scholarly journals Cognitive Archaeology and the Cognitive Sciences

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frederick L. Coolidge ◽  
Thomas Wynn ◽  
Karenleigh A. Overmann ◽  
James M. Hicks

Cognitive archaeology uses cognitive and psychological models to interpret the archaeological record. This chapter outlines several components that may be essential in building effective cognitive archaeological arguments. It also presents a two-stage perspective for the development of modern cognition, primarily based upon the work of Coolidge and Wynn. The first describes the transition from arboreal to terrestrial life in later Homo and the possible cognitive repercussions of terrestrial sleep. The second stage proposes that a genetic event may have enhanced working memory in Homo sapiens (specifically in terms of Baddeley’s multicomponent working memory model). The present chapter also reviews the archaeological and neurological bases for modern thinking, and the latter arguments are primarily grounded in the significance of the morphometric rescaling of the parietal lobes, which appears to have distinguished Homo sapiens from Neandertals.

2019 ◽  
pp. 406-431 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frederick L. Coolidge

This chapter traces the origins and currents of Frederick Coolidge’s collaborations with archaeologist Thomas Wynn. It begins with their first article, in 2001, in which they traced a cultural explosion some 50,000 years ago in the archaeological record (as attested by the appearance of things like cave paintings, highly ritualized burials, depictive figurines) to enhanced executive functions (i.e., temporal sequencing, inhibition, planning, and organization) that perhaps resulted from an earlier genetic or epigenetic event not shared by Neandertals. As evidence of enhanced executive functioning in Homo sapiens, Wynn and Coolidge offered barbed points from Katanda, bow-and-arrow technology, agriculture, and the colonization of the Sahul. In their more recent papers, they labeled the cognitive consequence of this genetic event enhanced working memory, thus incorporating their ideas into Baddeley’s multicomponent model of working memory. The chapter ends with speculations on the evolutionary origins of learning and memory systems, looking back to the very beginnings of life on earth.


2011 ◽  
Vol 2011 ◽  
pp. 1-12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Wynn ◽  
Frederick L. Coolidge

What distinguishes the cognition of biologically modern humans from that of more archaic populations such as Neandertals? The norm in paleoanthropology has been to emphasize the role of language and symbolism. But the modern mind is more than just an archaic mind enhanced by symbol use. It also possesses an important problem solving and planning component. In cognitive neuroscience these advanced planning abilities have been extensively investigated through a formal model known as working memory. The working memory model is now well-enough established to provide a powerful lens through which paleoanthropologists can view the fossil and archaeological records. The challenge is methodological. The following essay reviews the controversial hypothesis that a recent enhancement of working memory capacity was the final piece in the evolution of modern cognition.


2010 ◽  
Vol 11 (S1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Kyle Lyman ◽  
Robert McDougal ◽  
Brian Myers ◽  
Joseph Tien ◽  
Mustafa Zeki ◽  
...  

2008 ◽  
Vol 102 (1-3) ◽  
pp. 128
Author(s):  
Andor Simon ◽  
Katja Cattapan-Ludewig

Author(s):  
COLIN RENFREW

This chapter discusses the attempts of pinpointing the origins of humans, i.e. Homo sapiens sapiens. Due to the recent advances in archaeology, specifically in archaeogenetics, it has been determined that the Homo sapiens sapiens originated in Africa 200,000 years ago, and that the speciation phase of human development occurred before that time. The chapter shows that cognitive archaeology would need to analyse more carefully the nature of mind, as well as seek further insight into the processes that underlie the achievements that characterise those different trajectories of development and change.


Anthropology ◽  
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frederick L. Coolidge ◽  
Thomas Wynn

Cognitive archaeology may be divided into two branches. Evolutionary cognitive archaeology (ECA) is the discipline of prehistoric archaeology that studies the evolution of human cognition. Practitioners are united by a methodological commitment to the idea that archaeological traces of past activity provide access to the minds of the agents responsible. The second branch, ideational cognitive archaeology, encompasses archaeologists who strive to discover the meaning of symbolic system, primarily through the analysis of iconography. This approach differs from ECA in its epistemology, historical roots, and citation universes, and focuses on comparatively recent time periods (after 10,000 years ago). Evolutionary cognitive archaeologists are concerned with the nature of cognition itself, and its evolutionary development from the time of the last common ancestor with chimpanzees to the final ascendancy of modern humans at the end of the Pleistocene. Although ECA methods are primarily archaeological, its theoretical grounding is in the cognitive sciences, including cognitive psychology, neuropsychology, and cognitive neuroscience. It is by its nature interdisciplinary. ECA differs from the allied discipline of evolutionary psychology in several important respects. Methodologically, ECA is a macroevolutionary science that studies physical evidence of past human cognition, including archaeological and fossil remains. Evolutionary psychology relies heavily on reverse engineering from controlled experiments on living humans. Theoretically, ECA is more eclectic, drawing on a variety of cognitive and evolutionary models; evolutionary psychology is committed to a neo-Darwinian, selectionist understanding of evolutionary change. The two approaches tend to study different components of human mental life, but are not inherently contradictory. ECA practitioners reconstruct prehistoric activities using well-established archaeological methods and techniques, including morphological analysis of artifacts to identify action sequences and decision patterns, functional analyses (e.g., microwear) to identify use patterns, and spatial patterns within sites to recognize activity loci (e.g., hearths). An increasingly important method is the actualistic recreation of prehistoric technologies to identify features not preserved in the archaeological remains. Neuroarchaeologists enhance such actualistic research by imaging the brains of the participants (most typically using fMRI), an approach that also contributes directly to cognitive science’s understanding of the neural basis of technical cognition. ECA practitioners take two non-mutually exclusive approaches to documenting human cognitive evolution. The first approach enriches the understanding of specific hominin taxa (i.e., Homo sapiens and their direct ancestors since 6 million years ago) by providing accounts of their cognitive life worlds, or by contrasting two taxa with one another. This approach is famously exemplified by attempts to contrast the abilities of Neandertals with those of modern humans. The second approach traces the evolution of specific cognitive abilities from the first appearance of stone tools 3.3 million years ago to the emergence of city-states 5,000 years ago. The range of accessible cognitive abilities is limited by the nature of archaeological remains, but evolutionary cognitive archaeologists have been able to trace developments in spatial cognition, memory, cognitive control, technical expertise, theory of mind, aesthetic cognition, symbolism, language, and numeracy.


Author(s):  
Gianluca Villani ◽  
Matin Jafarian ◽  
Anders Lansner ◽  
Karl Henrik Johansson

2001 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 117-118 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alan Baddeley

Cowan's revisiting of the magic number is very timely and the case he makes for a more moderate number than seven is persuasive. It is also appropriate to frame his case within a theoretical context, since this will influence what evidence to include and how to interpret it. He presents his model however, as a contrast to the working memory model of Baddeley (1986). I suggest that this reflects a misinterpretation of our model resulting in a danger of focusing attention on pseudo-problems rather than genuine disparities between his approach and my own.


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