scholarly journals Le Sommet UE-Afrique 2021 : Quo vadis, compte tenu du Brexit et de la Covid-19

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dirk Kohnert

ABSTRACT & RÉSUMÉ : Every three years, the AU-EU summit reunites African and EU leaders to outline the future direction of cooperation. The 6th summit had been to reaffirm and renew the partnership between the two blocks already in October 2020, but it was pushed back to the first quarter of 2021 or even later due to COVID-19 crisis. Besides, Brussels had to deal with its own post-Brexit situation and its repercussions on EU-Africa relations, excluding the UK. African states, for their part, wanted to renegotiate the EU-Africa partnership and to balance it with new promising Post-Brexit visions of the British premier Johnson about increased economic ties with the African Angloshere. China and other global players compete with the EU and its member states in the new scramble for African resources. Given that Africa is increasingly courted by other partners it could be inclined to successively limit its relations with the EU and see it as a mere provider of aid and security against Islamic terrorism. This trend was reinforced by the fact that the new EU-Africa strategy still hasn't been approved by EU member states. And a timely replacement of the Cotonou Agreement, which expires in November 2021, is open to question. _________________________________________________________________________ RÉSUMÉ : Tous les trois ans, le sommet UA-UE réunit les dirigeants africains et européens pour définir l'orientation future de la coopération. Le 6e sommet devait réaffirmer et renouveler le partenariat entre les deux blocs déjà en octobre 2020, mais il a été repoussé au premier trimestre 2021, ou même plus tard, en raison de la crise du COVID-19. En outre, Bruxelles a dû faire face à sa propre situation post-Brexit, compte tenu l'exclusion du Royaume-Uni, et à ses répercussions sur les relations UE-Afrique. Les États africains, pour leur part, souhaitaient renégocier le partenariat UE-Afrique, et l'équilibrer avec les nouvelles visions post-Brexit prometteuses du Premier ministre britannique Johnson sur le renforcement des liens économiques avec l'Anglosphère africaine. La Chine et d'autres acteurs mondiaux sont en concurrence avec l'UE et ses États membre dans la nouvelle ruée vers les ressources africaines. Étant donné que l'Afrique est de plus en plus courtisée par d'autres partenaires, elle pourrait être encline à limiter successivement ses relations avec l'UE et à la considérer comme un simple fournisseur d'aide et de sécurité contre le terrorisme islamique. Cette tendance a été renforcée par le fait que la nouvelle stratégie UE-Afrique n'a toujours pas été approuvée par les États membres de l'UE. Et un remplacement opportun de l'accord de Cotonou, qui expire en novembre 2021, est sujet à caution.

