scholarly journals Are Most Published Research Findings False In A Continuous Universe?

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kleber Neves ◽  
Pedro Batista Tan ◽  
Olavo Bohrer Amaral
Keyword(s):  
Publication Bias ◽  
Effect Size ◽  
Statistical Power ◽  
Statistical Significance ◽  
Significance Test ◽  
Effect Sizes ◽  
Diagnostic Screening ◽  
Research Findings ◽  
Published Research ◽  
Effect Size Distribution

Diagnostic screening models for the interpretation of null hypothesis significance test (NHST) results have been influential in highlighting the effect of selective publication on the reproducibility of the published literature, leading to John Ioannidis’ much-cited claim that most published research findings are false. These models, however, are typically based on the assumption that hypotheses are dichotomously true or false, without considering that effect sizes for different hypotheses are not the same. To address this limitation, we develop a simulation model that overcomes this by modeling effect sizes explicitly using different continuous distributions, while retaining other aspects of previous models such as publication bias and the pursuit of statistical significance. Our results show that the combination of selective publication, bias, low statistical power and unlikely hypotheses consistently leads to high proportions of false positives, irrespective of the effect size distribution assumed. Using continuous effect sizes also allows us to evaluate the degree of effect size overestimation and prevalence of estimates with the wrong signal in the literature, showing that the same factors that drive false-positive results also lead to errors in estimating effect size direction and magnitude. Nevertheless, the relative influence of these factors on different metrics varies depending on the distribution assumed for effect sizes. The model is made available as an R ShinyApp interface, allowing one to explore features of the literature in various scenarios.

scholarly journals The earth is flat (p>0.05): Significance thresholds and the crisis of unreplicable research

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Valentin Amrhein ◽  
Fränzi Korner-Nievergelt ◽  
Tobias Roth
Keyword(s):  
Publication Bias ◽  
Null Hypothesis ◽  
Statistical Power ◽  
Alternative Hypothesis ◽  
Statistical Significance ◽  
Practical Importance ◽  
Decision Rules ◽  
Effect Sizes ◽  
P Values ◽  
True Effect

The widespread use of 'statistical significance' as a license for making a claim of a scientific finding leads to considerable distortion of the scientific process (American Statistical Association, Wasserstein & Lazar 2016). We review why degrading p-values into 'significant' and 'nonsignificant' contributes to making studies irreproducible, or to making them seem irreproducible. A major problem is that we tend to take small p-values at face value, but mistrust results with larger p-values. In either case, p-values can tell little about reliability of research, because they are hardly replicable even if an alternative hypothesis is true. Also significance (p≤0.05) is hardly replicable: at a realistic statistical power of 40%, given that there is a true effect, only one in six studies will significantly replicate the significant result of another study. Even at a good power of 80%, results from two studies will be conflicting, in terms of significance, in one third of the cases if there is a true effect. This means that a replication cannot be interpreted as having failed only because it is nonsignificant. Many apparent replication failures may thus reflect faulty judgement based on significance thresholds rather than a crisis of unreplicable research. Reliable conclusions on replicability and practical importance of a finding can only be drawn using cumulative evidence from multiple independent studies. However, applying significance thresholds makes cumulative knowledge unreliable. One reason is that with anything but ideal statistical power, significant effect sizes will be biased upwards. Interpreting inflated significant results while ignoring nonsignificant results will thus lead to wrong conclusions. But current incentives to hunt for significance lead to publication bias against nonsignificant findings. Data dredging, p-hacking and publication bias should be addressed by removing fixed significance thresholds. Consistent with the recommendations of the late Ronald Fisher, p-values should be interpreted as graded measures of the strength of evidence against the null hypothesis. Also larger p-values offer some evidence against the null hypothesis, and they cannot be interpreted as supporting the null hypothesis, falsely concluding that 'there is no effect'. Information on possible true effect sizes that are compatible with the data must be obtained from the observed effect size, e.g., from a sample average, and from a measure of uncertainty, such as a confidence interval. We review how confusion about interpretation of larger p-values can be traced back to historical disputes among the founders of modern statistics. We further discuss potential arguments against removing significance thresholds, such as 'we need more stringent decision rules', 'sample sizes will decrease' or 'we need to get rid of p-values'.

