scholarly journals Integration Processes in Central Asia: The Clash of Interests of External Factors

Author(s):  
A. E. Bezrukov ◽  
K. A. Ivanov ◽  
E. S. Chimiris

The article examines the prospects and limitations of the development of integration processes in the Central Asian region, taking into account several prominent external players in relation to the region — Russia, the United States and the EU (“collective West”) China The chosen topic is relevant for several reasons: the high resource capacity of the Central Asian region, the peculiarities of its geopolitical and geostrategic position, the growth of foreign policy and foreign economic activity of the countries of the region The authors of the article proceed from the hypothesis that the interests of the main large geopolitical players: Russia, China and the West, play one of the important roles in these processes The main problem considered in this article is to what extent the interests of large players coincide or contradict each other and whether they contribute to the interests of Eurasian economic integration The study was carried out using resource-actor analysis, taking into account the peculiarities of the behaviour of foreign policy actors The study identifed the most conflicting points on the agenda of large external players, possible areas for cooperation, and factors, that influence Russian integration initiatives in the region

Politeja ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (4(73)) ◽  
pp. 29-52
Author(s):  
Kamen Velichkov

Geography and a preference for regional approaches have an impact on EU foreign policy. From the EU perspective, the countries of Central Asia are classified as “neighbors of EU neighbors.” The EU’s policies assume the existence of strong centripetal forces in the Eurasian heartland, whereas in fact the regionalization is still in the initial stages there. Consequently, EU foreign policy in Central Asia pursues both structural and relational objectives. The specific goals and performance of EU member states add a two-tier dimension to this process. In parallel with other external actors such as Japan, the United States, South Korea, and India, the European Union conducts its dialogue and cooperation with the Central Asian states in a 5+1 format. Compared to the policies of China, Turkey, or Russia, the EU has much more limited influence. It primarily aims to support the independent development of the Central Asian countries, for which some degree of regionalization appears to be a prerequisite.


Subject Belarus's attempts to court the EU and the United States. Significance The Belarusian government has shifted from an exclusively Russia-oriented foreign policy to a campaign to mend fences with the West. Government statements and a defence policy document speak of equal, non-adversarial relationships, while President Alexander Lukashenka has encouraged greater engagement with the EU and United States. Impacts Western governments will grant more legitimacy to the government. Opposition parties will find it harder to cite international isolation as a failed government policy. The EU's Eastern Partnership may be revitalised by its emerging role as conduit for ties with Belarus.


2015 ◽  
Vol 59 (11) ◽  
pp. 38-46
Author(s):  
A. Kokeev

Relations between Germany, the US and NATO today are the core of transatlantic links. After the Cold War and the reunification of Germany, NATO has lost its former importance to Germany which was not a "frontline state" anymore. The EU acquired a greater importance for German politicians applying both for certain political independence and for establishing of a broad partnership with Russia and China. The task of the European Union Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) development has been regarded by Berlin as a necessary component of the NATO's transformation into a “balanced Euro-American alliance”, and the realization of this project as the most important prerequisite for a more independent foreign policy. Germany’s refusal to support the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 led to the first serious crisis in US Germany relations. At the same time, there was no radical break of the deeply rooted Atlanticism tradition in German policy. It was Angela Merkel as a new head of the German government (2005) who managed to smooth largely disagreements in relations with the United States. Atlanticism remains one of the fundamental foreign policy elements for any German government, mostly because Berlin’s hope for deepening of the European integration and transition to the EU CFSP seems unrealistic in the foreseeable future. However, there is still a fundamental basis of disagreements emerged in the transatlantic relationship (reduction of a military threat weakening Berlin’s dependence from Washington, and the growing influence of Germany in the European Union). According to the federal government's opinion, Germany's contribution to the NATO military component should not be in increasing, but in optimizing of military expenses. However, taking into account the incipient signs of the crisis overcoming in the EU, and still a tough situation around Ukraine, it seems that in the medium-term perspective one should expect further enhancing of Germany’s participation in NATO military activities and, therefore, a growth in its military expenses. In Berlin, there is a wide support for the idea of the European army. However, most experts agree that it can be implemented only when the EU develops the Common Foreign and Defense Policy to a certain extent. The US Germany espionage scandals following one after another since 2013 have seriously undermined the traditional German trust to the United States as a reliable partner. However, under the impact of the Ukrainian conflict, the value of military-political dimension of Germany’s transatlantic relations and its dependence on the US and NATO security guarantees increased. At the same time, Washington expects from Berlin as a recognized European leader a more active policy toward Russia and in respect of some other international issues. In the current international political situation, the desire to expand political influence in the world and achieve a greater autonomy claimed by German leaders seems to Berlin only possible in the context of transatlantic relations strengthening and solidarity within the NATO the only military-political organization of the West which is able to ensure the collective defense for its members against the external threats. However, it is important to take into consideration that not only the value of the United States and NATO for Germany, but also the role of Germany in the North Atlantic Alliance as a “representative of European interests” has increased. The role of Germany as a mediator in establishing the West–Russia relations remains equally important.


