scholarly journals Egypt’s Military Coup of 2013: An Analysis of the Private Press in 112 Days

2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Maher Hamoud

In July 2013, a widely celebrated military coup took place in Egypt – only two and a half years after the 2011 Revolution. This article investigates the hegemonic power of the private press owned by Egypt’s business elite during the coup period. In the context of this research objective, this study answers the question of “how did Egypt’s private press provide popular support to the 2013 military coup?” through following a critical approach and conducting framing analysis of news headlines in a period of 112 days. This article examines the popular privately-owned newspapers al-Masry al-Youm and al-Watan as the main case studies. Findings show that Egypt’s business elite engaged in significant news framing in support of the 2013 military coup - for the purpose of maintaining their hegemonic position in the country. They particularly used the frame of “fear” (of the Muslim Brotherhood, potential violence and political chaos) and the frame of “promotion” by portraying the military as a saviour.    

2019 ◽  
pp. 133-160
Author(s):  
Marina ◽  
David Ottaway

This chapter recounts the stages of the 2011 uprising in Egypt, from the fall of one military dictator to the rise of another. The upheaval ended three decades of sclerotic rule under Hosni Mubarak, and ushered in a brief period of democracy that saw the Muslim Brotherhood triumph in parliamentary and presidential elections for the first time in Egyptian history.After a year of tumultuous rule, Islamic President Mohammed Morsi was ousted in a military coup d’état in 2013thanks to the connivance of self-proclaimed democratic secularists. The new military dictator, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, has set about uprooting all traces of Islamist presence in the country and eliminating all civil society activism as well. His goal has been to turn Egypt back fifty years to restore the military state established by Gamal Abdel Nasser, and imitate his pursuit of costly mega-projects to solve the country’s crushing economic and social problems.


2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 300-321
Author(s):  
Joel W. Abdelmoez

Abstract In July 2013, after months of protest, Egypt’s first democratically elected president, Mohammed Morsi, was ousted by the Egyptian armed forces. The Muslim Brotherhood, who supported Morsi, took to the streets, chanting and singing against the ousting, which they termed a military coup, while supporters of Sisi, who viewed it as a revolution, began producing songs to show their allegiance to the military leadership. While abundant research has been conducted on the role of oppositional and revolutionary music in Egypt since 2011, relatively little has been done on the widely popular pro-military music sometimes known as watani music. Watani songs are a genre of patriotic music made by popular artists to show their allegiance to the Egyptian armed forces. In this paper I examine the surge of watani songs and trace their history back to the Nasser era, thereby showing a continuity in style as well as content. I further argue that there are connections between nationalism and gender constructions, as the national project comes with obligations for men to offer their bodies to the cause. This obligation is aided by constructions about ‘male bravery’ and ‘courage’ that are designed to make men believe that military service is somehow essential to masculinity. Watani music, whether commissioned or not, fits well with this mythology of military men. It forms an ideological undercurrent, supports the narrative that it is necessary for patriotic military men to bravely safeguard the nation against its enemies.


2021 ◽  
pp. 2150008
Author(s):  
Jason Chiam Chiah Sern ◽  
Tai Wei Lim

This paper examines the case studies of three East Asian entities (Thailand, Myanmar and Hong Kong) battling both the COVID-19 coronavirus pandemic as well as socio-political unrest simultaneously. While Thailand/Myanmar and Hong Kong are different in geographical/demographic sizes and the former two are sovereign states while the latter is a Special Administrative Region (SAR), they have similar challenges in experiencing cosmopolitan pro-democracy movements (made up of young activists) pitted against the governments determined to maintain control in what political scientists may characterize as illiberal political systems. While Thailand and Myanmar may be much larger in terms of geographical/demographic sizes, much of the recent political activism occurred in the capital city of Bangkok (a city of about 8 million people) and Yangon (also having about 7 million in population and being the former capital of Myanmar before the military elites had moved the capital to Naypyidaw in anticipation of political unrests). In the case of Myanmar, the demonstration and protests have effectively spread nationwide. Both cities are similar in size to Hong Kong that is with approximately 7 million inhabitants. Both Bangkok and Hong Kong are also cosmopolitan cities with high exposure to global commerce, ideas and tourism while Yangon is a fast-developing urban commercial capital city. In terms of ideologies and political systems, both Bangkok and Hong Kong have nominal liberal democratic systems that have limits imposed on political freedoms while Myanmar was liberalizing and democratizing before the military coup on February 1, 2020. These similarities make them suitable candidates for comparative studies, including analyzing their differences in managing the political challenges.


2019 ◽  
Vol 50 (3) ◽  
pp. 239-256 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicola Pratt ◽  
Dina Rezk

Unprecedented levels of state violence against the Muslim Brotherhood, and the widespread acceptance of this violence by Egyptians following the July 2013 military coup, have been under-examined by scholars of both critical security studies and Middle East politics, reflecting implicit assumptions that state violence is unexceptional beyond Europe. This article explores how the deployment of such levels of violence was enabled by a securitization process in which the Egyptian military successfully appropriated popular opposition to Muslim Brotherhood rule, constructing the group as an existential threat to Egypt and justifying special measures against it. The article builds on existing critiques of the Eurocentrism of securitization theory, alongside the writings of Antonio Gramsci, to further refine its application to non-democratic contexts. In addition to revealing the exceptionalism of state violence against the Muslim Brotherhood and highlighting the important role of nominally non-state actors in constructing the Muslim Brotherhood as a threat to Egypt, the article also signals the role of securitization in re-establishing authoritarian rule in the wake of the 2011 uprising. Thus, we argue that securitization not only constitutes a break from ‘normal politics’ but may also be integral to the reconstitution of ‘normal politics’ following a period of transition.


