Evolutionary Cognitive Archaeology

Anthropology ◽  
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frederick L. Coolidge ◽  
Thomas Wynn

Cognitive archaeology may be divided into two branches. Evolutionary cognitive archaeology (ECA) is the discipline of prehistoric archaeology that studies the evolution of human cognition. Practitioners are united by a methodological commitment to the idea that archaeological traces of past activity provide access to the minds of the agents responsible. The second branch, ideational cognitive archaeology, encompasses archaeologists who strive to discover the meaning of symbolic system, primarily through the analysis of iconography. This approach differs from ECA in its epistemology, historical roots, and citation universes, and focuses on comparatively recent time periods (after 10,000 years ago). Evolutionary cognitive archaeologists are concerned with the nature of cognition itself, and its evolutionary development from the time of the last common ancestor with chimpanzees to the final ascendancy of modern humans at the end of the Pleistocene. Although ECA methods are primarily archaeological, its theoretical grounding is in the cognitive sciences, including cognitive psychology, neuropsychology, and cognitive neuroscience. It is by its nature interdisciplinary. ECA differs from the allied discipline of evolutionary psychology in several important respects. Methodologically, ECA is a macroevolutionary science that studies physical evidence of past human cognition, including archaeological and fossil remains. Evolutionary psychology relies heavily on reverse engineering from controlled experiments on living humans. Theoretically, ECA is more eclectic, drawing on a variety of cognitive and evolutionary models; evolutionary psychology is committed to a neo-Darwinian, selectionist understanding of evolutionary change. The two approaches tend to study different components of human mental life, but are not inherently contradictory. ECA practitioners reconstruct prehistoric activities using well-established archaeological methods and techniques, including morphological analysis of artifacts to identify action sequences and decision patterns, functional analyses (e.g., microwear) to identify use patterns, and spatial patterns within sites to recognize activity loci (e.g., hearths). An increasingly important method is the actualistic recreation of prehistoric technologies to identify features not preserved in the archaeological remains. Neuroarchaeologists enhance such actualistic research by imaging the brains of the participants (most typically using fMRI), an approach that also contributes directly to cognitive science’s understanding of the neural basis of technical cognition. ECA practitioners take two non-mutually exclusive approaches to documenting human cognitive evolution. The first approach enriches the understanding of specific hominin taxa (i.e., Homo sapiens and their direct ancestors since 6 million years ago) by providing accounts of their cognitive life worlds, or by contrasting two taxa with one another. This approach is famously exemplified by attempts to contrast the abilities of Neandertals with those of modern humans. The second approach traces the evolution of specific cognitive abilities from the first appearance of stone tools 3.3 million years ago to the emergence of city-states 5,000 years ago. The range of accessible cognitive abilities is limited by the nature of archaeological remains, but evolutionary cognitive archaeologists have been able to trace developments in spatial cognition, memory, cognitive control, technical expertise, theory of mind, aesthetic cognition, symbolism, language, and numeracy.

2002 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 420-421 ◽  
Author(s):  
Valerie E. Stone

Evolutionary theories of human cognition should refer to specific times in the primate or hominid past. Though alternative accounts of tool manufacture from Wynn's are possible (e.g., frontal lobe function), Wynn demonstrates the power of archaeology to guide cognitive theories. Many cognitive abilities evolved not in the “Pleistocene hunter-gatherer” context, but earlier, in the context of other patterns of social organization and foraging.


2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (5) ◽  
pp. 20200083
Author(s):  
Rebecca W. Cook ◽  
Antonino Vazzana ◽  
Rita Sorrentino ◽  
Stefano Benazzi ◽  
Amanda L. Smith ◽  
...  

