scholarly journals Tate & Lyle : Pure Economic Loss and the Modern Tort of Public Nuisance

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. W. Neyers ◽  
Andrew Botterell

Professor Lewis Klar criticizes the Canadian approach to the tort of public nuisance forbeing illogical and incoherent. The authors agree with Klar’s assessment of the current stateof public nuisance law, but argue that insights drawn from the House of Lords decision inTate & Lyle Industries Ltd. v. Greater London Council offer a way forward. Byconceptualizing the tort of public nuisance as a cause of action that protects subjects fromsuffering actual loss that is consequential on the violation of their passage and fishing rightsover public property, Tate & Lyle offers a coherent and restrained formulation of the tortof public nuisance. This article examines the Tate & Lyle approach to public nuisance andapplies it to two infamous Canadian public nuisance cases. It concludes that the coherent,logical approach to public nuisance articulated by the House of Lords in Tate & Lyle shouldbe readopted by Canadian courts.

Legal Studies ◽  
1995 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 376-389
Author(s):  
Nicholas J McBride ◽  
Andrew Hughes

The House of Lords has now handed down decisions in six cases which have involved extended discussions of the scope of liability to compensate another for pure economic loss under the Hedley Byme principle. It seems reasonable to suppose that we can now arrive, on the basis of those decisions, at some conclusions as to when and why such liability arises. In this article we attempt to amve at such conclusions. In so doing we avoid using the usual terminology- ‘duty of care’, ‘proximity’, ‘just and reasonable’, ‘policy’, ‘reliance’, ‘assumption of responsibility’, ‘equivalent to contract’, even ‘negligence’-which an analysis of the scope and rationale of liability under Hedley Byme would be expected to employ.


Author(s):  
Simon Deakin ◽  
Angus Johnston ◽  
Basil Markesinis

This chapter discusses the tort of deceit. The common-law rules concerning liability for dishonesty were synthesised to create the tort of deceit at the end of the eighteenth century in Pasley v. Freeman, and the tort takes its modern form from the decision of the House of Lords in Derry v. Peek in 1889. Most of the cases concern non-physical damage, that is to say, financial or pure economic loss, although the tort can also extend to cover personal injuries and damage to property. The requirements of liability are as follows: the defendant must make a false statement of existing fact with knowledge of its falsity and with the intention that the claimant should act on it, with the result (4) that the claimant acts on it to his detriment.


Legal Studies ◽  
1991 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 85-102 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marianne Giles ◽  
Erika Szyszczak

It was generally accepted that the House of Lords in Anns v Merton LBC introduced an ‘entirely new type of product liability’ into the law of tort by expanding liability in negligence in relation to the construction of defective buildings. The novelty of the action was to introduce liability in tort for the construction of the defective product itself and to allow a claim for economic loss resulting from the defect. The consequence was to blur some of the traditional boundaries between contract and tort claims and to cause controversy in relation to the nature of the allowable loss recoverable from the negligent act. In particular it led to the question of whether such claims fell into the category of ‘pure economic loss’: a loss not easily accepted in conventional tort jurisprudence.


Legal Studies ◽  
1995 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 415-433 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Murphy

The law of negligence has long been concerned not to countenance liability ‘in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class’. Nowhere, except perhaps in relation to pure economic loss, has this reluctance been more pronounced than in the context of negligently inflicted psychiatric harm. Without aiming to advocate a system of law that would create an increase in the workload of personal injury practitioners, this article attempts a thoroughgoing reappraisal of the bases of liability for psychiatric harm. More particularly, its primary aim is to accommodate liability for such harm within the current, tripartite framework governing the duty of care: that harm to the plaintiff be foreseeable, that there be a relationship of proximity between the plaintiff and the defendant and, that it be just and reasonable to impose a duty. Such an endeavour is both timely and necessary in view of the House of Lords’ recent insistence that in all cases-even those involving physical harm-all three limbs of the duty formula must explicitly be demonstrated.


Author(s):  
Simon Deakin ◽  
Zoe Adams

This chapter discusses the tort of deceit. The common-law rules concerning liability for dishonesty were synthesised to create the tort of deceit at the end of the eighteenth century in Pasley v. Freeman, and the tort takes its modern form from the decision of the House of Lords in Derry v. Peek in 1889. Most of the cases concern non-physical damage, that is to say, financial or pure economic loss, although the tort can also extend to cover personal injuries and damage to property. The requirements of liability are as follows: the defendant must make a false statement of existing fact with knowledge of its falsity and with the intention that the claimant should act on it, with the result (4) that the claimant acts on it to his detriment.


Legal Studies ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 558-585
Author(s):  
Mark Stiggelbout

This paper considers the relevance of a finding that, even absent the defendant's unlawfulness, the private law claimant would have suffered the losses claimed. It provides a principled framework for considering the issues raised by such a finding of ‘losses in any event’, arguing that it should be distinguished both from causation of injury and from the scope of the defendant's duty of care, and that it should be treated as raising a question of damages. It highlights the need, particularly in pure economic loss cases, for a careful comparison of the real and the hypothetical losses so as to determine whether the latter would indeed have been losses in any event. In this regard, the decision of the Court of Appeal in Calvert v William Hill Credit Ltd is subjected to close scrutiny. A more general argument advanced is that tort and contract both do and should adopt similar approaches in this field.


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