An Examination of Effect Sizes and Statistical Power in Speech, Language, and Hearing Research

2020 ◽  
Vol 63 (5) ◽  
pp. 1572-1580
Author(s):  
Laura Gaeta ◽  
Christopher R. Brydges
Keyword(s):  
Effect Size ◽  
Statistical Power ◽  
Effect Sizes ◽  
Medium Effect ◽  
Speech Language Pathology ◽  
Sample Sizes ◽  
Hearing Research ◽  
Language Pathology ◽  
Meta Analyses ◽  
Published Research

Purpose The purpose was to examine and determine effect size distributions reported in published audiology and speech-language pathology research in order to provide researchers and clinicians with more relevant guidelines for the interpretation of potentially clinically meaningful findings. Method Cohen's d, Hedges' g, Pearson r, and sample sizes ( n = 1,387) were extracted from 32 meta-analyses in journals in speech-language pathology and audiology. Percentile ranks (25th, 50th, 75th) were calculated to determine estimates for small, medium, and large effect sizes, respectively. The median sample size was also used to explore statistical power for small, medium, and large effect sizes. Results For individual differences research, effect sizes of Pearson r = .24, .41, and .64 were found. For group differences, Cohen's d /Hedges' g = 0.25, 0.55, and 0.93. These values can be interpreted as small, medium, and large effect sizes in speech-language pathology and audiology. The majority of published research was inadequately powered to detect a medium effect size. Conclusions Effect size interpretations from published research in audiology and speech-language pathology were found to be underestimated based on Cohen's (1988, 1992) guidelines. Researchers in the field should consider using Pearson r = .25, .40, and .65 and Cohen's d /Hedges' g = 0.25, 0.55, and 0.95 as small, medium, and large effect sizes, respectively, and collect larger sample sizes to ensure that both significant and nonsignificant findings are robust and replicable.

scholarly journals The earth is flat (p > 0.05): significance thresholds and the crisis of unreplicable research

PeerJ ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 5 ◽  
pp. e3544 ◽  
Author(s):  
Valentin Amrhein ◽  
Fränzi Korner-Nievergelt ◽  
Tobias Roth
Keyword(s):  
Publication Bias ◽  
Null Hypothesis ◽  
Statistical Power ◽  
Statistical Significance ◽  
Practical Importance ◽  
Effect Sizes ◽  
Point Estimate ◽  
Selective Reporting ◽  
Interval Estimate ◽  
True Effect

The widespread use of ‘statistical significance’ as a license for making a claim of a scientific finding leads to considerable distortion of the scientific process (according to the American Statistical Association). We review why degradingp-values into ‘significant’ and ‘nonsignificant’ contributes to making studies irreproducible, or to making them seem irreproducible. A major problem is that we tend to take smallp-values at face value, but mistrust results with largerp-values. In either case,p-values tell little about reliability of research, because they are hardly replicable even if an alternative hypothesis is true. Also significance (p ≤ 0.05) is hardly replicable: at a good statistical power of 80%, two studies will be ‘conflicting’, meaning that one is significant and the other is not, in one third of the cases if there is a true effect. A replication can therefore not be interpreted as having failed only because it is nonsignificant. Many apparent replication failures may thus reflect faulty judgment based on significance thresholds rather than a crisis of unreplicable research. Reliable conclusions on replicability and practical importance of a finding can only be drawn using cumulative evidence from multiple independent studies. However, applying significance thresholds makes cumulative knowledge unreliable. One reason is that with anything but ideal statistical power, significant effect sizes will be biased upwards. Interpreting inflated significant results while ignoring nonsignificant results will thus lead to wrong conclusions. But current incentives to hunt for significance lead to selective reporting and to publication bias against nonsignificant findings. Data dredging,p-hacking, and publication bias should be addressed by removing fixed significance thresholds. Consistent with the recommendations of the late Ronald Fisher,p-values should be interpreted as graded measures of the strength of evidence against the null hypothesis. Also largerp-values offer some evidence against the null hypothesis, and they cannot be interpreted as supporting the null hypothesis, falsely concluding that ‘there is no effect’. Information on possible true effect sizes that are compatible with the data must be obtained from the point estimate, e.g., from a sample average, and from the interval estimate, such as a confidence interval. We review how confusion about interpretation of largerp-values can be traced back to historical disputes among the founders of modern statistics. We further discuss potential arguments against removing significance thresholds, for example that decision rules should rather be more stringent, that sample sizes could decrease, or thatp-values should better be completely abandoned. We conclude that whatever method of statistical inference we use, dichotomous threshold thinking must give way to non-automated informed judgment.

