New Graph Of Graph

Constructing new graph from the graph's parameters and related notions in the way that, the study on the new graph and old graph in their parameters could be facilitated. As graph, new graph has some characteristics and results which are related to the structure of this graph. For this purpose, regular graph is considered so the internal relation and external relation on this new graph are studied. The kind of having same number of edges when this number is originated by common number of graphs like maximum degree, minimum degree, domination number, coloring number and clique number, is founded in the word of having regular graph

Aldo Rossi

Aldo Rossi offers a captivating account of the relationship between human life and material forms. Rossi says that he came to “the great questions”, and to his discovery of Ludwig Wittgenstein and Georg Trakl through Adolf Loos (Rossi 1982: 46). I will outline some connections between Loos, Trakl, and Wittgenstein that might help us to grasp the way in which Rossi’s assertive attitude concerning architecture gradually leans towards “forgetting architecture”. (The goal is not to try and justify how they might have influenced Rossi; rather the aim is to try to understand Rossi’s work with those connections as a backdrop; to outline a constellation of affinities.) The running thread being the internal relation between the object and the subject, i.e., “construction and the artist’s own life” (Lombardo 2003: 97). I will conclude by considering architectural form on the page, that is to say, in Rossi’s plans, “a graphic variation of the handwritten manuscript”, and drawings, “where a line is no longer a line, but writing” (Rossi 1981: 6), and finally by considering what he says about his architecture, namely, that it stands “mute and cold,” though it will still “creak” (Rossi 1981: 44), and give rise to “new meanings”.

L-concave derived internal relations and L-convex derived enclosed relations

Derived operator plays an important role in describing algebraic properties of many mathematical structures such as topology, matroid, convergence and convex space. In this paper, we present the notions of L-concave derived internal relation space and L-convex derived enclosed relation space by which we characterize L-concave space and L-convex space. Based on this, we further introduce some other structures such as L-concave derived hull space and L-convex derived hull space. We find that these spaces are isomorphic to L-concave space and L-convex space.

Informalism

Informalism comprises the theories that frame the law produced by international organizations in shades of normativity: member states and international organizations are integrated in heterarchical relationships primarily governed by politics; the law created by international organizations belongs to hybrid legal systems; the institutional veil is characterized by degrees of transparency depending on the internal relation of power; the conduct of a member state acting in the institutional forum is alternatively relevant or not relevant as a matter of international law, depending on the internal relation of power. This chapter describes the historical roots of this conceptualization and elaborates why under this perspective the rules of the organizations are considered as a matter of degrees of legality. Afterwards, it describes the flaws of this theory focusing on the law of the international civil service and on global administrative law.

How Saussure is misinterpreted in Cognitive Grammar

As the father of modern linguistics, Ferdinand de Saussure influences all aspects of linguistic development with no exception of Cognitive Grammar. A scrutiny of how Saussure is understood in Cognitive Grammar indicates that Saussurean linguistics is misinterpreted in terms of five core ideas: (1) langue, rather than parole, is given highest priority; (2) the internal relation of “signifier-signified” counts as the pairing of “form-meaning”; (3) “arbitrariness” is contradictory to “symbolicity”; (4) “arbitrariness” means “unmotivatedness”; (5) arbitrariness is not the inherent nature of morphological and syntactic structures. This paper is intended to reassess these five ideas and argue that they depart further from Saussure’s thought.

Wittgensteins Kritik am additiven Verständnis des sprachlichen Zeichens

This paper argues that Wittgenstein, both early and late, rejects the idea that the logically simpler and more fundamental case is that of “the mere sign” and that what a meaningful symbol is can be explained through the elaboration of an appropriately supplemented conception of the sign: the sign plus something (say, an interpretation or an assignment of meaning). Rather the sign, in the logically fundamental case of its mode of occurrence, is an internal aspect of the symbol. The Tractatus puts this point as follows: “The sign is that in the symbol which is perceptible by the senses.” Conversely, this means that it is essential to a symbol – to what a symbol is – that it have an essentially perceptible aspect. For Wittgenstein there is no privileged direction of explanatory priority between symbol and sign here: without signs there are no symbols (hence without language there is no thought) and without some sort of relation to symbols there are no signs (hence the philosopher’s concept of the supposedly “merely linguistic” presupposes an internal relation to symbols).

L-topological derived internal (resp. Enclosed) relation spaces

In this paper, notions of L-topological derived internal relation space, L-topological derived interior operator space, L-topological derived enclosed relation space and L-topological derived closure operator space are introduced. It is proved that all of these spaces are categorically isomorphic to L-topological space, L-topological internal relation space and L-topological enclosed relation space.

Dispensing with the theory (and philosophy) of affordances

This article will contest the claim made by many ecological psychologists that affordances are invariantly the objects of perception. First of all, the lack of agreement concerning what affordances actually are, what their true nature is, is considerable. Second, the metaphysico-ontological debate has obscured the important misunderstanding consisting in conceiving of affordances as ecological objects or entities of any kind. Third, an appropriate analysis of the notion of affordance will show that this concept is not primarily devoted to perception, and believing that it is has unnecessarily impoverished what we (can) see in our environment. From a Wittgensteinian and an ethnomethodological approach, to make sense of the relation between ourselves and our environments we should use only those concepts available to us, and the internal relation between our everyday concepts and the way we invoke them in practice will be shown. No theory of meaning is needed here.