scholarly journals Structure shapes the representation of a novel category

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sarah Solomon ◽  
Anna Schapiro

Concepts contain rich structures that support flexible semantic cognition. These structures can be characterized by patterns of feature covariation: certain clusters of features tend to occur in the same items (e.g., feathers, wings, can fly). Existing computational models demonstrate how this kind of structure can be leveraged to slowly learn the distinctions between categories, on developmental timescales. It is not clear whether and how we leverage feature structure to quickly learn a novel category. We thus investigated how the internal structure of a new category is extracted from experience and what kinds of representations guide this learning. We predicted that humans can leverage feature clusters within an individual category to benefit learning and that this relies on the rapid formation of distributed representations. Novel categories were designed with patterns of feature associations determined by carefully constructed graph structures (Modular, Random, and Lattice). In Experiment 1, a feature inference task using verbal stimuli revealed that Modular categories—containing clusters of reliably covarying features—were more easily learned than non-Modular categories. Experiment 2 replicated this effect using visual categories. In Experiment 3, a temporal statistical learning paradigm revealed that this Modular benefit persisted even when category structure was incidental to the task. We found that a neural network model employing distributed representations was able to account for the effects, whereas prototype and exemplar models could not. The findings constrain theories of category learning and of structure learning more broadly, suggesting that humans quickly form distributed representations that reflect coherent feature structure.

2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (4) ◽  
pp. 381-401
Author(s):  
Ryan Staples ◽  
William W. Graves

Determining how the cognitive components of reading—orthographic, phonological, and semantic representations—are instantiated in the brain has been a long-standing goal of psychology and human cognitive neuroscience. The two most prominent computational models of reading instantiate different cognitive processes, implying different neural processes. Artificial neural network (ANN) models of reading posit nonsymbolic, distributed representations. The dual-route cascaded (DRC) model instead suggests two routes of processing, one representing symbolic rules of spelling–to–sound correspondence, the other representing orthographic and phonological lexicons. These models are not adjudicated by behavioral data and have never before been directly compared in terms of neural plausibility. We used representational similarity analysis to compare the predictions of these models to neural data from participants reading aloud. Both the ANN and DRC model representations corresponded to neural activity. However, the ANN model representations correlated to more reading-relevant areas of cortex. When contributions from the DRC model were statistically controlled, partial correlations revealed that the ANN model accounted for significant variance in the neural data. The opposite analysis, examining the variance explained by the DRC model with contributions from the ANN model factored out, revealed no correspondence to neural activity. Our results suggest that ANNs trained using distributed representations provide a better correspondence between cognitive and neural coding. Additionally, this framework provides a principled approach for comparing computational models of cognitive function to gain insight into neural representations.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey N. Chiang ◽  
Yujia Peng ◽  
Hongjing Lu ◽  
Keith J. Holyoak ◽  
Martin M. Monti

AbstractThe ability to generate and process semantic relations is central to many aspects of human cognition. Theorists have long debated whether such relations are coded as atomistic links in a semantic network, or as distributed patterns over some core set of abstract relations. The form and content of the conceptual and neural representations of semantic relations remains to be empirically established. The present study combined computational modeling and neuroimaging to investigate the representation and comparison of abstract semantic relations in the brain. By using sequential presentation of verbal analogies, we decoupled the neural activity associated with encoding the representation of the first-order semantic relation between words in a pair from that associated with the second-order comparison of two relations. We tested alternative computational models of relational similarity in order to distinguish between rival accounts of how semantic relations are coded and compared in the brain. Analyses of neural similarity patterns supported the hypothesis that semantic relations are coded, in the parietal cortex, as distributed representations over a pool of abstract relations specified in a theory-based taxonomy. These representations, in turn, provide the immediate inputs to the process of analogical comparison, which draws on a broad frontoparietal network. This study sheds light not only on the form of relation representations but also on their specific content.SignificanceRelations provide basic building blocks for language and thought. For the past half century, cognitive scientists exploring human semantic memory have sought to identify the code for relations. In a neuroimaging paradigm, we tested alternative computational models of relation processing that predict patterns of neural similarity during distinct phases of analogical reasoning. The findings allowed us to draw inferences not only about the form of relation representations, but also about their specific content. The core of these distributed representations is based on a relatively small number of abstract relation types specified in a theory-based taxonomy. This study helps to resolve a longstanding debate concerning the nature of the conceptual and neural code for semantic relations in the mind and brain.


