Roman Law and Some Questions of Korean Civil Law - Focused on the Possibilities of Roman Law’s Contribution to Law School Education

The Justice ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 186 ◽  
pp. 339-378
Author(s):  
Byoung-Ho Jung
1998 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 158-179 ◽  
Author(s):  
John W Cairns

This article, in earlier versions presented as a paper to the Edinburgh Roman Law Group on 10 December 1993 and to the joint meeting of the London Roman Law Group and London Legal History Seminar on 7 February 1997, addresses the puzzle of the end of law teaching in the Scottish universities at the start of the seventeenth century at the very time when there was strong pressure for the advocates of the Scots bar to have an academic education in Civil Law. It demonstrates that the answer is to be found in the life of William Welwood, the last Professor of Law in St Andrews, while making some general points about bloodfeud in Scotland, the legal culture of the sixteenth century, and the implications of this for Scottish legal history. It is in two parts, the second of which will appear in the next issue of the Edinburgh Law Review.


Author(s):  
Detlef Liebs

Abstract Four kinds of Romans in the Frankish kingdoms in the 6th to 8th centuries. Roman law texts from Merowingian Gaul make a difference between cives Romani, Latini and dediticii, all considered as Romans. This difference mattered only to slaves who had been freed. The status of Latin and dediticius was hereditary, whereas the descendants of one who had been freed as civis Romanus were free born Romans, who should be classified as a proper, a fourth kind of beeing Roman; it was the standard kind. The difference was important in civil law, procedural law and criminal law, especially in wergeld, the sum to be payed for expiation when somebody had been killed: Who had killed a Roman, had to pay different sums according to the status of the killed.


Author(s):  
Iryna I. Banasevych ◽  
Ruslana M. Heints ◽  
Mariia V. Lohvinova ◽  
Oksana S. Oliinyk

Theoretical and applied research of the features of the legal status of the subjects of civil law remains debatable today. Doctrinal and legislative analysis of this subject points to unresolved issues in this area. In particular, the provision on defining the state as a party to civil law remains controversial. There is no consensus on the definition of individuals and legal entities as subjects of civil law among scholars. Furthermore, the legal regulation of certain types of entities is somewhat unsystematic and chaotic. This is largely due to the insufficient development of theoretical issues related to the subjects of civil law. The above issues determine the relevance of the study of the features of the legal status of subjects of civil law. The purpose of the study is to investigate the features of the legal status of subjects of civil law based on doctrinal and legislative analysis. The study is based on a systematic approach, which lies in studying a complex system of relationships between subjects of civil law. Furthermore, the study is based on the laws and principles of dialectics, which contribute to the study of the legal status of the subjects of civil law. Systemic and structural-functional analysis was used to comprehensively describe the legal status of subjects of civil law. The historical method contributed to the study of the evolution of research on the subjects of civil law. The formal legal method helped identify the special features of the provisions of regulations concerning the subjects of civil law. With the help of the comparative legal method, the study analysed the provisions of the Civil Code of Ukraine in terms of regulation of subjects of civil law and such regulation was compared with other countries. The study defined the concepts and types of subjects of civil law and considered the features of the legal status of individuals, legal entities, as well as the state as a special participant of civil law. Special attention was paid to the historical analysis of the development of approaches to the definition of subjects of law, starting with Roman law


Author(s):  
Donald R. Kelley

Centuries of Roman jurisprudence were assembled in the great Byzantine collection, the Digest, by Tribonian and the other editors. Roman law became more formal when during the Renaissance of the twelfth century it came to be taught in the first universities, starting with Bologna and the teaching of Irnerius. The main channels of expansion were through the Glossators and post-Glossators, who commented on the main texts and on later legislation by the Holy Roman Emperors, which included “feudal law,” but also by notaries and other proto-lawyers. Christian doctrine also became part of the “Roman” tradition, and canon and civil law were taught together in the universities as “civil science.” According to the ancient Roman jurist Gaius, “all the law which we use pertains either to persons or to things or to actions,” three categories that exhaust the external human condition—personality, reality, and action. In the nineteenth century, the study of Roman law lost its ideological power and became part of philology and history, at least so concludes James Whitman.


2017 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 43
Author(s):  
Zuzanna Służewska

