scholarly journals Gagasan Allah Kristianitas dalam Modernisme, Postmodernisme, dan 'Illative Sense' John Henry Newman

MELINTAS ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 174
Author(s):  
Riston Situmorang
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
John Henry Newman ◽  
Religious Epistemology ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Experience Of God ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Ways Of Thinking ◽  
Idea Of God

Modern worldview tends to explore everything, including the idea of God, grounded on reason and rational evidences. Postmodernism on the other hand tends to consider that the basic of epistemology of modernism fails to explain the experience and the existence of God, because modernism relies too much on the cognitive and empiric powers. John Henry Newman might be viewed as a constructive postmodernist for he chooses a different power for judging the truth about the concept and experience of God. Newman appears not to think in ‘either-or’ way like in the rationalism and empiricism worldview, but attempts to fuse and bridge the ways of thinking using ‘both-and’. He suggests that this power, i.e., the <em>illative sense</em>, is a faculty that help the believers judge the truth in comprehending the existence of God. With illative sense, people may decide and make spontaneous inferences on concrete issues naturally. In this line, postmodernism might be seen not as a threat or enemy, but companion to religion, for the postmodern epistemology tends to be sensorial, intuitive, and experiential. Illative sense, as a power that each believer has, is converging the particularities towards the existence of God in the context of religious epistemology.

Moral Values as Religious Absolutes

1992 ◽  
Vol 32 ◽  
pp. 145-160
Author(s):  
James P. Mackey
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Religion ◽  
Moral Values ◽  
True Proposition ◽  
The Other ◽  
Centrifugal Forces ◽  
Empirical World ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The World ◽  
Idea Of God

Those who have had the benefit of a reasonably lengthy familiarity with the philosophy of religion, and more particularly with the God question, may be so kind to a speaker long in exile from philosophy and only recently returned, as to subscribe, initially at least, to the following rather enormous generalization: meaning and truth, which to most propositions are the twin forces by which they are maintained, turn out in the case of claims about God, to be the centrifugal forces by which they disintegrate. In simpler language, the greater the amount of intelligible meaning that can be given to the idea of God, the less grounds there would appear to be for assuming let alone asserting, that God exists, at least as a being distinguishable from all the things in this empirical world which are the source of the range of meanings available to us; on the other hand, the more we insist that God exists, a being over and above the things that make up this empirical world (the more we take the proposition ‘God exists’ to be a true proposition in this particular transcendent sense, for the adjective ‘transcendent’ has many uses) the less the amount of commonly available meaning we appear to be able to apply to God. Or, to put this in a manner which might obviate an obvious objection to it; either everything we know is tout ensemble, God, and then nothing in the world that we know is distinctively divine; or else nothing in this world is God, and then nothing that we appear to be able to know is God. That same formulation will work, it should be noted, even if we substitute for ‘things in the world’, ‘an aspect or aspects of things in the world’.

Newman and the ‘Ethics of Belief’

1983 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 361-373 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. Jamie Ferreira
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
John Henry Newman ◽  
Ethics Of Belief ◽  
Insufficient Evidence ◽  
Philosophical Discussion ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The Will ◽  
The Ethics Of Belief

The last thirty years have seen a number of major contributions to the philosophical discussion of the possibility and character of an ‘ethics of belief’. In so far as the concern was focused on the problem of what constitutes ‘sufficient’ or ‘insufficient evidence’, the question of the ‘ethics of belief’ has turned into the current philosophical preoccupation with the question of the character of ‘rationality’ and the possibility of criteria of rationality which are either universal or at least cross-contextual. On the other hand, in so far as the concern was focused on the debated thesis that ‘believing is subject to moral appraisal (including the determination of “duties” to believe)’ the question of the ‘ethics of belief’ is with us today as the double inquiry into the question of the ‘will to believe’ and the relation of belief to action. Though the two concerns are not entirely separable, I will pay more explicit attention in this paper to the latter one in assessing some recent claims concerning the position held by John Henry Newman on these matters. After addressing some of the main points in the modern philosophical discussion of the ‘ethics of belief’, I will attempt to clarify Newman's place in the ‘ethics of belief’ discussion and argue that recent evaluations of Newman misrepresent his position in crucial ways and obscure his contributions to that discussion.

scholarly journals Hyperfiction and Reading, with Examples of Electronic Processing of Grimms’ Fairy Tales

2018 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 115-128
Author(s):  
Vladimira Velički ◽  
Damir Velički
Keyword(s):  
Fairy Tales ◽  
Temporal Sequence ◽  
The Other ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Ways Of Thinking ◽  
Electronic Processing

Hypertext is suitable for conducting literary experiments. It deconstructs the temporal sequence of narration, and lessens the author’s authority. The author of hyperfiction, in some way, loses control over how his or her work influences the reader. On the other hand, the belief that the reader of hyperfiction is at the same time its author, for he or she chooses which way to navigate the text, which hyperlinks to mark and in this manner create a new text, can be challenged. Using as its basis the networked and the non-networked versions of some Grimms’ fairy tales, this paper presents the results of the study, which was conducted with the aim of determining whether and how works of hyperfiction will change ways of reading, or even thinking, or, on the contrary, whether traditional ways of thinking and reading, and their sequence (beginning, middle, end) are so deeply rooted in our processing that they cannot be changed.