Homo floresiensis is a small-bodied hominin from Flores, Indonesia, that exhibits plesiomorphic dentognathic features, including large premolars and a robust mandible, aspects of which have been considered australopith-like. However, relative to australopith species, H. floresiensis exhibits reduced molar size and a cranium with diminutive midfacial dimensions similar to those of later Homo , suggesting a reduction in the frequency of forceful biting behaviours. Our study uses finite-element analysis to examine the feeding biomechanics of the H. floresiensis cranium. We simulate premolar (P 3 ) and molar (M 2 ) biting in a finite-element model (FEM) of the H. floresiensis holotype cranium (LB1) and compare the mechanical results with FEMs of chimpanzees, modern humans and a sample of australopiths (MH1, Sts 5, OH5). With few exceptions, strain magnitudes in LB1 resemble elevated levels observed in modern Homo . Our analysis of LB1 suggests that H. floresiensis could produce bite forces with high mechanical efficiency, but was subject to tensile jaw joint reaction forces during molar biting, which perhaps constrained maximum postcanine bite force production. The inferred feeding biomechanics of H. floresiensis closely resemble modern humans, suggesting that this pattern may have been present in the last common ancestor of Homo sapiens and H. floresiensis .


2001 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 255-260 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frederick L. Coolidge ◽  
Thomas Wynn

A core question of cognitive archaeology is the evolution of modern thinking. In this article, it is argued that a cluster of specific cognitive abilities, ‘executive functions’, was one of the key evolutionary acquisitions that led to the development of modern thinking. A review of the history of executive functions is presented as well as current opinions as to their nature and genetic basis. Examples are also presented from the cognitive archaeological record that may be representative of executive functions in the evolution of modern thought.


Author(s):  
Francisco J. Ayala ◽  
Camilo J. Cela-Conde

This chapter deals with the similarities and differences between Homo neanderthalensis and Homo sapiens, by considering genetic, brain, and cognitive evidence. The genetic differentiation emerges from fossil genetic evidence obtained first from mtDNA and later from nuclear DNA. With high throughput whole genome sequencing, sequences have been obtained from the Denisova Cave (Siberia) fossils. Nuclear DNA of a third species (“Denisovans”) has been obtained from the same cave and used to define the phylogenetic relationships among the three species during the Upper Palaeolithic. Archaeological comparisons make it possible to advance a four-mode model of the evolution of symbolism. Neanderthals and modern humans would share a “modern mind” as defined up to Symbolic Mode 3. Whether the Neanderthals reached symbolic Mode 4 remains unsettled.


2020 ◽  
Vol 375 (1803) ◽  
pp. 20190495 ◽  
Author(s):  
Natalie Uomini ◽  
Joanna Fairlie ◽  
Russell D. Gray ◽  
Michael Griesser

Traditional attempts to understand the evolution of human cognition compare humans with other primates. This research showed that relative brain size covaries with cognitive skills, while adaptations that buffer the developmental and energetic costs of large brains (e.g. allomaternal care), and ecological or social benefits of cognitive abilities, are critical for their evolution. To understand the drivers of cognitive adaptations, it is profitable to consider distant lineages with convergently evolved cognitions. Here, we examine the facilitators of cognitive evolution in corvid birds, where some species display cultural learning, with an emphasis on family life. We propose that extended parenting (protracted parent–offspring association) is pivotal in the evolution of cognition: it combines critical life-history, social and ecological conditions allowing for the development and maintenance of cognitive skillsets that confer fitness benefits to individuals. This novel hypothesis complements the extended childhood idea by considering the parents' role in juvenile development. Using phylogenetic comparative analyses, we show that corvids have larger body sizes, longer development times, extended parenting and larger relative brain sizes than other passerines. Case studies from two corvid species with different ecologies and social systems highlight the critical role of life-history features on juveniles’ cognitive development: extended parenting provides a safe haven, access to tolerant role models, reliable learning opportunities and food, resulting in higher survival. The benefits of extended juvenile learning periods, over evolutionary time, lead to selection for expanded cognitive skillsets. Similarly, in our ancestors, cooperative breeding and increased group sizes facilitated learning and teaching. Our analyses highlight the critical role of life-history, ecological and social factors that underlie both extended parenting and expanded cognitive skillsets. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Life history and learning: how childhood, caregiving and old age shape cognition and culture in humans and other animals’.


2014 ◽  
Vol 112 (2) ◽  
pp. 366-371 ◽  
Author(s):  
Habiba Chirchir ◽  
Tracy L. Kivell ◽  
Christopher B. Ruff ◽  
Jean-Jacques Hublin ◽  
Kristian J. Carlson ◽  
...  

