scholarly journals The Mask Diplomacy of China in Southeast Asia

2021 ◽  
Vol 1 (1(50)) ◽  
pp. 73-81
Author(s):  
Natalia G. Rogozhina ◽  

The article notes that China's mask diplomacy in Southeast Asia is an integral part of its foreign policy aimed at strengthening its positions in the region by increasing the level of confidence. By providing assistance to Southeast Asian countries in the fight against COVID-19, China hopes to improve its image of a “benevolent” neighbor in the region. At the same time, the priority was given to those countries of Southeast Asia with which the closest relations have developed and which are participating in the Belt and Road Initiative. In the development of the achieved success in mask diplomacy, China is moving to the implementation of the so-called vaccine diplomacy in Southeast Asia. However, despite the currently pronounced humanitarian orientation of China's foreign policy in Southeast Asia, the continuing territorial conflict in the South China Sea plays against its positive image in the region as “generous sponsor”. Time will tell whether mask diplomacy will help China gain an edge in the competition for influence in the region. But one thing is clear – China is acting decisively and does not miss a single chance to provide support for the countries of Southeast Asia in the competition with the United States.

2021 ◽  
Vol 65 (10) ◽  
pp. 91-102
Author(s):  
N. Rogozhina

The choice of the countries of Southeast Asia as an example for analyzing the nature of interaction between developing countries and China within the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative is not accidental. The very logic of China’s stated goals of gaining dominant positions in the world economy and politics makes it inevitable that the countries of Southeast Asia located in geographic proximity to it are included in its long-term economic and political plans. The question, however, is to what extent do they meet the interests of the Southeast Asian countries themselves? The solution to this question is the main subject of research in the article. There are objective prerequisites for mutually beneficial cooperation. The Belt and Road projects are viewed by China as a tool for economic expansion into the region with the prospect of taking a leading position there, using the interest of Southeast Asian countries in the inflow of foreign investment to create modern infrastructure, the lack of which narrows their opportunities for further economic growth, maintaining competitiveness and developing integration ties within ASEAN Community. Expert assessments made by international organizations confirm the positive impact of OBOR projects on the economic development of Southeast Asian countries and although today it is too early to draw any conclusions, since the initiative is only at the initial stage of its implementation in the region, nevertheless the case studies presented in the article indicate a mismatch in the positions of the parties on a number of issues related to the financing of projects, their lack of transparency. non-compliance with environmental and social requirements. The support of the initiative on the part of the Southeast Asian countries does not automatically mean their acceptance of the terms of the agreements proposed by China, which are far from always consistent with their national interests and give rise to fears in society about its expansionist intentions. Therefore, in many Southeast Asian countries, participation in OBOR projects is turning into a subject of political discourse, which reflects the presence of disagreements in society and confrontation of interests regarding the advisability of rapprochement with China, given the associated economic and political risks. The countries of Southeast Asia can be conditionally divided into two groups according to their relation to the Belt and Road initiative. The first group includes Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam and Myanmar, whose position can be described as national pragmatism. While supporting the Chinese initiative in general, they nevertheless assess the possible risks of their participation in projects and seek to reduce them. The second group is represented by Laos and Cambodia, whose leadership unconditionally supports the Chinese initiative, guided by the interests of their own survival, which largely depends on Chinese assistance. Therefore, the prospect of falling into a debt trap and increasing economic dependence on the PRC and even the threat of losing sovereignty does not deter them from participating in highly controversial projects from a commercial point of view. Based on the analysis made, the author comes to the conclusion that, given the existing alignment of political forces in Southeast Asia, China can count on promoting its initiative in the region, which, however, does not automatically lead to an increase in its political influence and to the creation of a China-centric model of regional order. Acknowledgements. The article was prepared within the project “Post-crisis world order: challenges and technologies, competition and cooperation” supported by the grant from Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Russian Federation program for research projects in priority areas of scientific and technological development (agreement № 075-15-2020-783).


2019 ◽  
Vol 01 (02) ◽  
pp. 1950006
Author(s):  
Ralph Pettman

International relations, as currently construed, are multi-dimensional. They are also Euro-American, which means modern-day China had no hand in making them. It was obliged to adapt to the state-centered, marketeering, nationalistic realities with which it was confronted when it became independent. And adapt it did. It also, however, revised these realities by adopting its own approach. Its leaders first repudiated China’s traditional experiences, while reworking its world ones to promote their own ends. Later, however, they began to express admiration for the values and vision of their own culture and civilization. They began to articulate policies, like the Belt and Road Initiative, that were not only representative of Euro-American principles, such as international cooperation and free trade, but also representative of non-Euro-American principles, such as the so-called “tribute system”. The latter characterized China’s foreign policy approach for millennia. It still arguably demonstrates China’s willingness not only to accept — while reforming — those Euro-American practices imposed upon it, but also to repudiate — by revolutionizing — those very same practices.


