The Party in Uniform: Toward a Theory of Civil-Military Relations in Communist Political Systems

1982 ◽  
Vol 76 (4) ◽  
pp. 778-789 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amos Perlmutter ◽  
William M. LeoGrande
Keyword(s):  
Division Of Labor ◽  
The Other ◽  
Political Systems ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Stage Of Development ◽  
Political Resource ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
The Military ◽  
Over Time

This article is an effort to establish a comparative theoretical framework for the study of civil-military relations in communist political systems. Although the literature on civil-military relations in polyarchic and praetorian polities is theoretically as well as empirically rich, theories of civil-military relations in the field of comparative communism are still at the preliminary stage of development. It is argued that civil-military relations, like all the fundamental dynamics of communist political systems, derive from the structural relationship between a hegemonic Leninist party and the other institutions of the polity. Although the party directs and supervises all other institutions, its political supremacy is necessarily limited by the division of labor among various institutions. The relative autonomy of the military and its relations with the party vary from one country to another and can be described as coalitional, symbiotic, or fused. These relations are dynamic, changing over time in each country in response to contextual circumstances. The role of the military in politics is complex and variegated: on ideological issues, there is usually little conflict between party and army; on issues of “normal politics,” the military acts as a functionally specific elite engaged in bargaining to defend its perceived institutional interests; and in crisis politics, the military is a political resource that various party factions seek to enlist against their opponents.

An American Crisis in Civilian Control and Civil-Military Relations?

1996 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 159-182
Author(s):  
Peter D. Feaver
Keyword(s):  
Division Of Labor ◽  
Correct Answer ◽  
American History ◽  
Use Of Force ◽  
The Other ◽  
Civilian Control ◽  
Military Conflict ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
The Military

Who décidés and what do they gct to décidé?1 This is the central normative question in civil-military relations theory, and disagrccment over the correct answer is behind much of what passes for the currcnt ‘crisis’ in American civil-military relations. So far. the American answer appears to havc solved tire problem that prcoccupies most comparative civil-military relations theorists: how to keep the military from taking over the governmcnt. Yct American history is rife with civil-military conflict because the American answer Icaves unresolved the other problem inhérent in the civil-military relationship: finding the proper division of labor belween civilian and military institutions, cspccially on use of force decisions.

scholarly journals Coup-Proofing and Civil War

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jun Koga Sudduth
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
Civil Conflict ◽  
The Other ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Rebel Groups ◽  
The Future ◽  
Face Threats ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
The Military

Political leaders face threats to their power from within and outside the regime. Leaders can be removed via a coup d’état undertaken by militaries that are part of the state apparatus. At the same time, leaders can lose power when they confront excluded opposition groups in civil wars. The difficulty for leaders, though, is that efforts to address one threat might leave them vulnerable to the other threat due to the role of the military as an institution of violence capable of exercising coercive power. On one hand, leaders need to protect their regimes from rebels by maintaining strong militaries. Yet, militaries that are strong enough to prevail against rebel forces are also strong enough to execute a coup successfully. On the other hand, leaders who cope with coup threats by weakening their militaries’ capabilities to organize a coup also diminish the very capabilities that they need to defeat their rebel challengers. This unfortunate trade-off between protection by the military and protection from the military has been the long-standing theme in studies of civil-military relations and coup-proofing. Though most research on this subject has focused primarily on rulers’ maneuvers to balance the threats posed by the military and the threats coming from foreign adversaries, more recent scholarship has begun to explore how leaders’ efforts to cope with coup threats will influence the regime’s abilities to address the domestic threats coming from rebel groups, and vice versa. This new wave of research focuses on two related vectors. First, scholars address whether leaders who pursue coup-proofing strategies that weaken their militaries’ capabilities also increase the regime’s vulnerability to rebel threats and the future probability of civil war. Second, scholars examine how the magnitude of threats posed by rebel groups will determine leaders’ strategies toward the militaries, and how these strategies affect both the militaries’ influence over government policy and the future probability of coup onsets. These lines of research contribute to the conflict literature by examining the causal mechanisms through which civil conflict influences coup propensity and vice versa. The literatures on civil war and coups have developed independently without much consideration of each other, and systematic analyses of the linkage between them have only just began.

