scholarly journals Proportional Representation System Whether Significance for Bangladesh: An Analysis

2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Nazma Akter ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Political Culture ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
Political Organizations ◽  
Representation System ◽  
Election Result ◽  
Election Process ◽  
Election System ◽  
Winner Takes All ◽  
Winner Take All ◽  
Take All

The purpose of this article is to ensure free, fair and credible election by adopting electoral reformation, switch from `Winner Take All” (WTA) to Proportional Representation (PR) system. In Bangladesh the election process and election result both have been questioned. Nevertheless, election is one of the key components in ensuring democracy. Particularly the free, fair and credible election is one of the basic and crucial prerequisites and elements of democratic government and governance. Bangladesh, we found an under developed political culture, lack of democratic political organizations, institutions and practices in true sense. All these indicators have been almost failed to institutionalize democracy in Bangladesh. In this backdrop, this paper attempts to explain that, a switch from the current Winner Takes All (WTA) system to Proportional Representation (PR) system can reshape the election system by keeping consistency, because of the fact that the democracy means the rule of the majority but the minority can't be uprooted as well as Proportional Representation (PR) method can help stabilize democracy in Bangladesh.

scholarly journals Proportional Representation System Whether Significance for Bangladesh: An Analysis

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nazma Akter
Keyword(s):  
Political Culture ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
Political Organizations ◽  
Representation System ◽  
Election Result ◽  
Election Process ◽  
Election System ◽  
Winner Takes All ◽  
Winner Take All ◽  
Take All

The purpose of this article is to ensure free, fair and credible election by adopting electoral reformation, switch from `Winner Take All” (WTA) to Proportional Representation (PR) system. In Bangladesh the election process and election result both have been questioned. Nevertheless, election is one of the key components in ensuring democracy. Particularly the free, fair and credible election is one of the basic and crucial prerequisites and elements of democratic government and governance. Bangladesh, we found an under developed political culture, lack of democratic political organizations, institutions and practices in true sense. All these indicators have been almost failed to institutionalize democracy in Bangladesh. In this backdrop, this paper attempts to explain that, a switch from the current Winner Takes All (WTA) system to Proportional Representation (PR) system can reshape the election system by keeping consistency, because of the fact that the democracy means the rule of the majority but the minority can't be uprooted as well as Proportional Representation (PR) method can help stabilize democracy in Bangladesh.

Four Bit Priority Resolution Network Using Current Mode Winner Take all Circuit

2014 ◽  
Vol 889-890 ◽  
pp. 886-889
Author(s):  
Wen Qin Cao ◽  
Hai Yan Zhu ◽  
Guo Ping Tu
Keyword(s):  
Current Mode ◽  
Cmos Process ◽  
Process Technology ◽  
Output Stage ◽  
New Approach ◽  
Input Stage ◽  
Load Resistor ◽  
Winner Takes All ◽  
Winner Take All ◽  
Take All

This paper presents a new approach for making a four bit priority resolution circuit using current mode winner Take all (WTA) analog computation cells, the winner-takes-all circuit is employed to evaluate the highest input among a set of competing inputs and inhibit the others. This circuit consists of an input stage, a current mode Lazzaros WTA circuit and an output stage consisting of current mirror and load resistor. This circuit is compact, consisting of a total of 28 transistors including the input stage, and a good linearity is observed in response. Simulation of proposed circuit is performed on cadence virtuoso software in 0.18 μm CMOS process technology.

scholarly journals The Political Boundaries of Ethnic Divisions

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 235-266
Author(s):  
Samuel Bazzi ◽  
Matthew Gudgeon
Keyword(s):  
Proportional Representation ◽  
The Political ◽  
Public Resources ◽  
Political Boundaries ◽  
Administrative Unit ◽  
Ethnic Tension ◽  
Policy Experiment ◽  
Ethnic Polarization ◽  
Winner Take All ◽  
Take All

We use a policy experiment in Indonesia to show how local political boundaries affect ethnic tension. Redrawing district borders along group lines reduces conflict. However, the gains in stability are undone or even reversed when new boundaries increase ethnic polarization. Greater polarization leads to more violence around majoritarian elections but has little effect around lower-stakes, proportional representation elections. These results point to distinct incentives for violence in winner-take-all settings with contestable public resources. Overall, our findings illustrate the promise and pitfalls of redrawing borders in diverse countries where it is infeasible for each group to have its own administrative unit. (JEL D72, D74, J15, O15, O17, O18)

scholarly journals When Does the Winner Take All in Two-Sided Markets?

2007 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mingchun Sun ◽  
Edison Tse
Keyword(s):  
Steady State ◽  
Differential Game ◽  
Market Share ◽  
Multiple Networks ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Winner Takes All ◽  
Winner Take All ◽  
Take All ◽  
Two Sided Markets

We study the diffusion of competing two-sided networks using a differential game framework. We find that whether the winner takes all depends on the participation behaviour of individual agents on both sides of the market. When individual agents tend to participate in only one network, one network will dominate the market. As the tendency for joining multiple networks increases, the possibility for two networks to co-exist in the long-run also increases. Thus the steady-state market share of competing two-sided networks can be very different depending on adopters' choice of "multi-homing" or "single-homing".

A Calamitous Compact

2016 ◽  
Vol 49 (04) ◽  
pp. 791-796 ◽  
Author(s):  
Darin DeWitt ◽  
Thomas Schwartz
Keyword(s):  
Presidential Election ◽  
Plurality Rule ◽  
Constitutional Amendment ◽  
Electoral College ◽  
State Law ◽  
Popular Vote ◽  
Election System ◽  
Winner Take All ◽  
Take All ◽  
Do So

ABSTRACTThe National Popular Vote Interstate Compact (joined so far by ten states and DC) would replace the current presidential-election system, based on the electoral college and the winner-take-all rule, with nationwide plurality rule, and it would do so by changes in state law, not a Constitutional amendment. The mischief that would create (especially procedural instability, noncompliant electors, nation-wide recounts, vote manipulation, and narrowed support), the compact’s questionable Constitutionality, the weakness of its defense, and the availability of less calamitous alternatives are reasons enough to reject it.

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