Stimulus pairing and statement target information have equal effects on stereotype-relevant evaluations of individuals

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rachel Rubinstein ◽  
Lee Jussim

The present research tested a series of theoretically derived competing hypotheses regarding the extent to which different ways of learning about others influence stereotype-relevant impression formation and reliance on stereotypes in stereotype-relevant target evaluations. First, we examined the extent to which stimulus pairing or statement information about novel White (Study 1) and Black (Study 2) targets’ intelligence influenced implicit and explicit impressions of the targets’ competence. In both studies, we found that the two modes of information presentation produced equal effects on impression formation at both the implicit and the explicit levels. In a third study, we compared the effectiveness of stimulus pairing and statement information at reducing or eliminating the influence of stereotypes on implicit and explicit person perception. We found that stereotyping in implicit person perception was completely eliminated by both types of information, but found no evidence of explicit stereotype bias even in the absence of individuating information. Together, the results of the three studies suggest that stimulus pairing and statement target information are equally influential in the formation of stereotype-relevant impressions of novel targets and in eliminating the influence of stereotypes on stereotype-relevant target evaluations. These findings provide support for propositional models of implicit evaluations and for dual-process theories allowing for interaction between different learning systems, but do not support dual-systems theories.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tobias Heycke ◽  
Sarah Marie Gehrmann ◽  
Julia M. Haaf ◽  
Christoph Stahl

Evaluative conditioning (EC) is proposed as a mechanism of automatic preference acquisition in dual-process theories of attitudes (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; Rydell & McConnell, 2006). Evidence for the automaticity of EC comes from studies claiming EC effects for subliminally presented stimuli. An impression-formation study by Rydell and colleagues (2006) showed a selective influence of briefly presented primes on implicitly measured attitudes, whereas supraliminally presented behavioral information about the target person was reflected in explicit ratings. This finding is considered one of the strongest pieces of evidence for dual process theories (Sweldens, Corneille, & Yzerbyt, 2014), and it is therefore crucial to assess its reliability and robustness. The present study presents two registered replications of the Rydell et al. (2006) study. In contrast to the original findings, the implicit measures did not reflect the valence of the subliminal primes in both studies.



2015 ◽  
Vol 37 (3) ◽  
pp. 577-600 ◽  
Author(s):  
GISELA GRANENA

ABSTRACTRecent proposals on language aptitude have distinguished between cognitive aptitudes for implicit and explicit learning (e.g., Doughty et al., 2010; Linck et al., 2013). This methodological study extends recent work on aptitude by investigating whether aptitudes for implicit and explicit learning are differentially related to the two main information-processing cognitive styles proposed by dual-process theories in cognitive psychology: rational–analytical and experiential–intuitive (Pacini & Epstein, 1999). A relationship was found between a rational–analytical profile and explicit aptitude, as well as between an experiential–intuitive profile and implicit aptitude. Structural equation modeling further showed that the proposed model had acceptable fit. These results were interpreted as support for the qualitatively different types of cognitive processes underlying the two hypothesized types of aptitude.



2015 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 135 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Godden

This paper explicates an account of argumentative rationality by articulating the common, basic idea of its nature, and then identifying a collection of assumptions inherent in it. Argumentative rationality is then contrasted with dual-process theories of reasoning and rationality prevalent in the psychology of reasoning. It is argued that argumentative rationality properly corresponds only with system-2 reasoning in dual-process theories. This result challenges the prescriptive force of argumentative norms derives if they derive at all from their descriptive accuracy of our cognitive capacities. In response, I propose an activity-based account of reasoning which retains the assumptions of argumentative rationality while recontextualizing the relationship between reasoning as a justificatory activity and the psychological states and processes underlying that activity.