The Best of Intentions

2019 ◽  
pp. 222-249
Author(s):  
Anit Mukherjee
Keyword(s):  
Institutional Design ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
History Of ◽  
Conceptual Discussion ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
The Military ◽  
Defense Planning

This chapter examines defense planning in the Indian military. It begins with a conceptual discussion on the role of civilians in defense planning, mainly by examining the experience of other democracies. Next, it describes the history of defense planning in India, focusing on the formulation and implementation of five-year defense plans. There are three main arguments in this chapter. First, effective defense planning requires a close partnership between civilians and the military. Second, defense planning in India is marked by a lack of civilian guidance and institutional discordance, creating friction in civil–military relations. To an extent, this is because of a lack of expertise, on the part of civilians, and an institutional design that creates strong civil–military silos. Third, notwithstanding the above, there have been periodic attempts at reforming defense-planning structures. Progress has been achieved in some sectors, but much remains to be done.

Patterns of militarism in Israel

1993 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 196-223 ◽  
Author(s):  
Baruch Kimmerling
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Present State ◽  
The Other ◽  
Israeli Society ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
The Social ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
The Military

Most of the subjects concerned with Israel, such as the location of the military and militaristic culture, are heavily distorted in comparison to other themes prevalant in the discourse and the debates in the social sciences, very much like the other issues linked with the Jewish-Arab conflict and Jewish-Arab relations (Kimmerling, 1992). Ideological and value loaded considerations blur the issue, making even the usage of the term ‘militarism’ in the canonical textbooks a taboo in Israel. The main purpose of this paper is three-fold: 1) to present a brief survey of the present state of the literature on so-called ‘civil-military relations’ in Israel, from which 2) a revision can be made of the overall impact of the Jewish-Arab conflict and the militarization of Israeli society. This will be followed by 3) a reformulation of the effect of militarization on the institutional and value spheres of the Israeli collectivity.

The Democratizer Army Paradox: The Role of the Algerian Army in Impeded Democratization

2019 ◽  
Vol 54 (7) ◽  
pp. 1033-1047
Author(s):  
Furkan Halit Yolcu
Keyword(s):  
Process Tracing ◽  
The Political ◽  
Political Sphere ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
The Military

The main paradox of the civil–military relations theory has been the protection of the political sphere from the military, which is administered by the politicians. The new dilemma lies under the paradox that occurs when the political sphere is entirely co-opted by the military, which is legitimized through democratization instead of protection of the civilian sphere. The question regarding the continuity of the pathology, the military superiority over the civil administration, has been largely omitted. This study is an attempt to respond to this conundrum related to the continuity of pathological civil–military relations. The main focus is the pathology that occurs when the military is the modernizer or the democratizer in a country. The study uses process tracing to collect the data as research attempts to unravel the rationale behind the continuity of military dominance in politics. In doing so, it will attempt to trace the causality between the lack of democratization and military dominance over politics in the case of Algeria.

The Military and Democratization in El Salvador

1993 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 39-88 ◽  
Author(s):  
Knut Walter ◽  
Philip J. Williams
Keyword(s):  
El Salvador ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Democratic Consolidation ◽  
Political Life ◽  
Military Rule ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Democratic Regimes ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
The Military

The recent coups and attempted coups in Haiti, Venezuela, and Peru serve as a sobering reminder of the military's central role in the political life of Latin America. Earlier assessments of the prospects for democratic consolidation now seem overly optimistic in light of these events. At a minimum, they point up the need to focus on the role of the military during transitions from authoritarianism and the consolidation of democratic regimes. As Stepan has suggested, prolonged military rule can leave important legacies which serve as powerful obstacles to democratic consolidation (Stepan, 1988: xi-xii). Understanding these legacies and the problems they present is essential in developing strategies aimed at democratizing civil-military relations.This is no less true in El Salvador, where the prospects for democratization are closely linked to the future of the country's armed forces.

