scholarly journals Privacy by design

2020 ◽  
Vol 24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kirsten Wahlstrom ◽  
Anwaar Ul-haq ◽  
Oliver Burmeister
Keyword(s):  
Social Contexts ◽  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
Privacy By Design ◽  
Human Right ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Blockchain Technology ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Right To Be Forgotten ◽  
European Court ◽  
The Right

Privacy is important because it supports freedom, dignity, autonomy, justice, and democracy, and therefore it is important that privacy is studied in ontologically robust ways. A form of privacy is implemented in the right to be forgotten, which is a human right established by the European Court of Justice. Blockchain and Holochain are examples of recently emerged technologies that were shaped by, and are now shaping of, social contexts in which economic transactions may occur. The right to be forgotten represents a compliance challenge for public and private implementations of blockchain technology. This paper describes a few of these challenges.

scholarly journals Recht auf Vergessen? Ethik der zweiten Chance?

2016 ◽  
Vol 64 (6) ◽  
Author(s):  
Christine Abbt
Keyword(s):  
Personal Data ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Right To Be Forgotten ◽  
European Court ◽  
The Moment ◽  
The Individual ◽  
The Right ◽  
Second Chance

AbstractThe notion of ‘forgetting’ has assumed a new dimension in the digital age. Here I will examine a particular kind of forgetting as reflected in a ruling of the European Court of Justice (ECJ). What the ruling of the ECJ of May 13, 2014 (C-131/12) formulates and invokes as a “right to be forgotten” encompasses the right to co-determine whether certain personal data in the Web should immediately show up or not when a first name and surname is entered as part of a search. When a user has invoked the “right to be forgotten”, and it is determined that it applies, information is, however, not made irretrievable. It continues to remain possible to find this information in a roundabout way, i.e., by means of more precise search queries, although the information should not immediately become visible the moment a person’s full name is typed into a search engine. I will argue that this ruling can be seen as corroborating the fundamental rights of the individual. The idea of the “right to be forgotten” is to give a person a second chance in society. Not all forms of forgetting and remembering can be subsumed under this idea. As will be expounded, this court decision offers a useful normative fundament for the distinction between (1) legitimate attempts at reintegration, (2) legitimate attempts at rehabilitation and (3) unjustified recourse to a right to be forgotten.

scholarly journals Right to be forgotten: european data imperialism, national privilege, or universal human right?

2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 125-152
Author(s):  
Oskar J. Gstrein
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Data Protection ◽  
Freedom Of Expression ◽  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Data ◽  
Right To Be Forgotten ◽  
European Court ◽  
The Right

The Digital Age has fundamentally reshaped the preconditions for privacy and freedom of expression. This transpires in the debate about a "right to be forgotten". While the 2014 decision of the European Court of Justice in "Google Spain" touches upon the underlying issue of how increasing amounts of personal data affects individuals over time, the topic has also become one of the salient problems of Internet Governance. On 24th September 2019 the European Court of Justice delivered its judgment in "Google vs CNIL" (C-507/17) which was supposed to clarify the territorial scope of the right. However, this judgment has raised doubts about the enforceability of the General Data Protection Regulation, and reveals the complex, multi-layered governance structure of the European Union. Acknowledging such complexity at a substantive and institutional level, this article starts by analysing the judgment. Additionally, to better understand the current situation in the European Union and its member states, recently produced draft guidelines by the European Data Protection Board are presented and discussed, as well as two judgments of the German Federal Constitutional Court. Subsequently, the European developments are put in international context. Finally, the insights from these sections are combined which allows to develop several conceptual ideas. In conclusion, it is argued that the right to be forgotten remains complex and evolving. Its success depends on effective multi-layer and multistakeholder interaction. In this sense, it has become a prominent study object that reveals potential venues and pitfalls on a path towards more sophisticated data protection frameworks.