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dirk Kohnert

ABSTRACT & RÉSUMÉ : Every three years, the AU-EU summit reunites African and EU leaders to outline the future direction of cooperation. The 6th summit had been to reaffirm and renew the partnership between the two blocks already in October 2020, but it was pushed back to the first quarter of 2021 or even later due to COVID-19 crisis. Besides, Brussels had to deal with its own post-Brexit situation and its repercussions on EU-Africa relations, excluding the UK. African states, for their part, wanted to renegotiate the EU-Africa partnership and to balance it with new promising Post-Brexit visions of the British premier Johnson about increased economic ties with the African Angloshere. China and other global players compete with the EU and its member states in the new scramble for African resources. Given that Africa is increasingly courted by other partners it could be inclined to successively limit its relations with the EU and see it as a mere provider of aid and security against Islamic terrorism. This trend was reinforced by the fact that the new EU-Africa strategy still hasn't been approved by EU member states. And a timely replacement of the Cotonou Agreement, which expires in November 2021, is open to question. ________________________________________________________________________ RÉSUMÉ : Tous les trois ans, le sommet UA-UE réunit les dirigeants africains et européens pour définir l'orientation future de la coopération. Le 6e sommet devait réaffirmer et renouveler le partenariat entre les deux blocs déjà en octobre 2020, mais il a été repoussé au premier trimestre 2021, ou même plus tard, en raison de la crise du COVID-19. En outre, Bruxelles a dû faire face à sa propre situation post-Brexit, compte tenu l'exclusion du Royaume-Uni, et à ses répercussions sur les relations UE-Afrique. Les États africains, pour leur part, souhaitaient renégocier le partenariat UE-Afrique, et l'équilibrer avec les nouvelles visions post-Brexit prometteuses du Premier ministre britannique Johnson sur le renforcement des liens économiques avec l'Anglosphère africaine. La Chine et d'autres acteurs mondiaux sont en concurrence avec l'UE et ses États membre dans la nouvelle ruée vers les ressources africaines. Étant donné que l'Afrique est de plus en plus courtisée par d'autres partenaires, elle pourrait être encline à limiter successivement ses relations avec l'UE et à la considérer comme un simple fournisseur d'aide et de sécurité contre le terrorisme islamique. Cette tendance a été renforcée par le fait que la nouvelle stratégie UE-Afrique n'a toujours pas été approuvée par les États membres de l'UE. Et un remplacement opportun de l'accord de Cotonou, qui expire en novembre 2021, est sujet à caution.


Author(s):  
Olha Ovechkina

In connection with the decision to withdraw the UK from the EU a number of companies will need to take into account that from 1 January 2021 EU law will no longer apply to the United Kingdom and will become a "third country" for EU Member States, unless the provisions of bilateral agreements or multilateral trade agreements. This means that the four European freedoms (movement of goods, services, labor and capital) will no longer apply to UK companies to the same extent as they did during the UK's EU membership. The purpose of the article is to study, first of all, the peculiarities of the influence of Great Britain's withdrawal from the European Union on the legal regulation of the status of European legal entities. Brexit results in the inability to register European companies and European economic interest groups in the UK. Such companies already registered before 01.01.2021 have the opportunity to move their place of registration to an EU Member State. These provisions are defined in Regulations 2018 (2018/1298) and Regulations 2018 (2018/1299).British companies with branches in EU Member States will now be subject to the rules applicable to third-country companies, which provide additional information on their activities. In the EU, many countries apply the criterion of actual location, which causes, among other things, the problem of non-recognition of legal entities established in the country where the criterion of incorporation is used (including the United Kingdom), at the same time as the governing bodies of such legal entities the state where the settlement criterion is applied. Therefore, to reduce the likelihood of possible non-recognition of British companies, given the location of the board of such a legal entity in the state where the residency criterion applies, it seems appropriate to consider reincarnation at the actual location of such a company. Reducing the risks of these negative consequences in connection with Brexit on cross-border activities of legal entities is possible by concluding interstate bilateral and multilateral agreements that would contain unified rules on conflict of law regulation of the status of legal entities.


Author(s):  
Federico Fabbrini

This chapter analyses the European Union during Brexit, explaining how the EU institutions and Member States reacted to the UK’s decision to leave the EU. It outlines how they went about this in the course of the withdrawal negotiations. The EU institutions and Member States managed to adopt a very united stance vis-à-vis a withdrawing state, establishing effective institutional mechanisms and succeeding in imposing their strategic preferences in the negotiations with the UK. Nevertheless, the EU was also absorbed during Brexit by internal preparations to face both the scenario of a ‘hard Brexit’—the UK leaving the EU with no deal—and of a ‘no Brexit’—with the UK subsequently delaying exit and extending its EU membership. Finally, during Brexit the EU increasingly started working as a union of 27 Member States—the EU27—which in this format opened a debate on the future of Europe and developed new policy initiatives, especially in the field of defence and military cooperation.