2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 8-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Predrag Teovanović

Although the anchoring effect is one of the most reliable results of experimental psychology, researchers have only recently begun to examine the role of individual differences in susceptibility to this cognitive bias. Yet, first correlational studies yielded inconsistent results, failing to identify any predictors that have a systematic effect on anchored decisions. The present research seeks to remedy methodological shortcomings of foregoing research by employing modified within-subject anchoring procedure. Results confirmed the robustness of phenomenon in extended paradigm and replicated previous findings on anchor’s direction and distance as significant experimental factors of the anchoring effect size. Obtained measures of individual differences in susceptibility to anchoring were fairly reliable but shared only small portion of variability with intelligence, cognitive reflection, and basic personality traits. However, in a group of more reflective subjects, substantial negative correlation between intelligence and anchoring was detected. This finding indicates that, at least for some subjects, effortful cognitive process of adjustment plays role in the emergence of the anchoring effect, which is in line with expectations of dual-process theories of human reasoning.



2020 ◽  
Vol 46 (Supplement_1) ◽  
pp. S258-S258
Author(s):  
Michael Bronstein ◽  
Gordon Pennycook ◽  
Jutta Joormann ◽  
Philip Corlett ◽  
Tyrone Cannon

Abstract Background Individuals endorsing delusions exhibit multiple reasoning biases, including a bias toward lower decision thresholds, a bias toward gathering less data before forming conclusions, and a bias toward discounting evidence against one’s beliefs. Although these biases have been repeatedly associated with delusions, it remains unclear how they might arise, how they might be interrelated, and whether any of them play a causal role in forming or maintaining delusions. Progress toward answering these questions may be made by examining delusion-related reasoning biases from the perspective of dual-process theories of reasoning. Dual-process theories posit that human reasoning proceeds via two systems: an intuitive system (which is autonomous, does not require working memory) and an analytic system (which relies on working memory, supports hypothetical thought). Importantly, when the outputs of one or both systems conflict with one another, successful detection of this conflict is thought to produce additional engagement in analytic reasoning. Thus, the detection of and ensuing neurocognitive response to conflict may modulate analytic reasoning engagement. Working from this dual-process perspective, recent theories have hypothesized that more limited engagement in analytic reasoning, perhaps resulting from conflict processing deficits, may engender delusion-inspiring reasoning biases in people with schizophrenia. Methods Given this hypothesis, a literature review (Bronstein et al., 2019, Clinical Psychology Review, 72, 101748) was conducted to critically evaluate whether impaired conflict processing might be a primary initiating deficit in pathways relevant to the generation of delusion-relevant reasoning biases and the formation and/or maintenance of delusions themselves. Results Research examined in this review suggested that in healthy people, successful conflict detection raises decision thresholds. Conflict-processing deficits in delusional individuals with schizophrenia might impair this process. Consistent with this possibility, delusional individuals with schizophrenia (vs. healthy controls) make more decisions when they perceive their favored choice to be only marginally better than alternatives. Lower decision thresholds in individuals who endorse delusions may limit analytic thinking (which takes time). Reductions in decision-making thresholds and in analytic reasoning engagement may encourage these individuals to jump to conclusions, potentially promoting delusion formation, and may also increase bias against disconfirmatory evidence, which may help delusions persist. Discussion Extant literature suggests that conflict processing deficits might encourage delusion-related cognitive biases, which is broadly consistent with the idea that these deficits may be causally primary in pathways leading to delusions. This conclusion lends credence to previous theories suggesting that reduced modulation toward analytic reasoning in the presence of conflict might promote delusions. Future research should attempt to more specifically determine the source of deficits related to analytic reasoning engagement in delusional individuals with schizophrenia. It is often unclear whether analytic-reasoning-related deficits observed in existing literature result from impairments in conflict detection, responsiveness to conflict, or both. Tasks used to study dual-process reasoning in the general population may be useful platforms for specifying the nature of analytic-reasoning-related deficits in delusional individuals with schizophrenia.



2020 ◽  
Vol 20 ◽  
pp. 101205
Author(s):  
Tsuyoshi Okuhara ◽  
Hirono Ishikawa ◽  
Hiroko Okada ◽  
Haruka Ueno ◽  
Takahiro Kiuchi


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