scholarly journals Hegemony and the Interest of Egypt’s Business Elite in Post-Mubarak Press

2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Maher Hamoud

This article aims at critically analysing the hegemony of Egypt’s business elite and the private press they own following Mubarak’s fall. Hegemony requires the exercise of power to maintain consent under changing conditions such as the 2011 uprising and the 2013 military coup. This study answers the question of “why and how Egypt’s business elite controls the post-Mubarak press?”. Situated within the interdisciplinary domain of “critical political economy of communication”, this article focuses on the two most popular privately-owned newspapers al-Masry al-Youm and al-Watan. Interviews with high-profile sources have been conducted and embedded into the research. Findings show that the Egyptian private press, particularly in the post-Mubarak era, is closely controlled by the business elite in favour of their interests, and indirectly in favour of the political elite – whether civilian or military. The sector’s hegemonic position was briefly shaken by the 2011 uprising, then quickly maintained and reinforced before the 2013 coup.

2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Maher Hamoud

This article aims at critically analysing the hegemony of Egypt‟s business elite and the private press they own following Mubarak‟s fall. Hegemony requires the exercise of power to maintain consent under changing conditions such as the 2011 uprising and the 2013 military coup. This study answers the question of “why and how Egypt‟s business elite controls the post-Mubarak press?”. Situated within the interdisciplinary domain of “critical political economy of communication”, this article focuses on the two most popular privately-owned newspapers al-Masry al-Youm and al-Watan. Interviews with high-profile sources have been conducted and embedded into the research. Findings show that the Egyptian private press, particularly in the post-Mubarak era, is closely controlled by the business elite in favour of their interests, and indirectly in favour of the political elite – whether civilian or military. The sector‟s hegemonic position was briefly shaken by the 2011 uprising, then quickly maintained and reinforced before the 2013 coup.


2020 ◽  
Vol 119 (476) ◽  
pp. 395-431
Author(s):  
Andrew Bowman

ABSTRACT This article analyses the causes, outcomes, and political significance of the inter-connected operational, financial, and governance crises afflicting Eskom, South Africa’s electricity parastatal. These crises emerged in the context of African National Congress initiatives to turn Eskom and other key parastatals into instruments of an envisaged South African developmental state, through increased investment and strategic procurement to support economic transformation goals. Instead, Eskom’s spiralling costs, procurement irregularities and inability to translate increased investment into functional new infrastructure meant it impeded these goals. Its indebtedness became a severe macro-economic risk, making Eskom a precarious nexus for the circulation of public funds, while the cost and unreliability of electricity has undermined South Africa’s energy-intensive industrial core. Intertwined with this were multiple high-profile corruption scandals associated with the ‘state-capture’ controversies of the latter stages of Jacob Zuma’s presidency. The article argues that Eskom’s extreme dysfunctionality results from long-running, and as yet unresolved, contestation of the parastatal and electricity policy more broadly by various interest groups, in a context of an increasingly fragmented political and business elite. This created a range of incoherent distributional pressures and institutional constraints. Rather than a straightforward outcome of corruption and ‘state capture’, this reflects deeper tensions in the post-apartheid political economy.


Subject The political impact of the 'Panamagate' scandal. Significance A five-member Supreme Court bench on April 20 ordered the constitution of a Joint Investigation Team (JIT) to probe the legitimacy of the offshore assets (mostly in the United Kingdom and Qatar) of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and his family. In coming months, the Court bench will monitor and oversee the investigation in which both civilian law enforcement and military intelligence will participate. Impacts The government will avoid challenging the military’s foreign policy this year. The scandal will increase pressure on the political elite to ensure public probity. A military coup is highly improbable at present.


