"In the Spirit of Partnership" West Germany, the Cold War, and Third World Development Aid Policy

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Katie Henderson
2012 ◽  
Vol 54 (3) ◽  
pp. 612-643 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cyrus Schayegh

AbstractThis paper examines two intertwined processes that shaped post-war Tehran. One was a ravenous demand for electricity, part of a surge in popular expectations for consumer goods and higher standards of living. The other was the construction of the Karaj Dam to meet that demand. Consumerist expectations, especially among Tehran's bourgeoning middle classes, developed together with a West-centered but ultimately global maturation of mass consumer culture, with the cultural Cold War, and with the shaky post-1953 regime's politics of promising higher living standards. The Karaj Dam became possible when that regime frightened its patron—the U.S. administration that dreaded Soviet influence—into helping pay for the project despite reservations in the U.S. Congress and among technical specialists. The dam was not simply a top-down state (or U.S.) project—it was also caused by and in that sense belonged to Tehranis. I draw on archival and published primary sources, images, and secondary literature to tell a story of society-state and domestic-global interactions that characterized many Third World countries. This paper builds on past studies of relationships between the Cold War and Third World development, and of the transnational history of development/modernization. But it transcends their focus on elites, and that of other scholars’ on subaltern victims, and argues that analyses of Third World development and the Cold War must include the middle classes and, conceptually, social history.


2015 ◽  
pp. 97-116
Author(s):  
Benjamin Young

From the mid-1960s to the late 1980s, Seoul and Pyongyang sought to gain international recognition as the sole government on the Korean peninsula. Africa, the site of many newly independent nations during the Cold War, became the primary battleground for this inter- Korean competition. Focusing on North Korean-African relations, this article examines several African dictators who admired North Korea’s alternative brand of socialist modernity, Pyongyang’s exportation of its Juche (roughly defined as self-reliance) ideology to Africa, and African students who studied in North Korea as part of official diplomatic exchanges. Using archival sources from North Korea’s former communist allies, North Korean newspapers, declassified documents from the U.S. Department of State, and interviews with African students who studied in North Korea in the 1980s, I explore an under-researched dimension of North Korea’s diplomatic history and the North Korean leadership’s efforts in Africa to depict the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) as a model of Third World development.


2018 ◽  
Vol 61 (4) ◽  
pp. 1065-1087 ◽  
Author(s):  
MARCO WYSS

AbstractIn Nigeria, Britain asserted its post-colonial security role during and immediately after the transfer of power, and remained responsible for assisting the Nigerian armed forces. While the Americans recognized Nigeria's potential as an important partner in the Cold War, they preferred to focus on development aid. Washington was thus supposed to complement British assistance, while leaving the responsibility for the security sector to London. But with the escalation of the Cold War in Africa, the Nigerians’ efforts to reduce their dependency on the United Kingdom, and Nigeria's growing significance for the United States in African affairs, this Anglo-American burden-sharing was increasingly questioned in Washington. The United States thus eventually decided to militarize its aid policy towards Nigeria. In analysing the militarization of US aid policy towards Nigeria, this article will, first, assess the Anglo-American relationship in the early 1960s; secondly, position Nigeria in American Cold War policy towards Sub-Saharan Africa; thirdly, question the role of military assistance in Washington's policy towards Nigeria and Africa; and fourthly, discover the regional and local factors that influenced policy-makers in Washington and London.


2008 ◽  
Vol 40 (4) ◽  
pp. 597a-597a
Author(s):  
Nathan J. Citino

This article examines Americans' uses of the Ottoman-Turkish past to justify different approaches to “Third World” development. Such invocations exposed tensions within American liberalism and projected them onto Middle Eastern history. One interpretation criticized Tanzimat land reform to emphasize agrarian democracy as the impetus for the development process. Another, reflecting postwar liberals' predilection for elite authority, relegated democracy to the end of that process by embracing Kemalism as its model. The article concludes by arguing that Ottoman historians influenced the modernization paradigm as much as it did them. H. A. R. Gibb and Harold Bowen transmitted Ottoman reform discourses to social scientists through Islamic Society and the West, which the authors based on reform-era writings at a time when archival research was just beginning to transform Ottoman studies. Cold War intellectuals and bureaucrats appropriated their Ottoman predecessors' temporal and spatial perspectives in the effort to manage Third World change


2009 ◽  
Vol 42 (01) ◽  
pp. 181-187 ◽  
Author(s):  
William F. S. Miles

ABSTRACTThis article illustrates the profound learning that occurs—for students and instructor alike—when a class on third-world development attempts to undertake foreign aid. With undergraduate, graduate, and departmental money, I purchased bulls and carts for farmers, and goats for widows, in two West African villages. Such experiential learning personalized for students the study of micropolitics under conditions of poverty, the development of organizational structure, and north-south dependency.


Asian Survey ◽  
1998 ◽  
Vol 38 (11) ◽  
pp. 1051-1066 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven W. Hook ◽  
Guang Zhang

Author(s):  
Sara Lorenzini

In the Cold War, “development” was a catchphrase that came to signify progress, modernity, and economic growth. Development aid was closely aligned with the security concerns of the great powers, for whom infrastructure and development projects were ideological tools for conquering hearts and minds around the globe, from Europe and Africa to Asia and Latin America. This book provides a global history of development, drawing on a wealth of archival evidence to offer a panoramic and multifaceted portrait of a Cold War phenomenon that transformed the modern world. Taking readers from the aftermath of the Second World War to the tearing down of the Berlin Wall, the book shows how development projects altered local realities, transnational interactions, and even ideas about development itself. The book shines new light on the international organizations behind these projects—examining their strategies and priorities and assessing the actual results on the ground—and it also gives voice to the recipients of development aid. It shows how the Cold War shaped the global ambitions of development on both sides of the Iron Curtain, and how international organizations promoted an unrealistically harmonious vision of development that did not reflect local and international differences. The book presents a global perspective on Cold War development, demonstrating how its impacts are still being felt today.


Author(s):  
Ayokunle Olumuyiwa Omobowale

Most of the discourse on development aid in Africa has been limited to assistance from Western countries and those provided by competing capitalist and socialist blocs during the Cold war era. Japan, a nation with great economic and military capabilities; its development assistance for Africa is encapsulated in the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) initiative. The TICAD started in 1993 and Japan has so far held 5 TICAD meetings between 1993 and 2013 during which Africa’s development challenges and Japan’s development assistance to the continent were discussed. The emphasis on “ownership”, “self-help” and “partnership” are major peculiar characteristics of Japan’s development aid that puts the design, implementation and control of development projects under the control of recipient countries. This is a major departure from the usual practice in international development assistance where recipient countries are bound by clauses that somewhat puts the control of development aid in the hands of the granting countries. Such binding clauses have often been described as inimical to the successful administration of the aids and development in recipient countries. Though Japan’s development aid to Africa started only in 1993, by the 2000s, Japan was the topmost donor to Africa. This paper examines the context of Japan’s development aid to Africa by analyzing secondary data sourced from literature and secondary statistics.


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