Generalization and source memory in acquired equivalence
Memory allows us to remember specific events but also combine information across events to infer new information. New inferences are thought to stem from integrating memories of related events during encoding but can be also generated on-demand, based on separate memories of individual events. Integrative encoding has been argued as dominant in the acquired equivalence paradigm, where people have a tendency to assume that when two faces share one preference, they also share another. A downside may be a loss of source memory, where inferred preferences are mistaken for observed ones. Here, we tested the predictions of integrative encoding across five data sets collected using small variations of the acquired equivalence paradigm. Results showed a statistically reliable but numerically small tendency to generalize preferences across faces, with stronger evidence for on-demand inferences at retrieval rather than spontaneous integration during encoding. Newly included explicit source memory test showed that participants differentiated learned from inferred preferences to a high degree, irrespective of whether they generalized preferences across faces. Overall, the results indicate that representations of individual events and retrieval-based processes may play a larger role in acquired equivalence than previously thought, informing current theories of generalization and knowledge representation.