Author(s):  
Seppo Louhenkilpi ◽  
Subhas Ganguly

In the field of experiment, theory, modeling and simulation, the most noteworthy progressions applicable to steelmaking technology have been closely linked with the emergence of more powerful computing tools, advances in needful software's and algorithms design, and to a lesser degree, with the development of emerging computing theory. These have enabled the integration of several different types of computational techniques (for example, quantum chemical, and molecular dynamics, DFT, FEM, Soft computing, statistical learning etc., to name a few) to provide high-performance simulations of steelmaking processes based on emerging computational models and theories. This chapter overviews the general steps and concepts for developing a computational process model including few exercises in the area of steel making. The various sections of the chapter aim to describe how to developed models for various issues related to steelmaking processes and to simulate a physical process starts with the process fundaments. The examples include steel converter, tank vacuum degassing, and continuous casting, etc.


2017 ◽  
Vol 372 (1711) ◽  
pp. 20160055 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elizabeth M. Clerkin ◽  
Elizabeth Hart ◽  
James M. Rehg ◽  
Chen Yu ◽  
Linda B. Smith

We offer a new solution to the unsolved problem of how infants break into word learning based on the visual statistics of everyday infant-perspective scenes. Images from head camera video captured by 8 1/2 to 10 1/2 month-old infants at 147 at-home mealtime events were analysed for the objects in view. The images were found to be highly cluttered with many different objects in view. However, the frequency distribution of object categories was extremely right skewed such that a very small set of objects was pervasively present—a fact that may substantially reduce the problem of referential ambiguity. The statistical structure of objects in these infant egocentric scenes differs markedly from that in the training sets used in computational models and in experiments on statistical word-referent learning. Therefore, the results also indicate a need to re-examine current explanations of how infants break into word learning. This article is part of the themed issue ‘New frontiers for statistical learning in the cognitive sciences’.


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicholas Franklin ◽  
Michael J. Frank

AbstractHumans are remarkably adept at generalizing knowledge between experiences in a way that can be difficult for computers. Often, this entails generalizing constituent pieces of experiences that do not fully overlap, but nonetheless share useful similarities with, previously acquired knowledge. However, it is often unclear how knowledge gained in one context should generalize to another. Previous computational models and data suggest that rather than learning about each individual context, humans build latent abstract structures and learn to link these structures to arbitrary contexts, facilitating generalization. In these models, task structures that are more popular across contexts are more likely to be revisited in new contexts. However, these models can only re-use policies as a whole and are unable to transfer knowledge about the transition structure of the environment even if only the goal has changed (or vice-versa). This contrasts with ecological settings, where some aspects of task structure, such as the transition function, will be shared between context separately from other aspects, such as the reward function. Here, we develop a novel non-parametric Bayesian agent that forms independent latent clusters for transition and reward functions, affording separable transfer of their constituent parts across contexts. We show that the relative performance of this agent compared to an agent that jointly clusters reward and transition functions depends environmental task statistics: the mutual information between transition and reward functions and the stochasticity of the observations. We formalize our analysis through an information theoretic account of the priors, and propose a meta learning agent that dynamically arbitrates between strategies across task domains to optimize a statistical tradeoff.Author summaryA musician may learn to generalize behaviors across instruments for different purposes, for example, reusing hand motions used when playing classical on the flute to play jazz on the saxophone. Conversely, she may learn to play a single song across many instruments that require completely distinct physical motions, but nonetheless transfer knowledge between them. This degree of compositionality is often absent from computational frameworks of learning, forcing agents either to generalize entire learned policies or to learn new policies from scratch. Here, we propose a solution to this problem that allows an agent to generalize components of a policy independently and compare it to an agent that generalizes components as a whole. We show that the degree to which one form of generalization is favored over the other is dependent on the features of task domain, with independent generalization of task components favored in environments with weak relationships between components or high degrees of noise and joint generalization of task components favored when there is a clear, discoverable relationship between task components. Furthermore, we show that the overall meta structure of the environment can be learned and leveraged by an agent that dynamically arbitrates between these forms of structure learning.