The False Promise of Self-Reliance

2019 ◽  
pp. 97-136
Author(s):  
Anit Mukherjee
Keyword(s):  
Domestic Industry ◽  
Procurement Process ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Self Reliance ◽  
Conceptual Discussion ◽  
Weapons Procurement ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
The Military

This chapter examines civil–military relations and the weapons procurement process in India. It begins with a conceptual discussion, using illustrations of other democracies, on the role of civilians in weapons procurement highlighting the importance of a constant and “iterative” dialogue between civilians and the military. Thereafter, it analyzes major trends in India’s weapons procurement process, highlighting the inability of state-owned domestic industry to meet the demands of the military. Problems emerge from weaknesses on the part of both civilians and the military. Civil–military relations and the pattern of interaction between them, intrinsic to the absent dialogue argument, accentuate the difficulty inherent in the weapons procurement process.

The Guatemalan Military Since the Peace Accords: The Fate of Reform Under Arzú and Portillo

2005 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 55-85
Author(s):  
J. Mark Ruhl
Keyword(s):  
Political Power ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Institutional Autonomy ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Democratic Control ◽  
Peace Accords ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
The Military

AbstractThe Guatemalan military dominated the country's politics for nearly half a century, but its political power declined during the 1990s. Democratically elected presidents Alvaro Arzú (1996–2000) and Alfonso Portillo (2000–2004) subordinated the armed forces to their authority and thereby gained an unprecedented opportunity to reduce the role of the military and institutionalize democratic civil-military relations. Unfortunately, neither of these tasks was accomplished. An analysis of the level of democratic control, combining Alfred Stepan's military prerogatives indicators with a newer system of measurement and classification designed by Samuel Fitch, shows that the armed forces retained substantial institutional autonomy and de facto legal immunity when Portillo left office in 2004. The role of the military in Guatemalan society, moreover, expanded again under Portillo after declining under Arzú. This study finds that the lack of sufficient civilian commitment to reform, rather than resistance from the armed forces, was the principal cause of these disappointing outcomes.

scholarly journals The Philosophy of the Civil-Military Relations in the Middle East

2021 ◽  
pp. 85
Author(s):  
Vladimir M. Ahmedov
Keyword(s):  
Domestic Politics ◽  
Focal Point ◽  
Middle Eastern ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Arab Countries ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Theoretical Approaches ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
The Military

The Army has played a significant role in the contemporary history of the Middle Eastern states. This fact was determined not only by the frequency of wars and military crises but mainly by the role of the military in domestic politics. In the past few decades, the army and security apparatus presented a focal point of Arabian countries’ politics. The military was the center of the power and decision-making mechanism in Middle Eastern countries. In the 1980–1990-s Arab rulers managed to curb the appetites of their military for power and military coups. Further developments of “Arab spring” proved this tendency wasn’t irreversible. The author studies universal Russian and Western methodological and theoretical approaches and criteria for examining civil-military relations. Based on the given results the author attempted to work out an original model for studying the civil-military relations in the Middle Eastern countries regards specific of its developments and in view of the special characteristics of the Arabic society. The main attention is paid to historical preconditions for the formatting of the armed forces in Arab countries. The author also examines the interaction between politics and military, military and society and tries to show the main reasons behind the army’s seizure of power in many Arab countries from the social, political, and economic backgrounds of military rule. The criteria of the civil control under the military and different approaches for preventing army’s intervention in politics are in the focus of this article. The author stresses the role of the national and religious factors in the system of civil-military relations. The role of the ruler and ruling élites in determining the behavioral patterns of the military are the subject of the author’s investigation as well.

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