2020 ◽  
pp. 54-59
Author(s):  
Philipp Zakharov

The foreign policy of Uzbekistan has become more dynamic and the country has moved confidently along the path of its interests since Shavkat M. Mirziyoyev came to power. The new President of Uzbekistan has launched an ambitious course to get the Republic the status of a regional leader. Uzbekistan actively uses soft power as one of the tools of its foreign policy. The author analyzes and compares the activities of the previous and current leadership of Uzbekistan in implementing integration processes and extending its influence to other states of the Central Asian region. In the conclusion, the author notes the pronounced course of modern Uzbekistan in interaction not only with the countries of the region, but also with such powers as Russia, China and the United States.


Author(s):  
Boris G. Koybaev

Central Asia in recent history is a vast region with five Muslim States-new actors in modern international relations. The countries of Central Asia, having become sovereign States, at the turn of the XX–XXI centuries are trying to peaceful interaction not only with their underdeveloped neighbors, but also with the far-off prosperous West. At the same time, the United States and Western European countries, in their centrosilic ambitions, seek to increase their military and political presence in Central Asia and use the military bases of the region’s States as a springboard for supplying their troops during anti-terrorist and other operations. With the active support of the West, the Central Asian States were accepted as members of the United Nations. For monitoring and exerting diplomatic influence on the regional environment, the administration of the President of the Russian Federation H. W. Bush established U.S. embassies in all Central Asian States. Turkey, a NATO member and secular Islamic state, was used as a lever of indirect Western influence over Central Asian governments, and its model of successful development was presented as an example to follow.


2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 451-469 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anne Jenichen

AbstractIt is a common—often stereotypical—presumption that Europe is secular and America religious. Differences in international religious freedom and religious engagement policies on both sides of the Atlantic seem to confirm this “cliché.” This article argues that to understand why it has been easier for American supporters to institutionalize these policies than for advocates in the EU, it is important to consider the discursive structures of EU and US foreign policies, which enable and constrain political language and behavior. Based on the analysis of foreign policy documents, produced by the EU and the United States in their relationship with six religiously diverse African and Asian states, the article compares how both international actors represent religion in their foreign affairs. The analysis reveals similarities in the relatively low importance that they attribute to religion and major differences in how they represent the contribution of religion to creating and solving problems in other states. In sum, the foreign policies of both international actors are based on a secular discursive structure, but that of the United States is much more accommodative toward religion, including Islam, than that of the EU.


Modern Italy ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 135-153 ◽  
Author(s):  
Raffaella A. Del Sarto ◽  
Nathalie Tocci

Focusing on Italy's Middle East policies under the second Berlusconi (2001–2006) and the second Prodi (2006–2008) governments, this article assesses the manner and extent to which the observed foreign policy shifts between the two governments can be explained in terms of the rebalancing between a ‘Europeanist’ and a transatlantic orientation. Arguing that Rome's policy towards the Middle East hinges less on Italy's specific interests and objectives in the region and more on whether the preference of the government in power is to foster closer ties to the United States or concentrate on the European Union, the analysis highlights how these swings of the pendulum along the EU–US axis are inextricably linked to a number of underlying structural weaknesses of Rome's foreign policy. In particular, the oscillations can be explained by the prevalence of short-term political (and domestic) considerations and the absence of long-term, substantive political strategies, or, in short, by the phenomenon of ‘politics without policy’ that often characterises Italy's foreign policy.


