scholarly journals Jurisdiction Clauses in New Zealand Law

2019 ◽  
Vol 50 (4) ◽  
pp. 631
Author(s):  
Mary Keyes

The Trans-Tasman Proceedings Acts 2010, mirror legislation in New Zealand and Australia, regulate the allocation of jurisdiction in trans-Tasman civil proceedings. The legislation includes provisions dealing with the effects of jurisdiction clauses. This article considers the treatment of jurisdiction clauses under the statutory regime and the common law regime which provides for the effect of jurisdiction clauses that are outside the scope of the legislation, how these regimes differ, and their relative strengths and weaknesses.

2020 ◽  
pp. 450-476
Author(s):  
Nicola Peart ◽  
Prue Vines

New Zealand and Australia are named in that order in the title because New Zealand was the first to develop the discretionary family provision jurisdiction, in 1900, that now applies in New Zealand, Australia, and much of the common law world. This allows courts to make awards to family members from the estate of the deceased. Originally benefitting only the surviving spouse and children, family provision has extended the rules of eligibility in line with changes in the meaning of ‘family’. So as well as spouses, claims can also, in many of the Australasian jurisdictions, be made by civil partners, cohabitants, and same-sex partners. Most jurisdictions have also broadened the class of eligible children to include grandchildren and stepchildren who were being maintained by the deceased as well as children born of new reproductive techniques. Both New Zealand and Australia have significant indigenous populations and their eligibility to claim family provision is modified to accord with their customary law. Over time, the courts have adopted a much broader view of a deceased’s ‘moral duty’ to his or her family, particularly in regard to claims by adult children. The size of awards has increased correspondingly. The chapter discusses this development, as well as the increasing relevance of Indigenous customary law and how the courts deal with disentitling conduct. In view of the greatly expanded scope of family provision in New Zealand and Australia, testamentary freedom may be only an illusion in these jurisdictions.


Author(s):  
Adrian Keane ◽  
Paul McKeown

Under the common law rule against hearsay, any assertion, other than one made by a person while giving oral evidence in the proceedings, was inadmissible if tendered as evidence of the facts asserted. The Civil Evidence Act 1968 constituted a major assault upon the common law rule in civil proceedings by making provisions for the admissibility of both oral and written hearsay subject to certain conditions. In June 1988 the Civil Justice Review recommended an inquiry by a law reform agency into the usefulness of the hearsay rule in civil proceedings and the machinery for rendering it admissible. The recommendations were put into effect by the Civil Evidence Act 1995. This chapter discusses the admissibility of hearsay under the Civil Evidence Act 1995; safeguards; proof of statements contained in documents; evidence formerly admissible at common law; and Ogden tables.


1982 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 517-534
Author(s):  
A.J. Geare

This paper examines the development in the limitations imposed on employers' right of dismissal in New Zealand from the time when only the common law restrictions applied, through the first ineffectual statutory limitations, to the current situation. The paper analyses the current statutory protection against unjustifiable dismissal with reference to recent Arbitration Court decisions, discussing its implications, achievements and shortcomings.


2013 ◽  
Vol 44 (3/4) ◽  
pp. 653 ◽  
Author(s):  
Caroline Sawyer

The Citizenship Amendment Act 2005 removed the traditional common law rule that a person born in New Zealand was, just for that reason, a New Zealand citizen. It required that the person have a parent who was a New Zealand citizen or permanent resident at that time. The change is often said to have been made to prevent transient immigrants having New Zealand citizen children in order to remain in the country, after the Supreme Court's decision in the Ding and Ye line of cases reputedly confirmed that foreign parents did thus obtain that right. This article discusses the misconceptions surrounding the loss of full birthright citizenship, the background of contemporary citizenship law in the common law world and the potential effects of the recent change on migrant communities and on New Zealand's existing population.


2020 ◽  
Vol 68 (2) ◽  
pp. 439-476
Author(s):  
John Bevacqua

There have been numerous recent Canadian cases in which taxpayers have alleged negligence by Canada Revenue Agency officials. This body of rapidly evolving Canadian case law constitutes, at present, the most extensive jurisprudence in the common-law world considering the tortious liability of tax officials. It also exposes fundamental unresolved controversies that inhibit legal clarity and certainty on the limits of the right of taxpayers to sue for the negligence of tax officials. Through comparison with cases in Australia and New Zealand, this article confirms that these unresolved controversies are not unique to Canada. The author proposes a range of options for addressing these issues. Intended as a primer for policy makers' attention and debate, these proposals are drawn from judicial and legislative approaches adopted in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, and in other broadly comparable common-law jurisdictions.


