scholarly journals Fallibilism and Ontology in Tuukka Kaidesoja’s Critical Realist Social Ontology

2015 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 349-358 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Little

AbstractThis article addresses Tuukka Kaidesoja’s critique of the philosophical presuppositions of Roy Bhaskar’s theories of critical realism. The article supports Kaidesoja’s naturalistic approach to the philosophy of the social sciences, including the field of social ontology. The article discusses the specific topics of fallibilism, emergence, and causal powers. I conclude that Kaidesoja’s book is a valuable contribution to current debates over critical realism.

2015 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 333-340 ◽  
Author(s):  
Petri Ylikoski

AbstractThis comment discusses Kaidesoja (2013) and raises the issue whether his analysis justifies stronger conclusions than he presents in the book. My comments focus on four issues. First, I argue that his naturalistic reconstruction of critical realist transcendental arguments shows that transcendental arguments should be treated as a rare curiosity rather than a general argumentative strategy. Second, I suggest that Kaidesoja’s analysis does not really justify his optimism about the usefulness of causal powers ontology in the social sciences. Third, I raise some doubts about the heuristic value of Mario Bunge’s social ontology that Kaidesoja presents as a replacement for critical realist ontology. Finally, I propose an alternative way to analyze failures of aggregativity that might better serve Kaidesoja’s purposes than the Wimsattian scheme he employs in the book.


Author(s):  
Grant Banfield

While specific applications of critical realism to ethnography are few, theoretical developments are promising and await more widespread development. This is especially the case for progressive and critical forms of ethnography that strive to be, in critical realist terms, an “emancipatory science.” However, the history of ethnography reveals that both the field and its emancipatory potential are limited by methodological tendencies toward “naïve realism” and “relativism.” This is the antimony of ethnography. The conceptual and methodological origins of ethnography are grounded in the historical tensions between anti-naturalist Kantian idealism and hyper-naturalist Humean realism. The resolution of these tensions can be found in the conceptual resources of critical realism. Working from, and building upon, the work of British philosopher Roy Bhaskar, critical realism is a movement in the philosophy of science that transcends the limits of Kantian idealism and Humean realism via an emancipatory anti-positivist naturalism. Critical realism emerged as part of the post-positivist movement of the late 1960s and early 1970s. From its Marxian origins, critical realism insists that all science, including the social sciences, must be emancipatory. At its essence, this requires taking ontology seriously. The call of critical realism to ethnographers, like all social scientists, is that while they must hold to epistemological caution this does not warrant ontological shyness. Furthermore, critical realism’s return to ontology implies that ethnographers must be ethically serious. Ethnography, if it is to hold to its progressive inclinations, must be about something. Critical realism for ethnography pushes the field to see itself as more than a sociological practice. Rather, it is to be understood as a social practice for something: the universalizing of human freedom.


2010 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Juha Käpylä ◽  
Harri Mikkola

International Relations as a scientific discipline can be considered elusive and, in a sense, “under debate.” A distinctive feature of the theoretical debates of the discipline has been the various calls for different kinds of theoretical and metatheoretical “turns.” In this atmosphere, the return of ontologically oriented IR theorizing based on Critical Realism has increased in influence. The aim of this article is to problematize some of the formulations of Critical Realist metatheory, especially in relation to the notions of correspondence, retroduction and emergence. The article will argue that in the context of the social sciences, two things are highly problematic. The first problem is the quest for establishing “heavy ontological furniture” as a backbone for scientific research. The second problem is the attempt to combine the fallibility of human knowledge with the “getting things right” attitude based on correspondence-like concepts of truth. The article concludes with a recommendation for a healthy caution towards the Critical Realist aspiration for the “ontological turn” in the social sciences.


2015 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 327-331
Author(s):  
Dave Elder-Vass

AbstractTuukka Kaidesoja’s new book is a welcome addition to the literature on critical realism. He shows good judgement in defending Roy Bhaskar’s argument for causal powers while criticising its framing as a transcendental argument. In criticising Bhaskar’s concept of a real-but-not-actual ontological domain, however, he discards an essential element of a realist ontology, even a naturalised one: a recognition of the transfactual aspect of causal power.


2009 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 371-395 ◽  
Author(s):  
FRED CHERNOFF

AbstractThis article argues that scientific and critical realism have embraced several mistaken claims, among them that social science enquiry cannot proceed unless the theoretical objects of study are specified in advance. The article argues, rather, that although pre-scientific, observable objects and events must be specified from the outset, theoretical objects come to our attention only in the course of formulating theories. The article advances an alternative to scientific realist and critical realist foundations, namely, causal conventionalism, which is an adaptation to the social sciences of several elements of Pierre Duhem's conventionalist account of physical science. The article argues that major goals of theorising that scientific realism and critical realism seek to fulfill are better satisfied by the conventionalist alternative. In an effort to clarify some important issues, the article identifies and responds to a series of related criticisms of my views offered by Colin Wight in his recent article ‘A Manifesto for Scientific Realism in IR: Assuming the Can-Opener Won't Work!’ in ‘Millennium’, and in his book, Agents, Structures and International Relations: Politics as Ontology.1


2021 ◽  
Vol 51 (2) ◽  
pp. 176-192
Author(s):  
Nadia Ruiz

Brian Epstein has recently argued that a thoroughly microfoundationalist approach towards economics is unconvincing for metaphysical reasons. Generally, Epstein argues that for an improvement in the methodology of social science we must adopt social ontology as the foundation of social sciences; that is, the standing microfoundationalist debate could be solved by fixing economics’ ontology. However, as I show in this paper, fixing the social ontology prior to the process of model construction is optional instead of necessary and that metaphysical-ontological commitments are often the outcome of model construction, not its starting point. By focusing on the practice of modeling in economics the paper provides a useful inroad into the debate about the role of metaphysics in the natural and social sciences more generally.


