scholarly journals Italy’s Communist Party and People’s China (’50s-early ’60s)

Author(s):  
Guido Samarani

In the ’50s and early ’60s the Italian Communist Party (ICP) was one of the main actors involved in informal and unconventional diplomacy between Italy and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). In the absence of diplomatic relations between the two countries, the presence in Italy of the largest Communist party in Western Europe undoubtedly acted as an important channel for unofficial Sino-Italian exchanges. This paper tries to trace the development of ICP-CCP relations focusing in particular on the Italian Communists’ views and analysis of the CCP’s historical experience. It also would like to show that ICP leaders generally viewed the CCP’s revolutionary in a positive way, an evaluation which largely stemmed from the ICP’s own national experience and its search for a more autonomous international role.

1972 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 593-598
Author(s):  
J. Chester Cheng

The historical experience of the Chinese Communist Party before 1949 has often assumed the dimension of a myth. As in any myth, what actually happens is not as important as the significant lesson to be learned. A case in point is the battle of “the last and the most strategic pass” of La-tzu-k'ou in the Long March. The Chinese annals contain at least five differing versions of this encounter on September 17–18, 1935. This may be attributed, inter alia, to the desire of the authors to glorify their own part in the Long March as much as that the battle of La-tzu-k'ou is of greater political than military significance. By publishing these accounts, the Chinese authorities hope to prove the correctness of Mao Tse-tung's policy of the northward march in mid-1935. Indeed Lin Piao's role was largely a magniloquent account of relevant events at La-tzu-k'ou, following his appointment as Minister of National Defense to succeed the disgraced P'eng Te-huao in 1959—notwithstanding the fact that Mao Tse-tung had in 1935 composed a well-known poem praising only P'eng's valor during the battle. True, history is historiography and historiography is politics in the People's Republic of China.


2012 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 252-271
Author(s):  
Madoka Fukuda

AbstractThis article examines the substance and modification of the “One-China” principle, which the government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) pursued in the mid 1960s. Under this principle, a country wishing to establish diplomatic relations with the PRC was required first to break off such relations with the Republic of China (ROC). In 1964 the PRC established diplomatic relations with France. This was its first ambassadorial exchange with a Western government. The PRC, in the negotiations over the establishment of diplomatic relations, attempted to achieve some consensus with France on the matter of “One-China”. The PRC, nevertheless, had to abandon these attempts, even though it demanded fewer conditions of France than of the United States (USA), Japan and other Western countries in the 1970s. The PRC had demanded adherence to the “One-China” principle since 1949. France, however, refused to accept this condition. Nevertheless, the PRC established diplomatic relations with France before the latter broke off relations with the ROC. Subsequently, the PRC abandoned the same condition in negotiations with the African governments of the Republic of Congo, Central Africa, Dahomey and Mauritania. After the negotiations with France, the PRC began to insist that the joint communiqué on the establishment of diplomatic relations should clearly state that “the Government of the People’s Republic of China is the sole legal government of China”. However, France refused to insert these words into the communiqué. Afterwards, the PRC nevertheless insisted on putting such a statement into the joint communiqués or exchanges of notes on the establishment of diplomatic relations with the African countries mentioned above. This was done in order to set precedents for making countries accede to the “One-China” principle. The “One-China” principle was, thus, gradually formed in the process of the negotiation and bargaining between the PRC and other governments.


2020 ◽  
Vol 03 (02) ◽  
pp. 2050003
Author(s):  
Francisco B. S. José Leandro ◽  
Danilo Lemos Henriques

This paper will examine the interplay and relationship between bilateral diplomatic relations and economic relations through the lens of political factors, examining the concrete case of the Republic of Portugal and the People’s Republic of China. It will consider their common past — the nations’ historical similarities, their common aims and ideological differences, and analyze the alignment and the synergy developed in the modern era in developing common platforms of aims and will, in terms of political agenda-setting, such as through the issue of the status of the territory of Macao and the relationship with Portuguese-speaking countries (PSCs). It further analyzes the past few decades through the signing of diplomatic protocols, engaged bilateral and multilateral economic diplomacies, and growing commerce and trade links to identify the key trends and extrapolate relevant correlations. We examine the progresses in the relationship between the advancement of Sino-Portuguese diplomatic relations and the development of economic interplay post the 1979 period, following the formal establishment of bilateral diplomatic relations. We argue in favor of an existing positive correlation between acts of economic diplomacy and the development of bilateral economic relations. This paper presents a methodological, theoretical-inductive, and constructivist perspective, combining qualitative, quantitative, and non-participated observation.