2017 ◽  
Vol 29 (10) ◽  
pp. 1646-1655 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anne G. E. Collins

Human learning is highly efficient and flexible. A key contributor to this learning flexibility is our ability to generalize new information across contexts that we know require the same behavior and to transfer rules to new contexts we encounter. To do this, we structure the information we learn and represent it hierarchically as abstract, context-dependent rules that constrain lower-level stimulus–action–outcome contingencies. Previous research showed that humans create such structure even when it is not needed, presumably because it usually affords long-term generalization benefits. However, computational models predict that creating structure is costly, with slower learning and slower RTs. We tested this prediction in a new behavioral experiment. Participants learned to select correct actions for four visual patterns, in a setting that either afforded (but did not promote) structure learning or enforced nonhierarchical learning, while controlling for the difficulty of the learning problem. Results replicated our previous finding that healthy young adults create structure even when unneeded and that this structure affords later generalization. Furthermore, they supported our prediction that structure learning incurred a major learning cost and that this cost was specifically tied to the effort in selecting abstract rules, leading to more errors when applying those rules. These findings confirm our theory that humans pay a high short-term cost in learning structure to enable longer-term benefits in learning flexibility.


2014 ◽  
Vol 369 (1634) ◽  
pp. 20120392 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew A. Lambon Ralph

Conceptual knowledge reflects our multi-modal ‘semantic database’. As such, it brings meaning to all verbal and non-verbal stimuli, is the foundation for verbal and non-verbal expression and provides the basis for computing appropriate semantic generalizations. Multiple disciplines (e.g. philosophy, cognitive science, cognitive neuroscience and behavioural neurology) have striven to answer the questions of how concepts are formed, how they are represented in the brain and how they break down differentially in various neurological patient groups. A long-standing and prominent hypothesis is that concepts are distilled from our multi-modal verbal and non-verbal experience such that sensation in one modality (e.g. the smell of an apple) not only activates the intramodality long-term knowledge, but also reactivates the relevant intermodality information about that item (i.e. all the things you know about and can do with an apple). This multi-modal view of conceptualization fits with contemporary functional neuroimaging studies that observe systematic variation of activation across different modality-specific association regions dependent on the conceptual category or type of information. A second vein of interdisciplinary work argues, however, that even a smorgasbord of multi-modal features is insufficient to build coherent, generalizable concepts. Instead, an additional process or intermediate representation is required. Recent multidisciplinary work, which combines neuropsychology, neuroscience and computational models, offers evidence that conceptualization follows from a combination of modality-specific sources of information plus a transmodal ‘hub’ representational system that is supported primarily by regions within the anterior temporal lobe, bilaterally.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steffen A. Herff ◽  
Shanshan Zhen ◽  
Rongjun Yu ◽  
Kat Rose Agres

Statistical learning (SL) is the ability to generate predictions based on probabilistic dependencies in the environment, an ability that is present throughout life. The effect of aging on SL is still unclear. Here, we explore statistical learning in healthy adults (40 younger and 40 older). The novel paradigm tracks learning trajectories and shows age-related differences in overall performance, yet similarities in learning rates. Bayesian models reveal further differences between younger and older adults in dealing with uncertainty in this probabilistic SL task. We test computational models of three different learning strategies: (1) Win-Stay, Lose-Shift, (2) Delta Rule Learning, (3) Information Weights to explore whether they capture age-related differences in performance and learning in the present task. A likely candidate mechanism emerges in the form of age-dependent differences in information weights, in which young adults more readily change their behavior, but also show disproportionally strong reactions towards erroneous predictions. With lower but more balanced information weights, older adults show slower behavioral adaptation but eventually arrive at more stable and accurate representations of the underlying transitional probability matrix.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document