Politeja ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (5(62)) ◽  
pp. 117-140
Author(s):  
David Darchiashvili ◽  
David Bakradze

The article views the geographical area between the EU and Russian borders as a battle space of two, drastically different foreign policy and ideological approaches. The authors argue that in the years since the end of the Cold War, a unique surrogate of former clash of liberal and communist worlds emerged, leading to and underpinning current Hybrid Warfare, underway from Ukraine to Georgia. Its roots lay in the Russian interpretation of the Western attitude towards the East as Neo-colonialist. Relying on the income from its vast energy resources, Russia also tries to develop its version of so called “Soft Power”, used by the West in this region. Though in Russian hands, it is coupled with Moscow’s imperial experiences and resentments, and is becoming a mere element in Hybrid or “non-linear” war. Speaking retrospectively, the Eastern Partnership Initiative of the European Union can be seen as a response to Hybrid threats, posed by Russia against its Western and Southern neighbors. But the question is, whether EU foreign policy initiatives towards this area can and will be efficient and sufficient, if continued to be mostly defensive and limited within Soft Power mechanisms and philosophy, while Russia successfully combines those with traditional Hard Power know-how? The authors argue that in the long run, European or Euro-Atlantic Soft Power tool-kits, spreading Human Rightsbased culture farther in the East, will remain unmatched. But in order to prevail over the Russian revisionist policy here and now, the West, and, particularly, the EU need to re-evaluate traditional foreign policy options and come up with a more drastic combination of Soft/Hard Powers by itself. As the Georgian case shows, the European community should more efficiently use Conditionality and Coercive Diplomacy, combined with clearer messages about partners’ membership perspectives.


2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 65-81
Author(s):  
E. V. Kryzhko ◽  
P. I. Pashkovsky

The article examines the features of the US foreign policy towards the Central Asian states in the post-bipolar period. The imperatives and constants, as well as the transformation of Washington’s Central Asian policy, have been characterized. It is shown that five Central Asian states have been in the focus of American foreign policy over the past thirty years. In the process of shaping the US foreign policy in Central Asia, the presence of significant reserves of energy and mineral resources in the region was of great importance. Therefore, rivalry for Caspian energy resources and their transportation routes came to the fore. In addition to diversifying transport and logistics flows and supporting American companies, the US energy policy in Central Asia was aimed at preventing the restoration of Russia’s economic and political influence, as well as countering the penetration of China, which is interested in economic cooperation with the countries of the region. During the period under review, the following transformation of mechanisms and means of Washington’s policy in the Central Asian direction was observed: the policy of “exporting democracy”; attempts to “nurture” the pro-American elite; striving to divide states into separate groups with permanent “appointment” of leaders; involvement in a unified military system to combat terrorism; impact on the consciousness of the population in order to destabilize geopolitical rivals; building cooperation on a pragmatic basis due to internal difficulties and external constraints. Central Asian states sympathized with the American course because of their interest in technology and investment. At the same time, these states in every possible way distanced themselves from the impulses of “democratization” from Washington. Kazakhstan was a permanent regional ally of the United States, to which Uzbekistan was striving to join. The second echelon in relations with the American side was occupied by Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. A feature of the positions of the Central Asian countries is the maximum benefit from cooperation with Washington while building good-neighborly relations with Russia and China, which is in dissonance with the regional imperatives of the United States. In the future, the American strategy in Central Asia will presumably proceed from the expediency of attracting regional allies and stimulating contradictions in order to contain geopolitical rivals in the region.


2018 ◽  
Vol 24 (83) ◽  
pp. 6-32 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dejan Jović

Abstract This paper focuses on perceptions of the European Union (EU) and external actors (such as the United States, Russia, and Turkey) in six countries of the Western Balkans (WB) and Croatia in a comparative perspective. We present data generated by public opinion polls and surveys in all countries of that region in order to illustrate growing trends of EU indifferentism in all predominately Slavic countries of the region. In addition, there is an open rejection of pro-EU policies by significant segments of public opinion in Serbia and in the Republic of Srpska, Bosnia-Herzegovina. On the contrary, there is much enthusiasm and support for the West in general and the EU in particular in predominately non-Slavic countries, Kosovo and Albania. We argue that the WB as a region defined by alleged desire of all countries to join the the EU is more of an elite concept than that shared by the general population, which remains divided over the issue of EU membership. In explaining reasons for such a gap we emphasise a role of interpretation of the recent past, especially when it comes to a role the West played in the region during the 1990s.


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