On Artifacts and Truth-Preservation
In Saving Truth from Paradox, Hartry Field presents and defends a theory of truth with a new conditional. In this paper, I present two criticisms of this theory, one concerning its assessments of validity and one concerning its treatment of truth-preservation claims. One way of adjusting the theory adequately responds to the truth-preservation criticism, at the cost of making the validity criticism worse. I show that in a restricted setting, Field has a way to respond to the validity criticism. I close with some general considerations on the use of revision-theoretic methods in theories of truth.
1990 ◽
Vol 48
(1)
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pp. 202-203
1994 ◽
Vol 58
(11)
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pp. 832-835
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1998 ◽
Vol 138
(2)
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pp. 205-205
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2006 ◽
Vol 2006
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pp. 148
2014 ◽
Vol 84
(5-6)
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pp. 244-251
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