scholarly journals Relationship Property and Trusts: the "Bundle of Rights" Theory?

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Frances Gush

<p>This dissertation examines the “bundle of rights” theory as it meets at the intersection of trust and family property law. Drawing on conceptions of property, the principles and purposes of the Property (Relationships) Act and contrasted with trust law, a theory is adopted to explain why family property law has presumptive power over trust principles. Orthodox trust principles are discussed to explain why trust assets are protected from third party claims, the importance of the laws of powers and fiduciary obligations, the problems created by settlor or appointor control and the reason a “controller” is a beneficial owner of trust assets. The dispositions of relationship property to trusts and the limits on compensatory payments are discussed alongside the significance of the abolition of gift duty, other statutory remedies and judicial responses. Case authorities are explored, similarities with Australian alter ego trusts are drawn upon, and the application of the “bundle of rights” theory is discussed with reference to the valuation of debts and occupation orders. The dissertation concludes that the “bundle of rights” theory draws on an expansive meaning of property, it is a principled approach but confined to the Act.</p>

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Frances Gush

<p>This dissertation examines the “bundle of rights” theory as it meets at the intersection of trust and family property law. Drawing on conceptions of property, the principles and purposes of the Property (Relationships) Act and contrasted with trust law, a theory is adopted to explain why family property law has presumptive power over trust principles. Orthodox trust principles are discussed to explain why trust assets are protected from third party claims, the importance of the laws of powers and fiduciary obligations, the problems created by settlor or appointor control and the reason a “controller” is a beneficial owner of trust assets. The dispositions of relationship property to trusts and the limits on compensatory payments are discussed alongside the significance of the abolition of gift duty, other statutory remedies and judicial responses. Case authorities are explored, similarities with Australian alter ego trusts are drawn upon, and the application of the “bundle of rights” theory is discussed with reference to the valuation of debts and occupation orders. The dissertation concludes that the “bundle of rights” theory draws on an expansive meaning of property, it is a principled approach but confined to the Act.</p>


2019 ◽  
Vol 50 (4) ◽  
pp. 733
Author(s):  
Jessie Wall

After a painfully long set up, that attempts to ground three claims about property law (in general) and the nature of the beneficial interest (in particular), this article considers two arguments about the law of discretionary trusts. The first is the bundle of rights argument. This argument concerns the interpretation of "property" in legislative provisions. It suggests that where legislation is concerned with the structure of the social relationships that property institutions facilitate (rather that the juridical structure of rights and duties under property law), interpretations regarding what amounts to a "property" interest should also be "functional" (rather than "formalistic"). The second argument is the concept of the illusory trust. This argument concerns the standard package of constitutive elements required by trust law when a settlor uses the trust institution to order his or her affairs. Where an ostensible trust lacks a constitutive element, it can be said to be illusory. I consider here recent attempts to further delineate the concept of the illusory trust, that look to the "substance" or "reality" of the trust, and in doing so, shift our attention away from juridical form and onto social function. I will argue that only the former argument needs to be taken seriously.


Author(s):  
J. E. Penner

This chapter discusses property law. It considers the idea that property had a “nominalist” ontology, and it was in danger of “disintegration” as a working legal category for that very reason. Nominalism about property has had a significant impact in U.S. case law. The concern here, however, is whether it is a helpful stance to take as a theorist of property. The chapter argues that it is not. There are indeed “high” level abstractions about property which one cannot plausibly do without if one is to understand property rights and property law doctrine. Moreover, the “bundle of rights” (BOR) challenge does not assist one in making sense of these abstractions. The chapter then looks at the conceptual failure of BOR and the New Private Law as it relates to property. BOR is generally regarded as being underpinned by what might be called the Hohfeld-Honoré synthesis. The synthesis rests upon a fairly serious mistake, which is that while the Hohfeldian examination of jural norms is analytic if it is anything, Honor’s elaboration of the incidents making up ownership is anything but—it is functional. This means that Honoré describes the situation of the owner not principally in terms of his Hohfeldian powers, duties, and rights vis-à-vis others, but in terms of the social or economic advantages that an owner has by virtue of his position, and the terms and limitations of those advantages.