Politics ◽  
2002 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 17-23 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul A. Lewis

Researchers in political science are devoting increasing attention to the ontological commitments of their theories – that is, to what those theories presuppose about the nature of the political world. This article focuses on a recent contribution to this ‘ontological turn’ in political science ( Sibeon, 1999 ). Tensions are identified in Sibeon's account of the causal interplay between agency and social structure. It is argued that these tensions can be resolved by reflecting explicitly on ontological issues, in particular the causal efficacy of social structure, using a particular approach to the philosophy of the social sciences known as critical realism. The value of such reflection for the explanatory power of political analysis is highlighted.


Author(s):  
Виктор Александрович Куприянов

Статья посвящена анализу понятий «механизм» и «организм» в социальной философии С.Л. Франка. Социально-философская концепция Франка помещается в широкий контекст философии XIX-начала XX вв. В статье исследуются связи социальной философии Франка и органических теорий государства и общества. Автор статьи приводит обзор органических теорий: демонстрируется их генезис в немецком классическом идеализме и анализируются подходы, наиболее распространенные в XIX в. В статье обосновывается, что органические теории государства исторически связаны с телеологией И. Канта. Именно в философии Канта впервые появляется важное для философии XIX в. противопоставление организма и механизма. В статье указывается, что специфика этого подхода заключается не столько в естественнонаучной аналогии, сколько в интерпретации отношений части и целого. Автор показывает, что оппозиция механизма и организма сыграла важную роль в истории органических представлений об обществе. Русская социально-философская и политологическая мысль рассматривается в контексте общего развития социальных наук XIX в. Русские философы и обществоведы позаимствовали из западной философии идею оппозиции социального механизма и органицизма. На этой основе в России были выработаны аналогичные философско-правовые концепции, которые также можно отнести к традиции органицизма. Автор относит социально-философскую концепцию С.Л. Франка также к указанной традиции социального органицизма. В статье приводится реконструкция социальной философии Франка и отмечается, что его подход близок к идеям, получившим развитие в немецком классической идеализме. Указывается, что Франк критиковал не органическую теорию как таковую, а распространенную в его время натуралистическую концепцию, отождествлявшую общество с организмом. В этой связи автор показывает вклад Франка в историю органических представлений об обществе. The article is devoted to the analysis of the notions «mechanism» and «organism» in S.L. Frank’s social philosophy. The sociophilosophical conception of S.L. Frank is considered in the context of the philosophy of the XIXth - beginning of the XXth centuries. The article deals with the relations of S.L. Frank’s philosophy to the organic theories of society. The author gives an overview of the organic theories: their genesis in the German idealism and analysis of the widespread approaches in the XIXth century philosophy. The article shows that the organic theories were historically connected with the teleology of I. Kant. I. Kant was the first to propose the very opposition of organism and mechanism. The author points out that the speceficity of this approach consists rather in the interpretation of the relations between the part and the whole, than in the scientific analogy. The author shows that this opposition played a significant role in the organic theory of society. Russian social philosophy and political science are considered in the general context of the social sciences of the XIXth century. Russian philosophers and social sciences borrowed the idea of mechanism and organism from the western philosophy. Based on this approach they developed their own conceptions which can also be referred to the organic tradition. The author refers S.L. Frank’s social philosophy to the tradition of social organism. The article reconstructs the Frank’s social philosophy and points out that his approach is derived from the German classical idealism. It is shown that Frank did not criticized the very organic theory, his criticism was directed against naturalistic theories of his time. The author of the article shows the Frank’s contribution to the organic theory of society.


2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 267-272 ◽  
Author(s):  
Heather Whiteside

This brief commentary on Henry Wai-chung Yeung’s “Rethinking Mechanism and Process in the Geographical Analysis of Uneven Development” makes three points. First, the commentary supports the article’s assertions that ‘analytical rigor’ is compromised when process and mechanism are conflated, that causal mechanisms are under- theorized in much economic geography, and that a latent realist ontology often lurks beneath interpretive and process-based approaches. Second, it explores the inherent hurdles that a revival of critical realism presents for efforts of engaged pluralism given geography’s contending perspectives on ontology and epistemology and multiple social and substantive theories. Third, the commentary concludes with a hopeful yet cautionary tale of what multidisciplinary engagement on causal mechanisms might entail given the ‘rigor mortis’ mainstream orthodoxy elsewhere in the social sciences.


2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Fiona Haigh ◽  
Lynn Kemp ◽  
Patricia Bazeley ◽  
Neil Haigh

Abstract Background That there is a relationship between human rights and health is well established and frequently discussed. However, actions intended to take account of the relationship between human rights and social determinants of health have often been limited by lack of clarity and ambiguity concerning how these rights and determinants may interact and affect each other. It is difficult to know what to do when you do not understand how things work. As our own understanding of this consideration is founded on perspectives provided by the critical realist paradigm, we present an account of and commentary on our application of these perspectives in an investigation of this relationship. Findings We define the concept of paradigm and review critical realism and related implications for construction of knowledge concerning this relationship. Those implications include the need to theorise possible entities involved in the relationship together with their distinctive properties and consequential power to affect one another through exercise of their respective mechanisms (ways of working). This theorising work enabled us identify a complex, multi-layered assembly of entities involved in the relationship and some of the array of causal mechanisms that may be in play. These are presented in a summary framework. Conclusion Researchers’ views about the nature of knowledge and its construction inevitably influence their research aims, approaches and outcomes. We demonstrate that by attending to these views, which are founded in their paradigm positioning, researchers can make more progress in understanding the relationship between human rights and the social determinants of health, in particular when engaged in theorizing work. The same approaches could be drawn on when other significant relationships in health environments are investigated.


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