This chapter demonstrates the close interdependence between the regulatory moves of the United States and those of China. Against the backdrop of the bitter Sino-US tech war, it applies game theory analysis of cooperation and conflict to examine the role of antitrust in China’s tit-for-tat strategy against the aggressive US sanctions. The US executive branch has wide discretion in prosecuting foreign businesses and individuals and has strategically used such legal discretion as an instrument of trade and foreign policy against China. China has retaliated in kind by invoking a number of regulatory measures. In particular, the Chinese antitrust authority has flexed its muscles by holding up large mergers between foreign multinationals, amending its antitrust law to allow for high monetary fines and potential criminal liabilities, and threatening to impose heavy sanctions on firms that boycott or refuse to supply key components to Chinese technology companies. As a result, the line between national security and antitrust policy, once belonging to separate spheres, has become increasingly blurred amid growing Sino-US tensions. However, similar to other countries that have applied countermeasures against US sanctions law, China faces significant economic constraints in weaponizing its antitrust law against US businesses.
Stealth Consolidation: Evidence from an Amendment to the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act