scholarly journals The earth is flat (p>0.05): Significance thresholds and the crisis of unreplicable research

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Valentin Amrhein ◽  
Fränzi Korner-Nievergelt ◽  
Tobias Roth
Keyword(s):  
Publication Bias ◽  
Null Hypothesis ◽  
Statistical Power ◽  
Statistical Significance ◽  
Practical Importance ◽  
Effect Sizes ◽  
Selective Reporting ◽  
Interval Estimate ◽  
P Values ◽  
True Effect

The widespread use of 'statistical significance' as a license for making a claim of a scientific finding leads to considerable distortion of the scientific process (according to the American Statistical Association). We review why degrading p-values into 'significant' and 'nonsignificant' contributes to making studies irreproducible, or to making them seem irreproducible. A major problem is that we tend to take small p-values at face value, but mistrust results with larger p-values. In either case, p-values tell little about reliability of research, because they are hardly replicable even if an alternative hypothesis is true. Also significance (p≤0.05) is hardly replicable: at a good statistical power of 80%, two studies will be 'conflicting', meaning that one is significant and the other is not, in one third of the cases if there is a true effect. A replication can therefore not be interpreted as having failed only because it is nonsignificant. Many apparent replication failures may thus reflect faulty judgment based on significance thresholds rather than a crisis of unreplicable research. Reliable conclusions on replicability and practical importance of a finding can only be drawn using cumulative evidence from multiple independent studies. However, applying significance thresholds makes cumulative knowledge unreliable. One reason is that with anything but ideal statistical power, significant effect sizes will be biased upwards. Interpreting inflated significant results while ignoring nonsignificant results will thus lead to wrong conclusions. But current incentives to hunt for significance lead to selective reporting and to publication bias against nonsignificant findings. Data dredging, p-hacking, and publication bias should be addressed by removing fixed significance thresholds. Consistent with the recommendations of the late Ronald Fisher, p-values should be interpreted as graded measures of the strength of evidence against the null hypothesis. Also larger p-values offer some evidence against the null hypothesis, and they cannot be interpreted as supporting the null hypothesis, falsely concluding that 'there is no effect'. Information on possible true effect sizes that are compatible with the data must be obtained from the point estimate, e.g., from a sample average, and from the interval estimate, such as a confidence interval. We review how confusion about interpretation of larger p-values can be traced back to historical disputes among the founders of modern statistics. We further discuss potential arguments against removing significance thresholds, for example that decision rules should rather be more stringent, that sample sizes could decrease, or that p-values should better be completely abandoned. We conclude that whatever method of statistical inference we use, dichotomous threshold thinking must give way to non-automated informed judgment.

scholarly journals Recalibrating expectations about effect size: A multi-method survey of effect sizes in the ABCD study

PLoS ONE ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (9) ◽  
pp. e0257535
Author(s):  
Max M. Owens ◽  
Alexandra Potter ◽  
Courtland S. Hyatt ◽  
Matthew Albaugh ◽  
Wesley K. Thompson ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Effect Size ◽  
Statistical Significance ◽  
Psychological Research ◽  
Sociodemographic Factors ◽  
Effect Sizes ◽  
Size Distributions ◽  
Different Types ◽  
Two Factors ◽  
Future Work ◽  
Effect Size Distribution