scholarly journals The Federal Constitutional Court Decisions: „The Right to be Forgotten I” and „The Right to be Forgotten II” – The Expectation of Increased Cooperation with the Concurrent Need to Maintain Independence

2020 ◽  
pp. 69-88
Author(s):  
Magdalena Jaś-Nowopolska ◽  
Daniel Mengeler
Keyword(s):  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Right To Be Forgotten ◽  
European Court ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
The Right ◽  
Eu Fundamental Rights

The article discusses the decisions “Right to be forgotten I” and “Right to be forgotten II” of 6 November 2019 by the Federal Constitutional Court, which redefine the relationship of cooperation between the Federal Constitutional Court and the European Court of Justice in the area of fundamental rights. The Court has decided for the first time that where EU fundamental rights take precedence over German fundamental rights, the Court itself can directly review, on the basis of EU fundamental rights, the application of EU law by German authorities. In the first part, the article presents the previous system, including the precedence of application of EU law and its exceptions (ultra-vires review; identity review), as well as the controversial question of the interpretation of Article 51 (1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which is decisive for the applicability of the fundamental rights under the Charter. The focus is on the constitutional background of the German Basic Law for the protection of fundamental rights in the European multi-level system. Against this background, the second part of the article presents the facts and reasons for the decisions “Right to be forgotten I” and “Right to be forgotten II”. This is followed by an analysis of the consequences of these decisions for the protection of fundamental rights and cooperation between the European Court of Justice and the Federal Constitutional Court. In particular, the way in which fundamental EU rights can now be enforced before the Federal Constitutional Court is described in greater detail. The concluding part provides an overview of the open questions, risks and opportunities of this approach. Here the article illustrates the significant impact of the two decisions on dogmatic and procedural matters.

The Right to Be Forgotten and What the Laws Should/Can/Will Be: Comparing the United States and Canada

2017 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 77-104
Author(s):  
Amy Lai
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Free Speech ◽  
Theoretical Perspective ◽  
The United States ◽  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Right To Be Forgotten ◽  
European Court ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
The Right

This article will first examine why the right to be forgotten should be recognized as a universal right by drawing upon natural law theories. Using the recent decision by the European Court of Justice as a starting point, it will then explore whether this right can be recognized in the United States and Canada. Often held to be similar in terms of cultures and values, the two neighbors in fact have very different free speech and privacy traditions. This article will conduct a comparative study of the u.s. and Canada to explain why this right can be accommodated by their laws and traditions from a theoretical perspective. Finally, it will adopt the framework of judicial globalization to explore why and to what extent the right to be forgotten will be recognized in these two jurisdictions.

Centros Ltd—A Complete U-Turn in the Right of Establishment for Companies?

2000 ◽  
Vol 49 (3) ◽  
pp. 621-642 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anne Looijestijn-Clearie
Keyword(s):  
United Kingdom ◽  
Member State ◽  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
Registered Office ◽  
Set Up ◽  
The Right ◽  
A Company

InCentros Ltd and Erhvers-og Selskabsstyrelesen (hereinafter Centros),1 the European Court of Justice ruled that it is contrary to Article 52 (now Article 432) and Article 58 (now Article 48) of the EC Treaty for the authorities of a member State (in casu Denmark) to refuse to register a branch of a company formed under the law of another member State (in casu the United Kingdom) in which it has its registered office, even if the company concerned has never conducted any business in the latter State and intends to carry out its entire business in the State in which the branch is to be set up. By avoiding the need to form a company there it would thus evade the application of the rules governing the provision for and the paying-up of a minimum share capital in force in that State. According to the Court, this does not, however, prevent the authorities of the member State in which the branch is to be set up from adopting appropriate measures for preventing or penalising fraud, either with regard to the company itself, if need be in co-operation with the member State in which it was formed, or with regard to its members, where it has been determined that they are in fact attempting, by means of the formation of a company, to evade their obligations towards creditors established in the territory of the member State of the branch.