2009 ◽  
Vol 53 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 290-316 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bruce Masters Masters*

AbstractThe return of Ottoman rule to Aleppo in 1840 corresponded with the inauguration of the reform era (1839-76). Although the central Ottoman state could not have foreseen the outcome, these political reforms undermined its economic sovereignty in two key areas. The Ottoman land reform law of 1858 and schemes to settle the Bedouin in northern Syria enabled Aleppo’s political elite to scramble for the steppe lands of the Euphrates valley and ultimately paved the way for European capitalists to exploit the agricultural resources of the region. Additionally, attempts to control the abuses of the capitulatory system provoked a marked decline in the relative fortunes of the city’s traditional commercial elite, with much of the internal regional trade shifting into the hands of European merchants.Le retour des Ottomans à Alep en 1840 correspond au début de la période de réformes (1839-1876). Bien que l’état central ottoman n’eût pas pu prévoir leurs conséquences, ces réformes politiques ont miné sa souveraineté économique dans deux régions clé. Le code foncier ottomane de 1858 et les projets visant à la sédentarisation des Bédouins dans la Syrie du Nord ont permis à l’élite politique d’Alep une ruée vers les steppes de la vallée de l’Euphrate et ont fini par préparer le chemin aux capitalistes européens qui sont venus exploiter les ressources agricoles de la région. En outre, les tentatives d’obtenir le contrôle des abus du système capitulaire ont provoqué le déclin marqué des fortunes concernées de l’élite commerciale traditionnelle car une grande partie du commerce intérieure régio-nale tombait dans les mains des négociants européens.


Author(s):  
Adeel Malik ◽  
Rinchan Ali Mirza

Abstract This paper offers a novel illustration of the political economy of religion by examining the impact of religious elites on development. We compile a unique database on holy Muslim shrines across Pakistani Punjab and construct a historical panel of literacy spanning over a century (1901-2011). Using the 1977 military take-over as a universal shock that gave control over public goods to politicians, our difference-in-differences analysis shows that areas with a greater concentration of shrines experienced a substantially retarded growth in literacy after the coup. Our results suggest that the increase in average literacy rate would have been higher by 13% in the post-coup period in the absence of shrine influence. We directly address the selection concern that shrines might be situated in areas predisposed to lower literacy expansion. Finally, we argue that the coup devolved control over public goods to local politicians, and shrine elites, being more averse to education since it undermines their power, suppressed its expansion in shrine-dense areas.


2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Maher Hamoud

In July 2013, a widely celebrated military coup took place in Egypt – only two and a half years after the 2011 Revolution. This article investigates the hegemonic power of the private press owned by Egypt’s business elite during the coup period. In the context of this research objective, this study answers the question of “how did Egypt’s private press provide popular support to the 2013 military coup?” through following a critical approach and conducting framing analysis of news headlines in a period of 112 days. This article examines the popular privately-owned newspapers al-Masry al-Youm and al-Watan as the main case studies. Findings show that Egypt’s business elite engaged in significant news framing in support of the 2013 military coup - for the purpose of maintaining their hegemonic position in the country. They particularly used the frame of “fear” (of the Muslim Brotherhood, potential violence and political chaos) and the frame of “promotion” by portraying the military as a saviour.    


2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 215-245
Author(s):  
Wan-Ping Tai

Abstract The value attached to the concept of guanxi (關係) by Chinese enterprises in Southeast Asia can be observed in their business culture. Previous scholars have attributed the success of Chinese enterprises in Southeast Asia to “guanxi networks.” The author’s observations on Thai enterprises made over a 5-year period are here used to validate their research findings. In conclusion, the author classifies Thailand as a market economy where business activities are conducted based on the value of guanxi and economic strategies.


2001 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 291-293
Author(s):  
STEPHEN FREDERIC DALE ◽  
Thomas K. Park

It has long been recognized that Iranian silk constituted the principal source of foreign exchange of the Safavid state in the reign of Shah [ayn]Abbas I (1589–1629), and widely appreciated that Armenian merchants of New Julfa, Isfahan, played a critical role in marketing Iranian silk both within the country and abroad. It is all the more remarkable therefore to consider that Ina Baghdiantz McCabe has produced the first major study of the Iranian Armenian community's business organization, their relationship with the Safavid state, and the nature of their involvement in the production and marketing of Iranian silk. Based on Armenian, English, French, and Persian sources, this well-illustrated publication in the University of Pennsylvania's Armenian Texts and Studies series represents an ambitious work of political economy. In it, Baghdiantz McCabe argues forcefully that the Armenians' position reflected the implementation of systematic economic goals by Iranian monarchs; that Armenians during the reign of Shah [ayn]Abbas I became part of the political elite; that Armenian trade, far from being the work of itinerant peddlers, was directed by a highly organized, extremely wealthy commercial elite; and that Armenian merchants operating within the Safavid system were successful in excluding European companies from gaining significant influence in the Iranian silk trade.


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