2007 ◽  
Vol 38 (3) ◽  
pp. 417 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gordon Anderson

On 7 August 2007, Gordon Anderson delivered his inaugural lecture after becoming a professor in the Law Faculty of Victoria University of Wellington. Gordon took as his theme the protection of employees employed on an individual contract of employment. Following the repeal of the award system by the Employment Contracts Act 1991 the majority of New Zealand employees ceased to be covered by collectively negotiated instruments. Instead the contract of employment became dominant. The lecture argued that the common law contract of employment provides little protection for employees. Instead protection depends on some critical statutory interventions that provide a degree of balance within the employment relationship. While not perfect, these protections may be the best that can be expected in the real world of employment.


1970 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Isaacus K. Adzoxornu

The primary purpose of this article is 2 fold: firstly, to argue that not only have industrial tribunals in New Zealand incorrectly interpreted the statutory term "worker", but also that in doing so, they have assumed a jurisdiction which has never been conferred on them by statute; and secondly, to make some suggestions towards reform of Labour Court practice in this crucial area.


2020 ◽  
pp. 707-739
Author(s):  
Kenneth G C Reid

In medieval English law, widows were entitled to dower and widowers to curtesy, both being life interests in the deceased’s real property. In addition, the personal property of the deceased was divided according to a tripartite system, with surviving spouse and children being entitled to one-third each and only the final third being available for disposal by will. The tripartite system was abandoned in the early modern period though it survives still in Scotland. But dower and curtesy remained and were exported to the British Empire. In the United States they had a rich future, developing into the fixed ‘elective share’ of the deceased’s estate which is available, in many states, for the surviving spouse. Elsewhere, dower and curtesy faded away during the nineteenth century giving rise to almost complete freedom of testation. This freedom was, however, short-lived. In 1900, New Zealand, having considered but rejected the tripartite system of fixed shares still used in Scotland, introduced a discretionary ‘family provision’ by which courts could make awards to close family members. The New Zealand model was soon copied throughout Australia, in the common law provinces of Canada, and, in 1938, in England and Wales itself. The chapter considers the reasons for the abandonment of freedom of testation, and examines the debate in New Zealand, England, and the Republic of Ireland as to whether family protection was best achieved by a system of fixed shares, as in Scotland, or by a system involving judicial discretion.


2020 ◽  
Vol 69 (2) ◽  
pp. 365-395
Author(s):  
Paul F. Scott

AbstractThis article, on the basis of a consideration of the development of the law relating to the use of passports as a tool of national security in the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, challenges the common law conception of passports, arguing that passports effectively confer rights and so, consequentially, that the refusal or withdrawal of a passport represents a denial of rights. From this conclusion a number of points flow. Though these consequences are most acute for the United Kingdom and Canada, in which passports remain regulated by, and are issued under, prerogative powers, there are also a number of points of significance for Australia and New Zealand, where passports have a statutory basis.


1979 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 269-285
Author(s):  
Wilberforce

I was not surprised when, from several alternative subjects, you chose, as the title of my Lecture, the need for a Constitution in Britain. Those of us without a written constitution are indeed, a select club—New Zealand, Israel, the United Kingdom.I will start with a quotation from Lord Salmon. In a recent lecture, he said: In this country [U.K.] we have an unwritten constitution. I have always regarded this as a blessing and never agreed with the theoretical objections to it. It is superbly flexible and above all it has stood the test of time. It works—and works admirably. But I am beginning to wonder whether it might not be wise to evolve, not an elaborate written constitution but perhaps the equivalent of a modern Bill of Rights. A statute which should lay down our basic freedoms, provide for their preservation and enact that it could not be repealed save by, say, a 75% majority of both Houses of Parliament.One can recognize in this passage the views of an eminent common lawyer, believing in the strength and potentialities of the common law as a flexible instrument, in, of course, the right hands: of one who believes deeply in human freedom, and who is concerned about the threat to it: who desires an explicit definition of the basic liberties and who believes that these can be protected by a sufficiently strong, entrenched, legal system. In this he undoubtedly reflects the views of many people, probably of the majority of ordinary men.


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