scholarly journals Reformasi di Kementerian Pertahanan RI

2016 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Beni Sukadis

AbstrakReformasi bidang pertahanan yang dialami Indonesia sejak disahkan UU Pertahanan Negara dan UU TNI hingga kini belum selesai karena beberapa faktor yang cukup menghambat reformasi ini. Beberapa faktor yang menghambat, yaitu masih ada budaya paternalistik dalam birokrasi, masih ada ketidakjelasan kedudukan antara menteri pertahanan dan panglima TNI dalam pembagian wewenang khususnya terkait hubungan sipil-militer dan kepemimpinan sipil yang lemah dalam mengelola reformasi di Kementerian Pertahanan. Hingga saat ini implementasi supremasi sipil masih samar di Kementerian Pertahanan, walaupun secara faktual menteri pertahanan berasal dari sipil, tapi di sisi lain dominasi militer dalam jabatan pengambilan keputusan masih terjadi. Padahal supremasi sipil seharusnya direpresentasikan dalam wujud nyata bukan hanya dari hanya dari satu posisi pimpinan, yakni bagaimana otoritas sipil secara dominan dapat mengambil keputusan politik yang otonom sesuai dengan kebijakan negara yang dimandatkan oleh UU dan aturan yang ada.Kata kunci: reformasi pertahanan, hubungan sipil militer, supremasi sipil. Defense reform still underway since Indonesia passed the Law on State Defense and the TNI the reform law has not completed yet, because there are many factors that impede the reform process. Some of the factors are the paternalistic culture still exist in the bureaucracy, there is also ambiguity on the relations between the Defense Minister and the Commander of TNI in the division of labor especially to civil-military relations and weak civilian leadership in managing the reform at the Ministry of Defense. Until now, the implementation of civil supremacy within the Ministry is vague, although the ministers are civilian, but in fact the military domination in decision making process remains strong. Whereas, civil supremacy should not be exemplified on the top position, but the civilians authority take the lead in the decision making in accordance to the State Policy as stipulated by the law.Keywords: defense reform, civil-military, civilian supremacy.

2016 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 38-52 ◽  
Author(s):  
Holger Albrecht ◽  
Dorothy Ohl

A few years into the most recent wave of popular uprisings—the Arab Spring—studying regime trajectories in countries such as Syria, Egypt, and Yemen still seems like shooting at a moving target. Yet what has not escaped notice is the central role military actors have played during these uprisings. We describe how soldiers have three options when ordered to suppress mass unrest. They mayexitthe regime by remaining in the barracks or going into exile,resistby fighting for the challenger or initiating a coup d’état, or remainloyaland use force to defend the regime. We argue that existing accounts of civil-military relations are ill equipped to explain the diverse patterns in exit, resistance, and loyalty during unrest because they often ignore the effects of military hierarchy. Disaggregating the military and parsing the interests and constraints of different agents in that apparatus is crucial for explaining military cohesion during such crises. Drawing on extensive fieldwork we apply our principal-agent framework to explain varying degrees and types of military cohesion in three Arab Spring cases: Bahrain, Yemen, and Syria. Studying military hierarchy elucidates decision-making within authoritarian regimes amid mass mobilization and allows us to better explain regime re-stabilization, civil war onset, or swift regime change in the wake of domestic unrest.


2019 ◽  
Vol IV (IV) ◽  
pp. 195-201
Author(s):  
Amna Zulfiqar ◽  
Zahid Yousaf

Civil-military relations in Pakistan are always in search of common ground. Historically, military forces and civilian leadership in Pakistan struggle to find the right balance and the civilian leadership has hardly commanded the gun. This study is intended to analyze that how the two selected daily English newspapers of Pakistan, i.e. Dawn and The News covered the major developments in civil-military relations, particularly during the regime of Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Raheel Sharif, followed by the most sensitive event i.e., Zarb-e-Azb. The study employed the method of discourse analysis and has used the theoretical notion of agenda-setting and framing. The results of the study revealed that the slant, style, themes, and discourses used in the news stories of both the newspapers almost remained the same, appreciating the military institutions positively. Whereas condemning the civilian leadership for their lack of concern towards implementing the already approved Nation Action Plan.


1982 ◽  
Vol 76 (4) ◽  
pp. 778-789 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amos Perlmutter ◽  
William M. LeoGrande

This article is an effort to establish a comparative theoretical framework for the study of civil-military relations in communist political systems. Although the literature on civil-military relations in polyarchic and praetorian polities is theoretically as well as empirically rich, theories of civil-military relations in the field of comparative communism are still at the preliminary stage of development. It is argued that civil-military relations, like all the fundamental dynamics of communist political systems, derive from the structural relationship between a hegemonic Leninist party and the other institutions of the polity. Although the party directs and supervises all other institutions, its political supremacy is necessarily limited by the division of labor among various institutions. The relative autonomy of the military and its relations with the party vary from one country to another and can be described as coalitional, symbiotic, or fused. These relations are dynamic, changing over time in each country in response to contextual circumstances. The role of the military in politics is complex and variegated: on ideological issues, there is usually little conflict between party and army; on issues of “normal politics,” the military acts as a functionally specific elite engaged in bargaining to defend its perceived institutional interests; and in crisis politics, the military is a political resource that various party factions seek to enlist against their opponents.


1996 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 159-182
Author(s):  
Peter D. Feaver

Who décidés and what do they gct to décidé?1 This is the central normative question in civil-military relations theory, and disagrccment over the correct answer is behind much of what passes for the currcnt ‘crisis’ in American civil-military relations. So far. the American answer appears to havc solved tire problem that prcoccupies most comparative civil-military relations theorists: how to keep the military from taking over the governmcnt. Yct American history is rife with civil-military conflict because the American answer Icaves unresolved the other problem inhérent in the civil-military relationship: finding the proper division of labor belween civilian and military institutions, cspccially on use of force decisions.


Author(s):  
Risa Brooks

Civil-military relations are fundamental to the fabric of American politics. Throughout the country’s history, relations among military institutions, the civilian leadership, and American society have experienced periodic challenges and frictions. Since the late 1950s, sociologists, historians, and political scientists have sought to document and analyze these tensions. The issues include the perennial topic of how best to assure civilian control of the military; the nature and consequences of the gaps between American society and the military; the military’s involvement in politics; and the appropriate roles of civilian and military leaders in strategic assessment. This chapter explores these scholarly debates and discusses their practical implications for contemporary American civil-military relations.


Author(s):  
Tughral Yamin

The importance of civil military relations assumes seminal importance in ensuring the success of all phases of a counter insurgency campaign. In the true tradition of the Clausewitzian dictum that war is the continuation of policy and vice versa; Pakistan Army has been employed as a matter of policy in counter insurgency operations in the erstwhile tribal areas. They have also been used in the stabilization operations to bring about normality in the insurgency ridden areas. In fact the employment of Pakistan Army in the stabilization process defies any previous example in any other country. In all phases of the conflict cycle, the military has worked hand in glove with its civilian counterparts. The civil-military coordination (CIMIC) in the insurgency ridden areas has taken place within the framework of the established ground rules of an organized counter insurgency campaign. It would not be unfair to say that the return to normality in the erstwhile FATA has only been possible because of a well-knit CIMIC architecture. This paper briefly explicates the salient points of the CIMIC aspect of the counter and post-insurgency part of the operations in the conflict zones and highlights the importance of this aspect of dealing with insurgencies.


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