The Dao through the Prism of the Logos: Eurocentrism at the Level of Concepts

2019 ◽  
Vol 62 (6) ◽  
pp. 33-53 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrey A. Krushinskiy
Keyword(s):  
Cross Cultural ◽  
The Other ◽  
European Standard ◽  
Conceptual Apparatus ◽  
The Past ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The Status ◽  
Ways Of Thinking ◽  
Western European ◽  
The One

Despite the declarations about the possibility of rationalities that are alternative to Western European, despite the reasoning about philosophical multipolarity, the multiplicity of ways of thinking, etc., nowadays, the Western European paradigm of rationality (and concepts that corresponds to it), which is derived from Hellenic thought, continues to claim the status of ideological neutrality and transcend any intercivilizational differences. The Western European rationality in all its diversity is now acting as rationality as such. The indispensability of the reference to the Greek conceptual apparatus in contemporary philosophizing manifests itself most openly in the form of comparativism. Thus, there is the focus on carrying out explicit parallels between, on the one hand, the studied non-European intellectual phenomena and, on the other hand, their supposed European counterparts. An example of the cross-cultural and methodologically sound research of the problems of rationality is an analysis of the Dao through the prism of the Logos. The statement of the uniqueness of the Greek Logos does not imply the prohibition of the existence of its original counterparts in the so-called “non-Western” civilizations with an ancient and distinctive culture. The assumption of the existence of their own analogues of the Logos and rationality in various non-European civilizations presumes the most interesting question about the pluralism of rationalities – the question about the existence of rationalities in the past that could be considered as an alternative to the now prevailing Western European standard of rationality.

Is a Religious Epistemology Possible?

1969 ◽  
Vol 3 ◽  
pp. 263-280
Author(s):  
Terence Penelhum
Keyword(s):  
Natural Theology ◽  
Religious Discourse ◽  
The Other ◽  
Division I ◽  
Religious Epistemology ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Cognitive Experience ◽  
To Come ◽  
The One

Those who despair of the possibility of proving the existence of God tend, naturally, to hold that knowledge of God's existence and of those religious claims that depend upon it can only be had, if it can be had at all, through some direct religious awareness or insight. On this view appeals to authority or to revelation rest on appeals to such insight, if it is agreed that the credentials of the revealing authority cannot be established by the methods of natural theology. It is common for debate between believers and sceptics who share this despair about the possibility of proof to take on an air of hopelessness and unreality because of a fundamental epistemological cleavage: on the one hand the believer has an allegedly cognitive experience and on the other the sceptic lacks and suspects it. I want in this paper to scrutinise some aspects of this division. I shall not do much to mitigate the pessimism of my earlier statements, since I think the division really is, in certain critical ways, an unbridgeable one. But it is worth while to come to a clearer understanding of its nature than I think some philosophers have. What follows has been influenced by reflection on recent controversies about the meaningfulness of religious discourse, but is not intended to be a contribution to them. Some of the best-known contributions, however, seem to me to have made the epistemological cleavage I have referred to seem even worse than it is.

The Impossibility of Kantian Immortality

Dialogue ◽  
1980 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 219-234 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. J. Macintosh
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Other Hand

When we discuss Kant's views on immortality we are walking in the by-ways of Kantian exegesis. Kant's views on immortality are interesting in themselves, but even within the Kantian framework, they do not affect other topics of importance. It is true that Kant felt that the possibility of immortality was necessary for certain moral manoeuvres to be possible, but he thought that the existence of God was even more essential, so that particular battle is lost regardless. On the other hand, some at least of Kant's views are shared by other people, and if he is wrong, not just over points of detail, but in a thoroughgoing way, that might be worth pointing out, and notjust as a matter of exegesis. And, I shall try to show, Kant is not only wrong, but necessarily wrong. Not only is his version of immortality impossible, but any version resembling his is also impossible. I shall discuss the topic under three main headings: first, I shall mention the views which led Kant to his doctrine of immortality; secondly, I shall try to bring out some of the important points which his doctrine involves; and, finally, I shall indulge briefly in what I hope will be the - by then - fairly superfluous task of showing why such a doctrine won't, after all do.

Is a Religious Epistemology Possible?