Author(s):  
Richard Maher

Abstract What are the prospects and likely future direction of European integration? Will it be marked by resilience and perhaps even deepening integration among European Union (EU) member states, or will it encounter further instability that could lead to fragmentation and disintegration? The answers to these questions are currently unknown but are important not just for the citizens and countries of the EU but for world politics more broadly. Scholars and other observers have advanced a range of arguments to answer these questions, many of which are derived from the three mainstream theoretical paradigms of contemporary International Relations (IR): realism, liberalism, and constructivism. These arguments reveal disagreement both within and across paradigms over the question of the EU's future. While it is commonly thought that realists are generally pessimistic and liberals and constructivists broadly optimistic regarding the EU's future prospects, it is possible to identify arguments derived from liberal IR theory that the EU faces possibly fatal challenges and realists who see powerful reasons for the EU to stick together, while there are constructivists who think it can go either way. There are thus six basic positions on the future of the EU derived from IR theory. This paper identifies and evaluates a broad range of causal forces that will affect the future of European integration. The paper concludes by discussing the enduring role and value of theory in the study of international relations.


2020 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 146-154
Author(s):  
Ines Kersan-Škabić

The heterogeneity of economic performances in the EU member states is one of the main reasons for the existence of a “core-periphery” relationship. The goal of this research is to examine various economic indicators to reveal possible divisions between the EU members. This issue emphasized the contribution of rich “core” countries to the imbalances in poorer “peripheral” EU members. By applying cluster methodology and considering the most recent data, two groups of countries were identified, the first comprising 11 countries that form the “centre” or the “core”, and the rest of the EU forming the “periphery”. Considering differences between these countries is necessary and justified for discussions about the future development of the EU that will involve differences between member states.


Author(s):  
Jean-Claude Piris

Este estudio surge de los acontecimientos producidos en 2014 y 2015 en Escocia (referéndum sobre la independencia) y en Cataluña («consulta informal» y elecciones autonómicas). En ambos casos, los movimientos secesionistas deseaban que un nuevo Estado nacido de la secesión llegara a ser (según ellos, «siguiera siendo») parte de la UE. Esta convicción les fortalece, ya que la UE es vista como un «refugio seguro », que permite la independencia sin la amenaza de quedar aislado. Los Tratados de la UE ni prevén ni prohiben la división de un Estado miembro. No obstante, para llegar a ser parte de la UE, la región secesionista debería primero ser reconocida como Estado por la comunidad internacional, y específicamente por los 28 Estados miembros de la UE (incluyendo España y el Reino Unido). Esto sería legalmente posible si el nuevo Estado naciera respetando completamente el Estado de Derecho, pero en cambio excluiría un «Estado» que hubiera declarado unilateralmente su independencia violando la Constitución nacional. Así, un nuevo Estado reconocido podría ser candidato a incorporarse a la UE. El autor muestra que debería seguirse el procedimiento del artículo 49 del Tratado de la UE y no el del artículo 48 (enmiendas a los Tratados). Tomando Escocia como ejemplo, el autor describe los pasos legales necesarios que deben darse después de la secesión. Señala que la división de un Estado de la UE ya no debería verse como un asunto estrictamente nacional; dadas sus consecuencias sobre la UE en conjunto y sobre otros Estados miembros, es un asunto que no puede ser ignorado por la UE.This study starts from the 2014-2015 events in Scotland (referendum on independence) and in Catalonia («informal consultation» and regional elections). Secessionists movements in both cases wished that a new State born from the secession would become (according to them «continues to be») part of the EU. That conviction strengthens them, as the EU is seen as a «safe haven», allowing independence without the threat of being isolated. The EU Treaties neither provide for, nor prohibit the partition of a Member State. However, in order to become part of the EU, the secessionist region should first be recognized as a State by the international community, and specifically by the 28 EU Member States (including Spain and the UK). This would be legally possible if the new State was born in full respect of the Rule of Law, but would exclude a «State» having unilaterally declared its independence in violation of the national Constitution. Then, a new State recognised could be a candidate to the EU. The author shows that the procedure of article 49 of the Treaty on EU woud have to be followed (accession of a new State) and not that of article 48 (amendments to the Treaties). Taking Scotland as an example, the author describes the necessary legal steps to be accomplished after the secession. He stresses that the partition of an EU State should not anymore being regarded as a strictly national matter. Given its consequences on the EU as a whole and on other Member States, it is a matter that cannot be ignored by the EU.