Effect sizes are commonly interpreted using heuristics established by Cohen (e.g., small: r = .1, medium r = .3, large r = .5), despite mounting evidence that these guidelines are mis-calibrated to the effects typically found in psychological research. This study’s aims were to 1) describe the distribution of effect sizes across multiple instruments, 2) consider factors qualifying the effect size distribution, and 3) identify examples as benchmarks for various effect sizes. For aim one, effect size distributions were illustrated from a large, diverse sample of 9/10-year-old children. This was done by conducting Pearson’s correlations among 161 variables representing constructs from all questionnaires and tasks from the Adolescent Brain and Cognitive Development Study® baseline data. To achieve aim two, factors qualifying this distribution were tested by comparing the distributions of effect size among various modifications of the aim one analyses. These modified analytic strategies included comparisons of effect size distributions for different types of variables, for analyses using statistical thresholds, and for analyses using several covariate strategies. In aim one analyses, the median in-sample effect size was .03, and values at the first and third quartiles were .01 and .07. In aim two analyses, effects were smaller for associations across instruments, content domains, and reporters, as well as when covarying for sociodemographic factors. Effect sizes were larger when thresholding for statistical significance. In analyses intended to mimic conditions used in “real-world” analysis of ABCD data, the median in-sample effect size was .05, and values at the first and third quartiles were .03 and .09. To achieve aim three, examples for varying effect sizes are reported from the ABCD dataset as benchmarks for future work in the dataset. In summary, this report finds that empirically determined effect sizes from a notably large dataset are smaller than would be expected based on existing heuristics.

Publication bias and statistical power in gerontological psychology

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Brydges
Keyword(s):  
Publication Bias ◽  
Statistical Power ◽  
Research Practices ◽  
P Values ◽  
Questionable Research Practices ◽  
Gerontological Research ◽  
Article Type ◽  
Research Findings ◽  
Psychological Journal ◽  
Published Research

Objectives: Research has found evidence of publication bias, questionable research practices (QRPs), and low statistical power in published psychological journal articles. Isaacowitz’s (2018) editorial in the Journals of Gerontology Series B, Psychological Sciences called for investigation of these issues in gerontological research. The current study presents meta-research findings based on published research to explore if there is evidence of these practices in gerontological research. Method: 14,481 test statistics and p values were extracted from articles published in eight top gerontological psychology journals since 2000. Frequentist and Bayesian caliper tests were used to test for publication bias and QRPs (specifically, p-hacking and incorrect rounding of p values). A z-curve analysis was used to estimate average statistical power across studies.Results: Strong evidence of publication bias was observed, and average statistical power was approximately .70 – below the recommended .80 level. Evidence of p-hacking was mixed. Evidence of incorrect rounding of p values was inconclusive.Discussion: Gerontological research is not immune to publication bias, QRPs, and low statistical power. Researchers, journals, institutions, and funding bodies are encouraged to adopt open and transparent research practices, and using Registered Reports as an alternative article type to minimize publication bias and QRPs, and increase statistical power.

Sample-Size Planning for More Accurate Statistical Power: A Method Adjusting Sample Effect Sizes for Publication Bias and Uncertainty

2017 ◽  
Vol 28 (11) ◽  
pp. 1547-1562 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samantha F. Anderson ◽  
Ken Kelley ◽  
Scott E. Maxwell
Keyword(s):  
Sample Size ◽  
Publication Bias ◽  
Effect Size ◽  
Statistical Power ◽  
Web Applications ◽  
R Package ◽  
Effect Sizes ◽  
Alternative Approach ◽  
Sample Size Planning ◽  
User Friendly

The sample size necessary to obtain a desired level of statistical power depends in part on the population value of the effect size, which is, by definition, unknown. A common approach to sample-size planning uses the sample effect size from a prior study as an estimate of the population value of the effect to be detected in the future study. Although this strategy is intuitively appealing, effect-size estimates, taken at face value, are typically not accurate estimates of the population effect size because of publication bias and uncertainty. We show that the use of this approach often results in underpowered studies, sometimes to an alarming degree. We present an alternative approach that adjusts sample effect sizes for bias and uncertainty, and we demonstrate its effectiveness for several experimental designs. Furthermore, we discuss an open-source R package, BUCSS, and user-friendly Web applications that we have made available to researchers so that they can easily implement our suggested methods.

Testing for Publication Bias in Political Science

2001 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 385-392 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alan S. Gerber ◽  
Donald P. Green ◽  
David Nickerson
Keyword(s):  
Political Science ◽  
Publication Bias ◽  
Effect Size ◽  
Statistical Significance ◽  
Small Samples ◽  
Experimental Literature ◽  
Sample Sizes ◽  
Voter Mobilization ◽  
Research Findings

If the publication decisions of journals are a function of the statistical significance of research findings, the published literature may suffer from “publication bias.” This paper describes a method for detecting publication bias. We point out that to achieve statistical significance, the effect size must be larger in small samples. If publications tend to be biased against statistically insignificant results, we should observe that the effect size diminishes as sample sizes increase. This proposition is tested and confirmed using the experimental literature on voter mobilization.

