Microanalysis of the Russia's Pension System

2012 ◽  
pp. 27-51 ◽  
Author(s):  
E. Gurvich ◽  
Yu. Sonina

The analysis is based on the Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS). Individual replacement rates are estimated for the first time. Russian pension system proves to be oriented rather on social policy objectives than on smoothing consumption over the life cycle. The efficiency of pension system happens to be relatively low - for instance, over 1/3 of base pensions is paid to people with income above median level. We give proofs that social policy for working and non-working pensioners should not be the same, as they have drastic differences in the income level. Estimates are given for possible economy of pension system financing if benefits are provided on a more focused basis. A new approach to the analysis of incentives and impediments for raising retirement age is suggested. Its application demonstrates that substantial part of pensioners is willing to work further in exchange for material stimulus. Most likely they would support higher retirement age if they realized that this will result in higher pension benefits.

2019 ◽  
pp. 5-39 ◽  
Author(s):  
Evsey T. Gurvich

Recent decision to raise retirement age in Russia is compared with alternative ways of pension system adjustment to population ageing. We conclude that postponing retirement was superior in terms of public welfare as compared to increasing public spending on pensions or lowering pension size relative to wages. Unlike advanced countries, which apply mainly a combination of higher effective retirement age, less generous pension benefits, and higher pension spending, Russia used various adjustment tools in sequence: sharp decline in pensions to wage ratio in 2002—2007 was followed by a marked increase in pension spending (which hiked almost 3 p.p. of GDP over 2007—2017). Some 2/3 of this growth was attributable to the cut in other spending (mainly “productive”, i.e. growth-enhancing), and 1/3 was financed by a redistribution of income from employees to pensioners. The general decision to raise retirement age thus was fully justified, but its parameters look reasonable only on average. Estimates based on cross-country analysis evidence that retirement age matching healthy life indicators anticipated for Russia would be 63/62 for men/women. Actual decision to increase retirement age to 65/60 maintains sharp gender distortions: the retirement age will remain too low for women and will get too high for men. Fiscal effect of higher retirement age are calculated by comparing pension spending ensuring constant pension to wage ratio under the old and new retirement ages. We find that this effect will stabilize around 3% of GDP in some 10 years after the start of reform. A bulk of this effect is in a sense “virtual”, as it mainly makes possible to evade further increase in pension spending. “Genuine” effect can be estimated as some 1% of GDP — these are public funds saved and available for different purposes, say for supporting programs increasing healthy life expectancy.


2011 ◽  
pp. 4-31 ◽  
Author(s):  
E. Gurvich

The paper suggests measures aimed at raising efficiency and long-term sustainability of the pension system. Pension contribution rate, amount of budget transfer to the pension system, and total size of pension benefits in percent of GDP are found to exceed substantially levels typical for the OECD countries and emerging markets. Our major " bottleneck" is very low by international standards support ratio (i.e. number of contributors to pension fund per pensioner). Increase in the retirement age by 2 years for men and 5 years for women would bring life expectancy at retirement in Russia to the level typical for emerging markets. Provisional gain of the budget from this measure is estimated to vary from 1.4 to 2.3% of GDP. The objective of higher retirement age should be not budget gains but stabilization of replacement rate under forthcoming demographic crisis. Other measures suggested include in particular restoring basic pensions, fixing own sources of funds for each of the pension system tiers, and building barriers for running pension imbalances, and fostering late retirement for working aged.


2008 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 114-134 ◽  
Author(s):  
Helmuth Cremer ◽  
Pierre Pestieau ◽  
Jean-Marie Lozachmeur

Abstract In many countries, pension systems involve some form of earnings test; i.e. an individual’s benefits are reduced if he has labor income. This paper examines whether or not such earnings tests emerge when pension system and income tax are optimally designed. We use a simple model with individuals differing both in productivity and in their health status. The working life of an individual has two ‘endings’: an official retirement age at which he starts drawing pension benefits (while possibly supplementing them with some labor income) and an effective age of retirement at which professional activity is completely given up. Weekly work time is endogenous, but constant in the period before official retirement and again constant (but possibly at a different level), after official retirement. Earnings tests mean that earnings are subject to a higher tax after official retirement than before.We show under which conditions earnings tests emerge both under a linear and under a non-linear tax scheme. In particular, we show that earnings tests will occur if heterogeneities in health or productivity are more significant after official retirement than before.


2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 315-326
Author(s):  
Paweł Trippner

The pension system’s construction is an important element of the public finance system and the state budget policy. It is a relevant and important topic from the perspective of the level of cash benefits for future retirees after they finish their professional careers.The aim of the paper is to present and analyze the evolution of solutions in the construction of the pension system in Poland since its first reform in 1999. The paper analyzes various options of investing for future pensions allowed by law in Poland. Simulations of the levels of future pension benefits are based on different variations, including membership or non-membership in an Employee Capital Plan and membership or non-membership in an Individual Retirement Account after the liquidation of Open Pension Funds.According to the calculations, the future pensioner can count on the total payment from the commercial pillars, assuming the average life expectancy in Poland is reached: PLN 230,100 (Option I), PLN 346,698 (Option II), PLN 187,643 (Option III), and PLN 304,240 (Option IV), respectively.It is an emphasized fact that ensuring the living standard’s expected level after reaching retirement age is strictly dependent on voluntary investments for future benefits during professional activity.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-27
Author(s):  
Markus Knell