THE CONTRACT OF PARTNERSHIP AS A BASE OF IN SOLIDUM LIABILITY IN ROMAN LAWSummary In the modern civil law joint and several liability of partners in a partnership is a rule rather than an exception. According to the common opinion this concept did not originate in the Roman law but was first invented in the medieval times by glossators and commentators. The Roman partnership created only a private relation between partners (who, due to a conclusion of that contract were reciprocally obliged to act together in accordance with a good faith in order to conduct common business and to divide profits and bear losses in proportion to their respective shares) and its conclusion did not affect their liability against third parties. The partners had no right to bind themselves contractually to any third parties, unless they all acted jointly (in this case, however, their joint representation was derived from their expressed declarations and not the existence of a contract o f partnership). Thus, any commitment made by an individual partner, even if made within the scope of a partnership having obtained other partners’ consent, was treated as a personal debt of this partner and the remaining partners were not liable against his contractor. Then, of course, the partner who made a commitment (acting within the partnership’s business) could claim a part of what he had paid to a third party from other partners in proportion to their respective shares in the common enterprise.Such a solution was necessary because of the purely consensual character o f the Roman partnership and the lack of any formal procedure of its conclusion and dissolution. The existence of that contract could not affect the model of the external liability of partners, because it would be too risky for third parties, which had no possibility to make sure if a contract of partnership between some persons had been actually concluded or not. Thus, the role of a contract of partnership in the Roman law was only limited to determine a mutual liability o f partners, to specify their respective rights and obligations and to define the scope of their liability against other partners.There are only a few written sources concerning so called specific kinds of partnership characterized by untypical joint and several responsibility of partners. Moreover these texts are not very clear and are difficult to interpret, so the issue of specific kinds of a partnership is a matter of doubts among Romanists. Some authors even believe that the specific types of partnership did not exist in the Roman law at all.It should be firstly observed that the texts regarding a contract of partnership itself (the texts included in the title pro socio of Justinian’ Digest) did not raise the question of the external liability of partners because they were devoted to internal settlement o f accounts within sociu Thus, taking into account only these texts one cannot ascertain that a conclusion of a contract of partnership could not affect in any way the model of the partners’ liability against third parties.Secondly, the other texts concerning the regulation of conducting an economic activity in the Roman law (actio institoria, actio exercitoria and actio de peculio) present some regularity in an introduction of joint and several liability of debtors.On the one hand that model of the liability was introduced in situations in which protecting safety of trade required that the creditor be able to claim a whole amount o f the debt from one person only.On the other hand this model of liability could be introduced only in these cases in which some internal relation existed between several debtors. On the grounds of such relations the debtor who satisfied in full the creditor’s claim could sue other debtors in order to recover their respective parts in the debt. In the Roman law that internal relation that guaranteed the possibility of a recourse could be either a joint-ownership or a partnership.Having considered that, one may say that the texts concerning specific kinds o f partnership do not prove existence of any special type of societas. These sources regard only the situations when a joint and several liability between several debtors was introduced because it was justified by the circumstances: that is the necessity to protect the safety of trade on one hand and the existence of the contract of partnership that guaranteed a possibility to realize the recourse, on the other.In conclusion one may say that although a closing of a contract of partnership did not create a joint and several liability of partners, in some cases its existence was decisive for introducing this model of liability since it guaranteed to every party a possibility to act against the others to obtain the recourse. Thus, Roman jurisprudence made an important step towards the future introduction o f joint and several liability of partners as a rule of a civil law.


2017 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 69
Author(s):  
Elżbieta Loska

A LEGACY IN THE ROMAN LAWSummary A notion of a legacy did not exist in the archaic Roman law as a homogenous concept of law and it developed as late as in the pre-classical Roman law. Even then, however, only particular types of legacies, rather than their general concept, were defined. Nevertheless, one may say that a legacy was a civil law instrument by means of which a testator left a certain economic benefit to a particular person, not making him\her an inheritor.At the beginning there were four basic types of legacy in the Roman law: legatum per vindicationem, legatum per praeceptionem, legatum per damnationem and legatum sinendi modo. The first two types had an effect of a disposition while the two latter ones of an obligation only. In sources there also exist two other types: legatum optionis and legatum partitionis. This last mentioned is similar to a later established concept of a fideicommissum, an informal legacy, which became actionable in the times of the Emperor August.Already in the ancient times one may observe a decrease in the significance of these types of legacy, the effects of which directly related to the ownership of objects (legatum per vindicationem and legatum per praeceptioneni).They were connected with the notion o f an ownership according to ius civile and formal means of transferring the ownership. They lost its significance when - beside the oldest civil law - praetorian law and emperors’ constitutions appeared and when the ownership was standardised. After the issuance of senatusconsultum Neronianum in the 1st century AD it became possible to retain the legal effectiveness of the legacies which until then were considered invalid due to a failure to preserve an appropriate form; an ex /^ con version took place. It resulted most probably in converting invalid legacies into legatum per damnationem.In the subsequent centuries, emperors’ constitutions led to a harmonisation o f the concept of legacy (while the division between the legacy having an effect of a disposition and an obligation was still preserved), and later on to equalisation in the legal effect of formal and informal legacies. The most important regulations were: the constitution of the Emperor Constantinus dated 339 AD, which abolished the requirement of solemnitas verbum and two constitutions of the Emperor Iustinianus - the first - dated 529 AD - introduced an identical legal nature of all legacies, the other - dated 531 AD - completely equalised legacies with fideicommissa. 


Author(s):  
Jan Hallebeek ◽  
Wim Decock

AbstractThis paper seeks to highlight the early modern scholastic contribution to dealing with the issue of pre-contractual duties to inform. Bringing together different strands of thought, ranging from Aristotelian philosophy to Roman law, the 16th and 17th century scholastics developed adequate analytical tools to solve legal and moral problems arising from information disparities between contracting parties. While first looking at the different classical and medieval texts that shaped the early modern debate, this paper then goes on to give a systematic account of how the early modern scholastics dealt with duties of disclosure about both intrinsic and extrinsic defects in the merchandise. A final chapter looks at how the early modern scholastic debate was received in the Northern natural law school, before concluding that the early modern scholastics took a surprisingly negative attitude towards duties to inform.


2019 ◽  
Vol 6 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 91-92
Author(s):  
Ishani Moulik

Rethinking the Law School: Education, Outreach, Research and Governance. Edited by Carel Stolker, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2014, 472 Pp., hb, £75.00. ISBN-13: 978-1107073890 ISBN-10: 978-1107073890


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document