2011 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-30 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kees Groenendijk

AbstractSeveral States require immigrants from outside the EU to participate in language or integration courses after arrival. In recent years, some EU Member States made passing a language test (Netherlands and Germany) or participating in a language course (France) a condition for a visa for family reunification for immigrants from certain third countries. Denmark and the UK introduced a similar requirement in 2010. The focus of his article is on three aspects: the political debate, the legal constraints and the effects. Firstly, the development of the pre-departure integration strategies is analyzed. What was the rationale behind the introduction and does is vary between Member States? Secondly, the legal constraints of EU and international law are discussed. Finally, the results of the first studies evaluating this policy instrument are presented. Is pre-departure a good predictor for immigrant’s ability to integrate? Does it actually assist integration, and what are the unexpected or counterproductive effects?


2017 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 84-106
Author(s):  
Tomasz Kubin

Abstract Initially, before the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty, differences in integration between members of the European Communities (EC; later the European Union) were relatively few and usually temporary in nature. The Schengen Agreement, the Maastricht Treaty and the Treaty of Amsterdam, and the possibility of establishing enhanced cooperation meant that the problem was becoming more and more important in the functioning of the EU—both in theory and in practice. The objective of the paper is to show that for several years, along with the stagnation in the deepening of integration between all the EU Member States, differentiation of integration in the EU is progressing very rapidly. The progressing differentiation in the EU is a consequence of mainly two processes: the development of enhanced cooperation and reforms in the eurozone, which are strengthened by the widening of the EU. The article covers the issue of the categorization of differentiation of European Union integration, which constitutes the theoretical framework for further considerations. Specified processes which contribute to increasing the differentiation of the EU are discussed, showing the development of enhanced cooperation in the EU and presenting the reforms of the eurozone. The article concludes with the identification and the consequences of differentiated integration, both those that have already occurred and those that may occur in the future.


Author(s):  
Dionysios Stivas

Currently, the European Union (EU) is dealing with an unprecedented refugee crisis which has been blamed for bringing the process of the EU integration to an impasse. By applying theories of European (dis)integration, this paper assesses the extent to which the current refugee crisis constitutes an impediment to the future of the European Union. This paper’s analysis is constructed around two hypotheses: (1) the refugee crisis triggered Brexit and the failure of the EU’s relocation scheme, symptoms of the EU’s disintegration; (2) the refugee crisis has a dual potential: to simultaneously promote the deeper integration and the disintegration of the EU. To test these hypotheses, this paper examines if and how the refugee crisis is related to Brexit and whether the rebellious reaction of certain EU member states to the implementation of the EU relocation scheme is a sign of reversal in the process of EU integration.


Author(s):  
Ferrarini Guido ◽  
Macchiavello Eugenia

This chapter explores the policy and regulatory issues generated by investment-based crowdfunding in Europe. Firstly, it argues that crowdfunding raises serious investor protection concerns, particularly when directed to retail investors. As governments try to stimulate innovation and the formation of new enterprises, a trade-off is created between investor protection and economic growth. The laws of the EU and its Member States try to solve this trade-off in different ways, as the chapter shows with reference to MiFID and the laws of the UK, France, Italy, Spain and Germany. Secondly, it shows that MiFID II, while enhancing investor protection and furthering harmonization, does not create all the conditions needed for a pan-European crowdfunding market. At the same time, MiFID II narrows the potential for exemptions under which some Member States have adopted special regimes for crowdfunding, therefore restricting the scope for an enabling approach to investment-based crowdfunding at national level.


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