Abstract This paper studies how the rates of deduction for early retirement have to be determined in pay-as-you-go (PAYG) systems in order to keep their budget stable. The derivation of these deductions requires the use of a multiperiod intertemporal budget constraint that involves assumptions about the retirement behavior of past, present, and future cohorts. In general, it is not possible to calculate budget-neutral deductions from the budget constraint of a single individual who retires before the target retirement age—an approach that dominates the related literature. Only for specific cases one can use this second approach but then one has to adjust the discount rate to the assumption about collective retirement. If there is only one deviating individual, then the right choice is the market interest rate while for a stationary retirement distribution it is the internal rate of return of the PAYG system. In this case, the necessary deductions are lower than under the standard approach. This is also true for retirement ages that fluctuate randomly around a stationary distribution. Various long-run developments (e.g., increases in life expectancy or permanent changes in the average retirement age) might cause challenges for the sustainability of the pension system. These developments, however, can only be dealt with by adequate adjustments to the basic pension formulas and not by the use of deduction rates.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sarah Lynne Salvador Daway-Ducanes

Abstract This paper analyses the macroeconomic and welfare effects of a higher retirement age within a dynamic overlapping generations framework, wherein exponential discounting and sophisticated quasi-hyperbolic discounting agents coexist in ‘mixed economies’. The transitional dynamics of economic aggregates depend on the proportion of QHD agents, and the extent to which reducing the social security tax rate mitigates crowding-out effects on savings and enables both lower pension contributions and higher pension benefits. Welfare impacts across agent types and cohorts differ accordingly: QHD agents employ the higher retirement age as a commitment mechanism to mitigate the adverse welfare implications of present-biasedness.


2011 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 53-70 ◽  
Author(s):  
GILLES LE GARREC

AbstractIn most industrial countries, public pension systems redistribute from workers to retired people, not from high-income to low-income earners. They are close actuarial fairness. However, they are not all equivalent. In particular, some pension benefits are linked to full lifetime average earnings, while others are only linked to partial earnings history. In the latter case, we then show in this article that an actuarially fair pay-as-you-go pension system can both reduce lifetime income inequality and enhance economic growth. We also shed light on the dilemma between inequality and economic growth in retirement systems: greater progressivity results in less lifetime inequlity but also less growth.


2016 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-59 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hamid Yilmaz ◽  
Mustafa Yilmaz

Purpose – Within team-oriented approaches, tasks are assigned to teams before being assigned to workstations as a reality of industry. So it becomes clear, which workers assemble which tasks. Design/methodology/approach – Team numbers of the assembly line can increase with the number of tasks, but at the same time, due to physical situations of the stations, there will be limitations of maximum working team numbers in a station. For this purpose, heuristic assembly line balancing (ALB) procedure is used and mathematical model is developed for the problem. Findings – Well-known assembly line test problems widely used in the literature are solved to indicate the effectiveness and applicability of the proposed approach in practice. Originality/value – This paper draws attention to ALB problem in which workers have been assigned to teams in advance due to the need for specialized skills or equipment on the line for the first time.


2006 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Annelies Debels ◽  
Hans Peeters ◽  
Gert Verschraegen ◽  
Jos Berghman

Old age protection of flexible workers in Belgium Old age protection of flexible workers in Belgium This article investigates to what extent the Belgian pension system is adapted to the proliferation of a-typical forms of employment. Are there any differences between the old age protection of flexible and non-flexible workers? What are the effects of flexible employment on participation in the three pension pillars and on the level of pension benefits? To answer these questions, the article pursues a double research strategy: an analysis of Belgian legislation and relevant collective labour agreements is complemented with a statistical analysis on the Panel Study of Belgian Households (PSBH). The analyses show that part-time employment results in a lower pension, while other forms of temporal flexibility such as temporary leave arrangements and temporary unemployment do not. In the second pillar we find that contractual and transitional flexible workers are discriminated. Finally, the results indicate that flexible workers do not compensate for lower pension protection through increased participation in the third pension pillar. Our findings suggest that a re-assessment of the system of ‘assimilated’ periods is required, as well as the development of a system of coordinated regulation for the three pension pillars.


2021 ◽  
Vol 21 (4) ◽  
pp. 2692-2701
Author(s):  
Vu T. Tan ◽  
La The Vinh ◽  
Vu Minh Khoi ◽  
Huynh Dang Chinh ◽  
Pham Van Tuan ◽  
...  

For the first time, the BaTiO3 nano-sized particles were obtained through solid-state reaction by employing the titanium oxide nanoparticle. Meanwhile, by using TiO2 with micro-sized particles, the synthesized BaTiO3 shows the micro-sized. The XRD pattern confirms that both BaTiO3 nano-sized and micro-sized particles display the tetragonal structure. Both SEM and TEM analysis revealed that the size of the nano-sized material is in the range of 30–50 nm; in the meantime, the microsized material shows a size of 500 nm. The Eg of both BaTiO3 micro-sized and nano-sized were calculated by using the Kubelka-Munk function. The shifted bandgap of BaTiO3 nano-sized particle is nearly 0.24 eV larger than that of BaTiO3 miro-sized particle due to the particle size effect. The P-E measurement of n-BaTiO3 proved that the obtained BaTiO3 nano-sized is ferroelectric material. The result may provide a new route for the fabrication of barium titanate nanoparticle with ferroelectric properties.


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