Author(s):  
А.А. Zabella ◽  
◽  
E.Yu. Katkova ◽  

The article defines the basic postulates of China's peripheral diplomacy and its features. The authors analyze the basics of China's foreign policy, as well as its policy towards the ASEAN. The authors focus on the "One belt, one road" initiative and the Indo-Pacific strategy, as well as the struggle between China and the United States for the loyalty of Southeast Asian countries.


2019 ◽  
Vol 237 ◽  
pp. 196-216 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yoram Evron

AbstractSceptics query China's economic and political ability to realize its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Less attention has been paid to BRI's implications for one of the defining features of China's foreign policy: low engagement in areas beyond its traditional sphere of influence. The Middle East is such a case. Addressing this issue, the article explores the mutual impact of China's low political involvement in the Middle East and BRI's realization. Distinguishing cross-border connectivity projects from other BRI-associated activities, the article examines the challenges to executing BRI-related projects in Israel. It finds that realizing connectivity projects – the essence of the BRI vision – will require China to increase its regional engagement, a shift that it has so far avoided.


2020 ◽  
Vol 02 (01) ◽  
pp. 2050003
Author(s):  
Cahyo Pamungkas ◽  
Saiful Hakam ◽  
Devi Tri Indriasari

This paper aims to describe the reason of China to change its governance of investment mainly the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in Southeast Asia. Although many countries in this region need huge investment to improve and build their infrastructure as well as infrastructure’s connectivity between countries, there is some fear involving China’s investment in the past. These are unintended consequences of China’s investment on environmental, social, and debt-trap in certain poor countries. Nevertheless, there is still hope for better Chinese investment such as consideration of local people’s aspirations and more transparency. At the regional level, the BRI can synergize with local connectivity initiatives, such as the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity (MPAC) and Indonesia’s Global Maritime Fulcrum, and encourage the integration of the ASEAN Economic Community. Different from the previous studies, this paper also uses the historical approach by learning the relation between China and Southeast Asian countries in the past. Our argument is Southeast Asian countries do not need to fear Chinese economic expansions based on history that China is not a political threat in the region. However, China should change the governance of BRI to accommodate the interest of people in Southeast Asian countries.


2020 ◽  
Vol 72 (2) ◽  
pp. 337-355
Author(s):  
Mihajlo Vucic

The topic of this article is the Serbian foreign policy between its main strategic aims - membership in the European Union, and cooperation with China in the framework of the Belt and Road initiative. Serbia bases its foreign policy upon four pillars - the accession process to the EU and three strategic partnerships with great world powers - China, the United States of America, and Russia. However, the accession process to the EU requires from Serbia to strictly follow its obligations from the Stabilization and Association Agreement, Treaty Establishing the Transport Community, and other treaties signed with the EU which might sometimes conflict with project activities from the Belt and Road partnership process. These obligations relate mostly to competition and environmental protection. The author gives the analysis of the main points of possible conflict and indicates a double standard in the EU approach to the Belt and Road initiative. Then he presents arguments that indicate the Belt and Road can serve as a bridge between candidate countries and the EU internal market. The author concludes that although there exist some structural justifications to EU?s skepticism towards the Belt and Road, the best way to overcome them is to insist on political dialogue on many existing levels between the EU and China, with the aim to exchange information between them on EU rules, policies and standards to make sure Chinese investments and other financial activities in Serbia are in accordance with its accession obligations.


Author(s):  
Selina Morell

China published its first White Paper on the Arctic region in 2018, announcing its vision of integrating it as a Polar Silk Road under its Belt and Road Initiative framework. This marked the beginning of an increasingly assertive Chinese presence in the Arctic and indicated that the region has gained strategic significance in Beijing’s foreign policy agenda. This master’s thesis examined whether the inclusion of the Arctic in the framework of China’s Belt and Road Initiative has influenced the Chinese foreign policy approach towards the Arctic countries. If the inclusion of the Arctic did indeed have an impact, this could help to assess the overall influence of the Belt and Road Initiative on China’s foreign policy and gain a better understanding of how China operates in its context.


World Affairs ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 184 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-56
Author(s):  
Emilian Kavalski

The countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) used to be quite buoyant about benefiting from China’s economic largesse. A little over a year ago, China’s cooperation with the region was brandished as a real feather in China’s foreign policy cap. Today, however, the China-CEE cooperation appears to be done with. This development has led many to question whether the China-CEE cooperation has become a victim of the COVID-19 pandemic. The answer provided here is: no, not at all! Most CEE states have been mulling a freeze in their participation for quite some time. In this respect, the pandemic has only accelerated the social distancing of CEE countries from China. The study suggests that the unrequited romance of China with the CEE region has important implications both for the country’s public diplomacy and the post-pandemic trajectories of the Belt and Road Initiative.


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