1969 ◽  
Vol 3 ◽  
pp. 263-280 ◽  
Author(s):  
Terence Penelhum
Keyword(s):  
Natural Theology ◽  
Religious Discourse ◽  
The Other ◽  
Division I ◽  
Religious Epistemology ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Cognitive Experience ◽  
To Come ◽  
The One

Those who despair of the possibility of proving the existence of God tend, naturally, to hold that knowledge of God's existence and of those religious claims that depend upon it can only be had, if it can be had at all, through some direct religious awareness or insight. On this view appeals to authority or to revelation rest on appeals to such insight, if it is agreed that the credentials of the revealing authority cannot be established by the methods of natural theology. It is common for debate between believers and sceptics who share this despair about the possibility of proof to take on an air of hopelessness and unreality because of a fundamental epistemological cleavage: on the one hand the believer has an allegedly cognitive experience and on the other the sceptic lacks and suspects it. I want in this paper to scrutinise some aspects of this division. I shall not do much to mitigate the pessimism of my earlier statements, since I think the division really is, in certain critical ways, an unbridgeable one. But it is worth while to come to a clearer understanding of its nature than I think some philosophers have. What follows has been influenced by reflection on recent controversies about the meaningfulness of religious discourse, but is not intended to be a contribution to them. Some of the best-known contributions, however, seem to me to have made the epistemological cleavage I have referred to seem even worse than it is.

William of Auvergne on the Individuation of Human Souls

Traditio ◽  
1994 ◽  
Vol 49 ◽  
pp. 77-93 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roland J. Teske
Keyword(s):  
Thirteenth Century ◽  
The Other ◽  
First Principle ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Latin West ◽  
Proper Name ◽  
Per Se

William of Auvergne, bishop of Paris from 1228 to his death in 1249, was one of the first theologians of the thirteenth century to take into serious account the philosophical works that poured into the Latin West during the last half of the twelfth and the early decades of the thirteenth century. William showed a great deal of openness toward the works of those to whom he referred as “Aristotle and his followers,” and obviously drew upon them, even going so far as to adopt the Avicennian arguments for the existence of God as the being that is necessary through itself, and to claim that the Avicennian expression, “necesse esse per se,” is the proper name of the first principle. On the other hand, he also firmly rejected many Aristotelian doctrines when he found them to be in opposition to the faith.

scholarly journals “Wie Hast Du’s Mit der Religion?” Religionstheorie Und -Kritik Nach Stirner

2013 ◽  
Vol 21 (41) ◽  
pp. 143-164
Author(s):  
Frank Hansel ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Friedrich Nietzsche ◽  
Religious Beliefs ◽  
The Other ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Death Of God ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Max Stirner ◽  
The Veil ◽  
The One

Well before Friedrich Nietzsche had Max Stirner with great Gestus shouted (spelled) out the death of God and pulled away the veil of the realm of spirits. Religion critique after Stirner, which follows a clarified Enlightenment, can thereafter for all intents and purposes be only of two sorts: On the one hand, to explain how mankind (has) created its’ Religion and its’ Gods: Gunnar Heinsohn settles this. And on the other hand to point out: Which functional equivalents are themselves found as (religious) beliefs of humankind - freely adapted from Feuerbach: The truth of Religion is the need for it. The free self after Stirner, that knows rationally of the non-existence of God, chooses for itself its’ own respective God, or, it being strong enough, can leave it also as is.

scholarly journals Eucaristia e experiência de Deus. A importância da Eucaristia no atual contexto de busca do Sagrado

2001 ◽  
Vol 61 (244) ◽  
pp. 803
Author(s):  
Maria Clara Luchetti Bingemer
Keyword(s):  
Jesus Christ ◽  
Modern Human ◽  
The Other ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
New Words ◽  
Experience Of God ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The One ◽  
The Church

Na sociedade atual, onde convivem e se entrecruzam, por um lado, a secularização que parece minimizar e desvalorizar o sagrado e o religioso e, por outro lado, a explosão de novas formas de expressão religiosa, a celebração da Eucaristia pretende oferecer àqueles que dela participam uma experiência de Deus. Para isso, a Igreja vive hoje o desafio da fidelidade a toda a profundidade de significação contida no Sacramento da Eucaristia, mas ao mesmo tempo de comunicar o mistério que é seu conteúdo em novas palavras e por novas expressões, por meios que atraiam e seduzam os seres humanos modernos. Para isso, a Eucaristia conta com um elemento de novidade radical naquilo que concerne ao sentido do sagrado: o mistério da Encarnação de Jesus Cristo, Verbo feito carne, Mediador Único  da Nova Aliança. Abstract: In present-day society, where side by side and intersecting, secularization on the one hand seems to minimize and devalorize the sacred and the religious while on the other hand is the explosion of new ways to express religiousness, the celebration of the Eucharist intends to offer to those who participate in it an experience of God. For this, the Church today lives out the challenge of fidelity to all the depth ofmeaning contained in the Sacrament of the Eucharist, but at the same time to communicate the mystery which is its content through new words and by new expressions, by means which attract and allure modern human beings. For this the Eucharist counts upon an element of newness radical in that which has to do with the meaning of the sacred: the mystery of the Incarnation of Jesus Christ,Word made flesh, the only Mediator of the New Alliance.

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