scholarly journals GUARANTEE OF THE RIGHT TO SILENCE AND OF THE RIGHT NOT TO CONTRIBUTE TO ONE’S OWN INCRIMINATION IN ROMANIAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW

2018 ◽  
Vol 2 (83) ◽  
pp. 25
Author(s):  
Carmen Adriana Domocos
Keyword(s):  
Freedom Of Expression ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Fair Trial ◽  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
European Convention ◽  
Criminal Offence ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
Right To Silence ◽  
The Right

The Romanian legislation establishes in the new penal procedure law the right to silence and the right of non-incrimination of the defendant in the criminal trial.The right to silence (to remain silent) is the implicit procedural guarantee of the right to a fair trial, which results from the case law of the European Court of Justice within the meaning of Article 6 paragraph 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights, according to which judicial authorities cannot oblige a perpetrator (suspected of having committed a criminal offence), a suspect or a defendant to make statements, while having, however, a limited power to draw conclusions against them, from their refusal to make statements.Therefore, the right to silence involves not only the right not to testify against oneself, but also the right of the suspect or defendant not to incriminate oneself. The suspect or defendant cannot be compelled to assist in the production of evidence and cannot be sanctioned for failing to provide certain documents or other evidence. Obligation to testify against personal will, under the constraint of a fine or any other form of coercion constitutes an interference with the negative aspect of the right to freedom of expression which must be necessary in a democratic Romanian society.The right not to contribute to one’s own incrimination (the privilege against self-incrimination) is the implicit procedural guarantee of the right to a fair trial, which results from the case law of the European Court of Justice within the meaning of Article 6 paragraph 1 of the European Convention, according to which judicial bodies or any other state authority cannot oblige a perpetrator (suspected of having committed a criminal offence), a suspect, a defendant or a witness to cooperate by providing evidence which might incriminate him or which could constitute the basis for a new criminal charge. It is essential to clarify certain issues as far as this right is concerned.

The Effect of WTO Dispute Settlement Rulings in the EC Legal Order: Reviewing Van Parys v Belgische Interventie- en Restitutiebureau (C-377/02)

2005 ◽  
Vol 6 (6) ◽  
pp. 1025-1032
Author(s):  
Delphine De Mey
Keyword(s):  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
National Court ◽  
Legal Order ◽  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
European Court ◽  
The Right ◽  
Community Legal Order

On 1 March 2005, the European Court of Justice (hereinafter ‘ECJ’ or ‘the Court’) got another opportunity to rule on the effect of recommendations and decisions of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (hereinafter ‘DSB’) in the Community legal order. The ECJ concluded that an individual does not have the right to challenge, before a national court, the incompatibility of Community measures with WTO rules, even if the DSB had previously declared the Community legislation to be incompatible with those rules.

Transposition and Implementation of EIA Directive in some EU Member States (with special emphasis on transport infrastructure cases)

elni Review ◽  
2007 ◽  
pp. 18-24
Author(s):  
Pavel Černý ◽  
Jerzy Jendrośka
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Impact ◽  
Public Participation ◽  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
Transport Infrastructure ◽  
Member States ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
Large Scope

One of the main goals of the Directive 85/337/EEC, on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment (“EIA Directive”), expressed in its Preamble, is to ensure that projects that are likely to have significant environmental impact proceed only after prior assessment of their likely effect on the environment, based on appropriate information supplied by the developer and with proper avenues for public participation. The European Court of Justice (ECD) repeatedly narrowed down the (originally large) scope of discretion of the member states in deciding whether a project shall be subject to EIA or not by requiring the environmental impact assessment for any project which is likely to have serious impacts de facto. Central to this article is a description of the typical and most important gaps of implementation of the EIA directive, emerging from the specific traffic infrastructure cases. Prior to that, some general remarks on the typical characteristics and problems concerning transposition of the EIA Directive are made.

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