Effect Size and Effect Uncertainty in Organizational Research Methods

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Scott B. Morris ◽  
Arash Shokri
Keyword(s):  
Confidence Intervals ◽  
Effect Size ◽  
Sampling Error ◽  
Statistical Significance ◽  
Scientific Progress ◽  
Effect Sizes ◽  
Practical Significance ◽  
Significance Tests ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Research Findings

To understand and communicate research findings, it is important for researchers to consider two types of information provided by research results: the magnitude of the effect and the degree of uncertainty in the outcome. Statistical significance tests have long served as the mainstream method for statistical inferences. However, the widespread misinterpretation and misuse of significance tests has led critics to question their usefulness in evaluating research findings and to raise concerns about the far-reaching effects of this practice on scientific progress. An alternative approach involves reporting and interpreting measures of effect size along with confidence intervals. An effect size is an indicator of magnitude and direction of a statistical observation. Effect size statistics have been developed to represent a wide range of research questions, including indicators of the mean difference between groups, the relative odds of an event, or the degree of correlation among variables. Effect sizes play a key role in evaluating practical significance, conducting power analysis, and conducting meta-analysis. While effect sizes summarize the magnitude of an effect, the confidence intervals represent the degree of uncertainty in the result. By presenting a range of plausible alternate values that might have occurred due to sampling error, confidence intervals provide an intuitive indicator of how strongly researchers should rely on the results from a single study.

scholarly journals The earth is flat (p>0.05): Significance thresholds and the crisis of unreplicable research

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Valentin Amrhein ◽  
Fränzi Korner-Nievergelt ◽  
Tobias Roth
Keyword(s):  
Publication Bias ◽  
Null Hypothesis ◽  
Statistical Power ◽  
Statistical Significance ◽  
Practical Importance ◽  
Effect Sizes ◽  
Selective Reporting ◽  
Interval Estimate ◽  
P Values ◽  
True Effect

The widespread use of 'statistical significance' as a license for making a claim of a scientific finding leads to considerable distortion of the scientific process (according to the American Statistical Association). We review why degrading p-values into 'significant' and 'nonsignificant' contributes to making studies irreproducible, or to making them seem irreproducible. A major problem is that we tend to take small p-values at face value, but mistrust results with larger p-values. In either case, p-values tell little about reliability of research, because they are hardly replicable even if an alternative hypothesis is true. Also significance (p≤0.05) is hardly replicable: at a good statistical power of 80%, two studies will be 'conflicting', meaning that one is significant and the other is not, in one third of the cases if there is a true effect. A replication can therefore not be interpreted as having failed only because it is nonsignificant. Many apparent replication failures may thus reflect faulty judgment based on significance thresholds rather than a crisis of unreplicable research. Reliable conclusions on replicability and practical importance of a finding can only be drawn using cumulative evidence from multiple independent studies. However, applying significance thresholds makes cumulative knowledge unreliable. One reason is that with anything but ideal statistical power, significant effect sizes will be biased upwards. Interpreting inflated significant results while ignoring nonsignificant results will thus lead to wrong conclusions. But current incentives to hunt for significance lead to selective reporting and to publication bias against nonsignificant findings. Data dredging, p-hacking, and publication bias should be addressed by removing fixed significance thresholds. Consistent with the recommendations of the late Ronald Fisher, p-values should be interpreted as graded measures of the strength of evidence against the null hypothesis. Also larger p-values offer some evidence against the null hypothesis, and they cannot be interpreted as supporting the null hypothesis, falsely concluding that 'there is no effect'. Information on possible true effect sizes that are compatible with the data must be obtained from the point estimate, e.g., from a sample average, and from the interval estimate, such as a confidence interval. We review how confusion about interpretation of larger p-values can be traced back to historical disputes among the founders of modern statistics. We further discuss potential arguments against removing significance thresholds, for example that decision rules should rather be more stringent, that sample sizes could decrease, or that p-values should better be completely abandoned. We conclude that whatever method of statistical inference we use, dichotomous threshold thinking must give way to non-automated informed judgment.

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