1987 ◽  
Vol 110 ◽  
pp. 256-275
Author(s):  
Jon W. Huebner

On 1 October 1949 the People's Republic of China was formally established in Beijing. On 7 December Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi), who had earlier moved to Taiwan to secure a final base of resistance in the civil war, ordered the Kuomintang (KMT) regime to withdraw to the island from Chengdu, Sichuan, its last seat on the mainland. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) declared its commitment to the goal of unifying the nation under the People's Republic, and thus called for the “liberation” of Taiwan. Although Taiwan represented the final phase of the still unfinished civil war, it was the strategic significance of the island that became of paramount concern to the CCP, the KMT and the United States.


2015 ◽  
Vol 50 (1) ◽  
pp. 141-174 ◽  
Author(s):  
AMY KING

AbstractThe Chinese Communist Party was confronted with the pressing challenge of ‘reconstructing’ China's industrial economy when it came to power in 1949. Drawing on recently declassified Chinese Foreign Ministry archives, this article argues that the Party met this challenge by drawing on the expertise of Japanese technicians left behind in Northeast China at the end of the Second World War. Between 1949 and 1953, when they were eventually repatriated, thousands of Japanese technicians were used by the Chinese Communist Party to develop new technology and industrial techniques, train less skilled Chinese workers, and rebuild factories, mines, railways, and other industrial sites in the Northeast. These first four years of the People's Republic of China represent an important moment of both continuity and change in China's history. Like the Chinese Nationalist government before them, the Chinese Communist Party continued to draw on the technological and industrial legacy of the Japanese empire in Asia to rebuild China's war-torn economy. But this four-year period was also a moment of profound change. As the Cold War erupted in Asia, the Chinese Communist Party began a long-term reconceptualization of how national power was intimately connected to technology and industrial capability, and viewed Japanese technicians as a vital element in the transformation of China into a modern and powerful nation.


2014 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 111-145 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lorenz M. Lüthi

The decision by France and the People's Republic of China (PRC) to establish diplomatic relations in late January 1964 has undergone relatively little scrutiny among scholars. Garret Martin's path-breaking article in the Winter 2008 issue of the JCWS is the most important account to date of this episode, but it focuses on the French side of the story. The account here provides a much fuller picture by drawing on declassified records of the PRC Foreign Ministry, official collections of formerly secret CCP documents, and materials from archives in former Soviet-bloc countries. These sources help illuminate two important but hitherto unknown or poorly understood aspects of Sino-French recognition in the period from August 1963 to January 1964: the French and Chinese thinking behind the decision to recognize each other, and the negotiation process itself.


1964 ◽  
Vol 18 ◽  
pp. 195-200 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Erasmus

On January 27 a communiqué was issued in Paris and Peking which read, somewhat baldly:The Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the French Republic have decided in mutual agreement to establish diplomatic relations.For this purpose, the two Governments have agreed to appoint their ambassadors within three months.


2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 152-157
Author(s):  
N I Malysheva

The article analyzes the problems of legitimation, legitimacy and legality of law in the light of the Chinese legal system. It is noted that the above theoretical and legal categories, which have been developed in the framework of various types of legal understanding, need serious clarification, taking into account the peculiarities of the Chinese political and legal reality. From the historical point of view attention is being paid to Confucianism and Legalism, which have laid the foundations of the Chinese legal tradition and are influencing China’s law system until now. The author is examining the possibility of further updating the ancient Chinese concept of the «Heaven mandate» in modern conditions. A significant place in the article is devoted to analyzing the role of the Chinese Communist Party in giving legitimacy to the legal norms established by the legislator. The author analyses the legal nature of the program documents of the Communist Party of China, emphasizes the existence of the suggestive elements of legitimization of laws being adopted in China. In conclusion the article focuses on the process of legitimization of one of the Constellations of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, which abolished the terms limits of the Chairman of the People’s Republic of China, and it sums up that the constitutional amendment was legal from the formal point of view.


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