophy of the social sciences, including the field of social ontology. The article discusses the specific topics of fallibilism, emergence, and causal powers. I conclude that Kaidesoja’s book is a valuable contribution to current debates over critical realism.

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