Humans are unique, compared with our closest living relatives (chimpanzees) and early fossil hominins, in having an enlarged body size and lower limb joint surfaces in combination with a relatively gracile skeleton (i.e., lower bone mass for our body size). Some analyses have observed that in at least a few anatomical regions modern humans today appear to have relatively low trabecular density, but little is known about how that density varies throughout the human skeleton and across species or how and when the present trabecular patterns emerged over the course of human evolution. Here, we test the hypotheses that (i) recent modern humans have low trabecular density throughout the upper and lower limbs compared with other primate taxa and (ii) the reduction in trabecular density first occurred in early Homo erectus, consistent with the shift toward a modern human locomotor anatomy, or more recently in concert with diaphyseal gracilization in Holocene humans. We used peripheral quantitative CT and microtomography to measure trabecular bone of limb epiphyses (long bone articular ends) in modern humans and chimpanzees and in fossil hominins attributed to Australopithecus africanus, Paranthropus robustus/early Homo from Swartkrans, Homo neanderthalensis, and early Homo sapiens. Results show that only recent modern humans have low trabecular density throughout the limb joints. Extinct hominins, including pre-Holocene Homo sapiens, retain the high levels seen in nonhuman primates. Thus, the low trabecular density of the recent modern human skeleton evolved late in our evolutionary history, potentially resulting from increased sedentism and reliance on technological and cultural innovations.


Open Biology ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 120143 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeff Errington

The peptidoglycan wall is a defining feature of bacterial cells and was probably already present in their last common ancestor. L-forms are bacterial variants that lack a cell wall and divide by a variety of processes involving membrane blebbing, tubulation, vesiculation and fission. Their unusual mode of proliferation provides a model for primitive cells and is reminiscent of recently developed in vitro vesicle reproduction processes. Invention of the cell wall may have underpinned the explosion of bacterial life on the Earth. Later innovations in cell envelope structure, particularly the emergence of the outer membrane of Gram-negative bacteria, possibly in an early endospore former, seem to have spurned further major evolutionary radiations. Comparative studies of bacterial cell envelope structure may help to resolve the early key steps in evolutionary development of the bacterial domain of life.


1990 ◽  
Vol 156 (6) ◽  
pp. 788-797 ◽  
Author(s):  
T. J. Crow

Attempts to draw a line of genetic demarcation between schizophrenic and affective illnesses have failed. It must be assumed that these diseases are genetically related. A post-mortem study has demonstrated that enlargement of the temporal horn of the lateral ventricle in schizophrenia but not in Alzheimer-type dementia is selective to the left side of the brain. This suggests that the gene for psychosis is the ‘cerebral dominance gene‘, the factor that determines the asymmetrical development of the human brain. That the psychosis gene is located in the pseudoautosomal region of the sex chromosomes is consistent with observations that sibling pairs with schizophrenia are more often than would be expected of the same sex and share alleles of a polymorphic marker at the short-arm telomeres of the X and Y chromosomes above chance expectation. That the cerebral dominance gene also is pseudoautosomal is suggested by the pattern of verbal and performance deficits associated with sex-chromosome aneuploidies. The psychoses may thus represent aberrations of a late evolutionary development underlying the recent and rapid increase in brain weight in the transition fromAustralopithecusthroughHomo habilisandHomo erectustoHomo sapiens.


2011 ◽  
Vol 54 (4) ◽  
pp. 93-109
Author(s):  
Miljana Milojevic

The aim of this paper is to show how a new outlook on human cognitive abilities, and in accordance with this a different view of rationality, can influence semantics and one of the most prominent debates in this field, namely, conflict between Fregeans and non Fregean anti-indiviidualists. This new account of rationality will help us difuse some of the main motivators for Fregean view of semantics and it will help us in justifying non-Fregean anti-individualism but also in eliminating some of the apparent contradictions in Fregean anti-individualism of, e.g. Campbell and Evans. In this attempt of bringing together some of the latest insights into human cognition and semantics I will be dealing mainly with Jessica Brown's outlook on motivation for Fregean sense and Ruth Millikan's embedded view on rationality.


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