Author(s):  
Amy Austin Holmes

This book offers the first analysis of both the revolution and counterrevolution in Egypt, beginning in January 2011 until July 2018. The period of revolutionary upheaval played out in three uprisings against three distinct forms of authoritarian rule: the Mubarak regime and the police state that protected it, the unelected military junta known as the Supreme Council of Armed Forces, and the religious authoritarianism of the Muslim Brotherhood. The second part of the book analyzes the counterrevolution, which is divided into two periods: the first under Adly Mansour as interim president; and the second after Abdel Fattah El -Sisi was elected president. During the first wave, the regime imprisoned or killed the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood and many secular activists, while during the second wave the regime turned against civil society at large: nongovernmental organizations , charities, the media, academia, and minority groups. In addition to providing new and unprecedented empirical data, the book makes two theoretical contributions. First, a new framework is presented for analyzing the state apparatus in Egypt, which is based on four pillars of regime support that can either prop up or press upon those in power: the Egyptian military, the business elite, the United States, and the multiheaded opposition. Second , the book brings together the literature on bottom-up revolutionary movements and top-down military coups, and it introduces the concept of a coup from below in contrast to the revolution from above that took place under Gamal Abdel Nasser.


2015 ◽  
Vol 2 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 88-103
Author(s):  
Hussein Solomon

Political Islam continues to gain adherents across the African continent. In an attempt to understand why this is the case, this article explores the historical evolution of political Islam or Islamism. Three case studies are then provided to examine the implementation of this ideology—the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Sudan’s National Islamic Front and Al Shabab in Somalia. In conclusion, we examine the future of political Islam from the perspective of secularism.


2015 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 379-397 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jennifer Wilmot

Prior to the 2011 Arab uprisings, Islamist parties in most Arab states had been systematically prevented from exercising any meaningful authority in government. Following President Hosni Mubarak's ousting from power in 2011, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (MB) established a political party – the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) – and formally entered mainstream politics, providing a rare opportunity to examine the role of an Islamist party in the context of democratic transition. Contrary to concerns that the MB might use Egypt's political opening to install an undemocratic regime, the movement instead committed itself to electoral politics and consistently adhered to the framework for political transition. An analysis of the MB's political trajectory during the 2011–13 timeframe reveals that the movement endeavoured to protect Egypt's democratic transition against the encroachment of the military and the judiciary. Despite the FJP's efforts, sustained interference by non-elected institutions brought Egypt's democratic experiment to a premature end. This course of events confirms that an Islamist movement is capable of fully committing to politics, but also indicates that political commitment alone is insufficient to ensure a successful transition to democratic governance.


2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Maher Hamoud

This article aims at critically analysing the hegemony of Egypt’s business elite and the private press they own following Mubarak’s fall. Hegemony requires the exercise of power to maintain consent under changing conditions such as the 2011 uprising and the 2013 military coup. This study answers the question of “why and how Egypt’s business elite controls the post-Mubarak press?”. Situated within the interdisciplinary domain of “critical political economy of communication”, this article focuses on the two most popular privately-owned newspapers al-Masry al-Youm and al-Watan. Interviews with high-profile sources have been conducted and embedded into the research. Findings show that the Egyptian private press, particularly in the post-Mubarak era, is closely controlled by the business elite in favour of their interests, and indirectly in favour of the political elite – whether civilian or military. The sector’s hegemonic position was briefly shaken by the 2011 uprising, then quickly maintained and reinforced before the 2013 coup.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Mouataz El Esrawi

This is a study on Egypt’s brief interlude of civilian rule that lasted for just over a year between June 2012 and July 2013. In June 2012, Mohamed Morsi, the candidate of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), ascended to the presidency in what was hitherto Egypt’s most democratic election. Morsi, the first civilian to hold the highest office in the state, was ousted from power in July 2013 in a military coup that was led by General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. This study seeks to explain the downfall of the Morsi regime, through emphasizing the dynamic interplay of three factors: 1) the regime’s mismanagement of relations with powerful and autonomous state institutions (particularly the military) and with broad segments of Egyptian society; 2) its inability to reverse the deterioration in Egypt’s economic performance; and 3) its mishandling of Egypt’s external relations with powerful regional and international players. The thesis contends that while none of the aforementioned factors singlehandedly explains why Egypt’s democratic experiment under Morsi (imperfect as it was) fumbled, their complex interplay created a powerful platform that the military, and its allies within the state and society, exploited to bring down Morsi and the MB. The thesis hopes to contribute to the literature on the domestic and international conditions that can often lead to the faltering of democratic transitions. Keywords: Egypt,


Author(s):  
Kira D. Jumet

This chapter identifies the discrepancy between real and perceived political opportunities and the effect this gap had on political mobilization for the June 30th protests in Egypt. The chapter relies on interview data and fieldwork conducted during the 2012 anti-Morsi protests, the 2013 coup, the months following the coup, and at protests in Tahrir Square and at the Rabaa al-Adawiya sit-in. In addition to outlining the politics surrounding President Morsi’s 2012 constitutional declaration, the subsequent protests, and how the Tamarod movement mobilized mass protests against Morsi that took place on June 30, 2013, the chapter also presents the details and step-by-step process of the 2013 military coup. The chapter explains post-coup politics, including the designation of the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization, the military’s mobilization of the public against the Muslim Brotherhood, the Rabaa al-Adawiya massacre, the cult of General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, and the 2014 constitutional referendum and presidential elections.


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