Author(s):  
Krystyna Szczepanowska-Kozłowska

AbstractOne form of industrial property right infringement is stocking for the purpose of offering or marketing. This form of infringement appears both in EU legal acts on trademarks or designs, as well as in national regulations, including those concerning patents. What is specific to stocking when compared to other activities comprising the stipulated exclusivity of the holder of industrial property rights is the fact that the literal meaning of “stocking” does not explain whether the infringing party or the warehouse keeper is the entity that places the goods in storage. The structure of industrial property rights as absolute rights would theoretically permit the view that the law is violated by both the entity that accepts the goods for storage and the entity that places such goods in storage. To determine if there is an infringement, it must be established what the goods being stocked are further intended for. It is not without significance that the finding of an infringement of industrial property rights does not depend on fault or awareness. From the point of view of the industrial property law regime, it is difficult to find arguments against this understanding of infringement by stocking. Since the offeror of goods infringing industrial property rights may be held liable even if the goods have not yet been manufactured, it is conceivable that the entity accepting such goods for stocking is also liable. This interpretation of the concept of stocking would certainly correspond to the absolute nature of liability for infringement.In a recent judgment the CJEU confirmed that the warehouse keeper who, on behalf of a third party, stores goods which infringe trademark rights only creates the technical conditions for trademark use by this third party provided that the warehouse keeper is not aware of that infringement. The CJEU also confirmed that only the person who decides about the purpose of storing the goods can be treated as an infringer. However, the CJEU did not respond to the question regarding whether the warehouse keeper could be treated as an infringer if it pursues the aims of storing the goods at the request of the entity that put the goods into storage.


Legal Studies ◽  
1987 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-38 ◽  
Author(s):  
Iwan Davies

In any system of property law a complete specification of rights and duties raises at least two questions. First, allocation of rights and duties inter se between the parties to the transaction; secondly, the rights and duties of the parties to the original transaction against the rest of the world. The traditional common law analysis where a third party wishes to acquire an indefeasible interest in a chattel is to direct the latter to the ‘owner’ and indeed the prerequisite for the enjoyment of most property rights depends upon our ability to acquire it from someone else. Furthermore, inherent in the idea of acquiring an absolute right in property (title) is exclusivity of possession ie superiority over the transferor and third parties.


Author(s):  
Robert Abbey ◽  
Mark Richards

Land Law is an important foundation for the study of Property Law and Practice (PLP). This chapter summarizes the fundamental principles of land law. It covers estates and interests in land; trusts and co-ownership; easements; freehold covenants; leases; mortgages; and third party rights, overriding interests, and the register and classes of title.


Author(s):  
Robert Abbey ◽  
Mark Richards

Land Law is an important foundation for the study of Property Law and Practice (PLP). This chapter summarizes the fundamental principles of land law. It covers estates and interests in land; trusts and co-ownership; easements; freehold covenants; leases; mortgages; and third party rights, overriding interests, and the register and classes of title.


Legal Studies ◽  
1998 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 369-390 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simone Wong

Ownership of the family home is usually not disputed until either the relationship between the spouses or cohabitants breakdown or there is a competing claim over the property by a third party. In such circumstances, determination of ownership rights becomes imperative. The Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 gives the courts adjustive powers to deal with disputes between spouses on the breakdown of the marriage. Notwithstanding this, there may be circumstances where it will be necessary or desirable to determine property rights between spouses. Furthermore, the adjustive powers of the courts are not applicable to cohabitants. Thus, in the absence of legal co-ownership in the family home, cohabitants and spouses who cannot rely on the 1973 Act will have to establish an equitable interest in the property. The analyses relied on are primarily based on property law and trusts principles and, more particularly, imputed trusts and proprietary estoppel. Under trusts principles, imputed trusts are usually taken to refer to resulting and constructive trusts.


Author(s):  
Gregory S. Alexander

The right to destroy is one of the least discussed twigs in the proverbial bundle of rights constituting ownership. The right in its broader sense includes not simply the Hohfeldian privilege to destroy but also the privilege to use and its correlative duty to preserve and maintain and implicates some of the most contentious and difficult issues in property law today, including historic preservation, the right of artists to alter or even destroy their work, and the right to destroy frozen sperm, embryos, and other human tissue. This chapter discusses these three controversies in relation to whether owners have a right to destroy what they own and whether they have obligations to preserve their property. The aim is to show how the human flourishing theory provides an illuminating framework for analyzing what is at stake in disputes over an owner’s asserted right to destroy something owned.


2020 ◽  
pp. 3-16
Author(s):  
Robert Abbey ◽  
Mark Richards

Land Law is an important foundation for the study of Property Law and Practice (PLP). This chapter summarizes the fundamental principles of land law. It covers estates and interests in land; trusts and co-ownership; easements; freehold covenants; leases; mortgages; and third party rights, overriding interests, and the register and classes of title.


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